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Abstract
This thesis contains three essays exploring the asset pricing implications of asymmetric in-
formation and trading constraints.
Chapter 1 studies how short-sale constraints a¤ect the informational e¢ ciency of market
prices and the link between prices and economic activity. I show that under short-sale con-
straints security prices contain less information. However, short-sale constraints increase the
informativeness of prices to some agents who learn about the quality of an investment oppor-
tunity from market prices and have additional private information. This, in turn, can lead
to higher allocative e¢ ciency in the real economy. My result thus implies that the decrease
in average informativeness due to short-sale constraints can be more than compensated by
an increase in informativeness to some agents.
In Chapter 2, I develop an equilibrium model of strategic arbitrage under wealth con-
straints. Arbitrageurs optimally invest into a fundamentally riskless arbitrage opportunity,
but if their capital does not fully cover losses, they are forced to close their positions. Strate-
gic arbitrageurs with price impact take this constraint into account and try to induce the
re sales of others by manipulating prices. I show that if traders have similar proportions
of their capital invested in the arbitrage opportunity, they behave cooperatively. However,
if the proportions are very di¤erent, the arbitrageur who is less invested predates on the
other. The presence of other traders thus creates predatory risk, and arbitrageurs might be
reluctant to take large positions in the arbitrage opportunity in the rst place, leading to an
initially slow convergence of prices.
Chapter 3 (joint with Dömötör Pálvölgyi) studies the uniqueness of equilibrium in a
textbook noisy rational expectations economy model a la Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). We
provide a very simple proof to show that the unique linear equilibrium of their model is the
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unique equilibrium when allowing for any continuous price function, linear or not. We also
provide an algorithm to create a (non-continuous) equilibrium price that is di¤erent from the
Grossman-Stiglitz price.
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Chapter 1
Short-sale constraints and credit
runs
1.1 Introduction
According to the view of many academics and regulators, short-sale constraints compromise
market liquidity and reduce the informativeness of market prices, while preventing value-
destroying price manipulation and hence severe economic ine¢ ciencies. A press release of
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), issued on the 19th of September, 2008,
clearly illustrates this point. They state that "under normal market conditions, short selling
contributes to price e¢ ciency and adds liquidity to the markets", but argue in favour of
an emergency order that bans short selling, as shorting, observed e.g. after the collapse of
Lehman Brothers, can lead to sudden price declines unrelated to true value. Since nancial
institutions "depend on the condence of their trading counterparties in the conduct of their
core business", if prices can inuence how these institutions are perceived by counterparties
and clients, low prices can have damaging e¤ects on the value of institutions as well. Thus,
providing a oor to asset prices can be benecial.1
In this chapter I examine how short-sale constraints a¤ect both the informational e¢ ciency
1See http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-211.htm. A similar point is reached by the Financial
Services Authority (FSA) discussion paper on short-selling (Financial Services Authority (2009), p.11-12). In
particular, they claim that the negative impact of shorting "reduces the ability of a rm to raise equity capital
or to borrow money, and makes it harder for banks to attract deposits."
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of prices, and the link between prices and economic activity. I show that under short-sale
constraints security prices contain less information. This is consistent with previous work,
and my contribution is to derive a simple closed-form solution of a rational expectations equi-
librium (REE) with short-sale constraints. My main result concerns the feedback to the real
economy. I nd that although prices contain less information, short-sale constraints increase
the informativeness of prices to some agents who have additional private information. This,
in turn, yields an equilibrium of the real economy that has higher allocative e¢ ciency. My
result thus implies that the decrease in average informativeness due to short-sale constraints
can be more than compensated by an increase in informativeness to some agents.
To analyze the informational e¤ects of short-sale constraints, I extend an asset pricing
model with information spillover from the nancial market to the real economy. I use a noisy
rational expectations model of a nancial market with asymmetric information, where noise
comes from a random demand shock, as in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), and I introduce
short-selling constraints on a subset of informed traders. For the real part of the economy, I
consider a distressed nancial institution (e.g. investment bank) that requires outside capital
from multiple lenders or short-term creditors to support its existing positions.2 Creditors,
endowed with dispersed private information about the value of the banks assets, consider
whether to supply capital to this institution. I model bank nancing as game with strategic
complementarities: the bank survives if the amount of capital provided by creditors is suf-
ciently large, and creditorspayo¤ is higher if the bank avoids bankruptcy.3 Besides their
private signals, creditors also observe the price of a traded security. The connection between
the security market and the nancing is provided by the correlation between the payo¤ of
the security and the unknown quality of the nancial institution. Therefore, the price, which
gathers information in the security market, constitutes a public signal to capital providers.4
2There is ample anecdotal evidence about Bear Stearns and Northern Rock not being able to secure short-
term nancing and being the victims of runs by their creditors at the beginning of the 2007-2008 crisis; see, for
example, Brunnermeier (2009) and Shin (2009). Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) show that after the failure of
Lehman Brothers in September 2008, there were runs by short-term lenders on nancial institutions, making
it hard for banks to roll over their short term debt. Moreover, runs on other nancial institutions, such as
investor withdrawals from hedge funds or mutual funds can be viewed as a coordination game among capital
providers, see Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and the vast literature on limited arbitrage.
3 Indirect and direct evidence of coordination motives among creditors have been shown by Asquith et al.
(1994), Brunner and Krahnen (2008) and Hertzberg et al. (2010). Moreover, Chen et al. (2010) document
coordination motives among investors of mutual funds.
4The nancial asset can be interpreted, for example, as a zero-net-supply derivative on the share price of
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The main observation of the model is that even though short-sale constraints decrease the
information content of prices, certain creditors endowed with additional private information
can learn more from asset prices with short-sale constraints than without the constraints. The
idea is that when creditors combine their private signals with the market price to form beliefs
about the state of the world, they also have to assess to what extent a high (low) market price
reects a high (low) fundamental value or a high (low) demand shock, i.e. whether informed
traders buy or whether they (would) short-sell. In presence of short-sale constraints, a high
demand shock increases the price, and informed investors would like to short, but cannot. It
leads to a decrease in the aggregate order ow, which is dominated by noise trading. High
price realizations are hence more noisy and less informative about the true state of the world,
as negative information about fundamentals is less incorporated into prices. Put di¤erently,
a given price realization means lower payo¤ if one believes the constraint binds in the market.
To see the intuition for how prices can provide more information in presence of trading
constraints, consider a creditor who receives a private signal realization higher than the price
she sees. A high signal means that according to her private information, states when the
payo¤ is lower than the price have low probabilities as they are tail events. She knows that if
informed traders (those who can) are shorting, the same price realization corresponds to lower
fundamentals compared to the case without short-sale constraints. But lower fundamentals
have smaller probabilities according to her private belief. Combining these two observations,
she assigns a smaller probability to informed traders shorting the asset than without short-
sale constraints, and thus thinks the asset payo¤ is higher. This reinforces her private signal,
and implies that her posterior can be more precise than without short-sale constraints.
Then I study the e¤ect of short-sale constraints in the security market on the bank
nancing. I show that the presence of short-sale constraints introduces multiple equilibria
in the coordination game, even when private information is arbitrarily precise. This result
stems from the observation that creditors with high private signal learn more from the market
price in presence of short-sale constraints. Indeed, when their posterior variance is smaller,
creditors have more precise assessments about both the banks fundamental and about the
information of other creditors. For every level of private noise precision, when short-sale
the bank, as an industry index that includes the bank, or the price of a security that the bank has on the
asset side of the balance sheet.
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constraints are su¢ ciently tight, they reinstate common knowledge among the subset of
more informed creditors, and lead to self-fullling beliefs and two stable equilibria. I refer to
the rst one, when creditors rely only on their private signals, as the informationally e¢ cient
equilibrium, because in the limit when private signals become very precise, agents ignore the
market price. This equilibrium is equivalent to the unique equilibrium of the game without
short-sale constraints. However, in presence of the constraint there exists a second stable
equilibrium, where creditors with high private signals keep relying on the public signal, if
they know that other creditors with similarly high signals do as well.
Interestingly, in this second stable equilibrium the bank receives more capital than in
the informationally e¢ cient equilibrium, thus they can be called high and low investment
equilibrium, respectively. This is because short-sale constraints only improve the precision of
agents with signals higher than the market price, so they are the creditors who might react
to the newsin short-sale constraints. Intuitively, short-sale constraints can only a¤ect the
equilibrium outcome if there are some creditors who behave di¤erently in the informationally
e¢ cient equilibrium, but due to short-sale constraints learn more about each others action.
Thus it is straightforward that the second equilibrium, whenever it exists, must feature
more capital provision than the informationally e¢ cient equilibrium. Short-sale constraints
improve the information of some agents who would stay out in absence of the constraint, and
create self-fullling beliefs and multiplicity in equilibrium actions among these creditors. This
leads to more investment, banks with lower asset quality remain solvent, and the equilibrium
is closer to the rst best. I conclude that short-sale constraints improve allocational e¢ ciency
by mitigating the adverse e¤ect of the coordination externality. Therefore, if the gain of
short-sale constraints in terms of the increased allocational e¢ ciency of the real economy is
higher (or more important) than the loss in terms of informational ine¢ ciency in the nancial
market, short-sale constraints can be benecial.
The model presented in this chapter is not the rst to highlight the impact of trading
constraints on the allocational e¢ ciency of the real economy. Panageas (2003) and Gilchrist
et al. (2005) study rms investment decisions when they raise capital during asset price
bubbles, when the cost of capital is low due to short-sale constraints. Both studies rely on
the literature initiated by Miller (1977) and Harrison and Kreps (1978), who suggest a link
between the level of belief heterogeneity and inated asset prices (see also Scheinkman and
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Xiong (2003), and Rubinstein (2004) for many more anomaliesassociated with short-sale
constraints). In contrast to these papers, in my model agents are rational, and short-sale
constraints do not inate the price, following the insights of Diamond and Verrecchia (1987).
In particular, in this study security prices in presence of short-sale constraints are lower than
without the constraints, and hence according to Panageas (2003) and Gilchrist et al. (2005)
investment should be lower. My focus is on the information provided by market prices instead
of price levels.
The nancial market model of this chapter is similar to that in Yuan (2005, 2006), who
studies a REE with asymmetric information and constraints on borrowing and shorting. She
numerically shows that, in presence of borrowing restrictions, a higher market price can reduce
uncertainty about the constraint status of informed investors, and that this information e¤ect
can be strong enough to cause a backward bending demand curve. In contrast, the rst part
of this chapter provides a simple closed-form solution of a model that is simplied in one
dimension but allows for more generality in other dimensions.5 Finally, Bai et al. (2006)
and Marin and Olivier (2008) study the e¤ects of short-sale constraints when investors trade
for informational and allocational purposes. In both papers, trading constraints limit the
positions of all informed traders. When the constraints bind, asset prices stop reecting
fundamentals, uninformed investors demand a large discount, and prices exhibit large drops.
Therefore, in these models high prices are more informative than low prices. In contrast,
in models presented here and in Yuan (2005, 2006), only a subset of informed investors are
subject to the short-selling constraint, and uninformed investors need to form beliefs about
the size of the demand shock, i.e. the constraint status of informed investors. The most
important distinction is that short-sale constraints bind for high prices, making them less
informative than low prices.
The model also belongs to the literature on coordination games with strategic comple-
mentarities, developed by Carlsson and van Damme (1993) and Morris and Shin (1998), and
contributes to discussion about the fragile interaction between private and public information
(see, for example, Morris and Shin (1999, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004) and Hellwig (2002)). In
5Also, in a nancial market with wealth- and shortsale-constrained risk-neutral agents and an asset supply
exponentially distributed, Barlevy and Veronesi (2003) present a theory of stock market crashes, where high
asset prices are more informative than low prices.
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particular, Morris and Shin (2001) show that when private information becomes arbitrarily
precise, a coordination game has a unique equilibrium. In the discussion of Morris and Shin
(2001), Atkeson (2001) highlights the potential role of nancial markets as the source of en-
dogenous public information, formalized by Angeletos and Werning (2006). They show that a
unique equilibrium might not prevail, if the precision of the public signal that aggregates pri-
vate information increases faster than the precision of the private signal. Hellwig et al. (2006)
and Tarashev (2007) also study a coordination game with a nancial price as the public sig-
nal, while Ozdenoren and Yuan (2008) and Goldstein et al. (2009) study coordination among
traders in the market. A common element in these papers is that the informational content
of the public signal does not vary across equilibria. In contrast to many previous models, in
the model presented in this chapter the informativeness of the public signal varies across its
realizations. This is similar in spirit to Angeletos et al. (2006). However, in their analysis
the signal is the equilibrium action of a policy maker, whereas in my study the varying in-
formativeness is the result of the asymmetric nature of short-sale constraints. Finally, there
are several papers that highlight the adverse e¤ect of short-selling on allocative e¢ ciency in
the economy and hence argue in favour of short-sale constraints, see for example Goldstein
and Guembel (2008) or Liu (2010). However, to my knowledge, this is the rst model that
explicitly studies the informational e¤ect of short-sale constraints on real economic activity.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the nancial
market. Section 1.3 studies the equilibrium of the nancial market and examines the e¤ect of
short-sale constraints on the equilibrium price. Section 1.4 analyzes the information content
of stock prices with and without short-sale constraints for outside observers. Section 1.5
embeds the credit run model into the economy, and Section 1.6 presents the equilibrium
of the coordination game with the skewed public signal. Section 1.7 discusses the results,
contrasts the ndings with the related literature, and provides some comparative statics and
policy implications. Finally, Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Model
This section introduces the nancial market model. I consider a two-period economy with
dates t = 0 and 1. At date 0 investors trade, and at date 1 assets pay o¤. The market is
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populated by three types of agents: informed and uninformed rational investors, and noise
traders.
1.2.1 Assets
There are two securities traded in a competitive market, a risk-free bond and a risky stock.
The bond is in perfectly elastic supply and is used as numeraire, with the risk-free rate
normalized to 0. The risky asset is assumed to be in net supply of S  0, and has nal
dividend payo¤ d at date 1, that is the sum of two random components: d = f +n. The rst
risky component of the dividend payo¤, f , can be regarded as the fundamental value of the
asset. The second component, n, is thought of as additional noise, preventing agents from
knowing the exact dividend payo¤. The price of the stock at date 0 is denoted by p.
1.2.2 Traders
I assume that the asset market is populated by a continuum of rational traders in unit
mass. Traders do not hold endowments in the risky security. They are risk averse and,
for tractability, I assume that they have a mean-variance objective function over terminal
wealth.6 Agent k, for k 2 [0; 1], maximizes
E [WkjIk]  
2
V ar [WkjIk] ,
where  is the risk aversion parameter, common across agents. The nal wealth Wk =
W 0k + xk (d  p) is given by the initial wealth W 0k plus the number of shares purchased, xk,
multiplied by the prot per share, d   p. Ik is the information set of trader k, and E [:jIk]
and V ar [:jIk] denote the expectation and variance conditional on the information set Ik,
respectively.
Rational investors can be either informed or uninformed. Informed traders, who have a
measure of  and are indexed with k 2 [0; ), observe the realization of the fundamental f
6The mean-variance objective function is equivalent to maximizing exponential (i.e. CARA) utility as long
as the uncertainty faced by traders is Gaussian. With short-sale constraints this is not the case for uninformed
investors, but the model is nevertheless solvable and yields qualitatively the same result as the one dicussed
here.
17
but not n. The other set of rational traders, with measure 1 , and indexed with k 2 [; 1],
are uninformed, and do not observe any (private) signals about f . Instead, all agents of the
model observe the market price p. These assumptions imply that the risk associated with n is
unlearnable for everyone, thus uninformed traders try to best guess component f . Formally,
the information set of informed traders is Ii = ff; pg = ffg, as the price cannot provide
more information about the nal payo¤ than their private observation. The information set
of uninformed traders is Iui = fpg.
Further, I assume that informed traders might be subject to short-sale constraints.7 In
particular, short-sale constraints mean that trader ks stock position is bounded below by
zero, xk  0. Short-sale constraints can be thought of as an extreme case of innite costs
when selling short. I assume that 0  w < 1 proportion of informed traders are subject
to short-sale constraints, and index them by k 2 [0; w), while the remaining, with mass
(1  w), for k 2 [w; ), are unconstrained. When w = 0, none of the informed traders are
restricted from shorting.8 Throughout the chapter, a higher w can be (broadly) interpreted
as higher cost and/or more di¢ cult shorting. This includes regulatory restrictions (such as
the short-sale ban of 2008 or the uptick rule), legal restrictions, search costs for lenders,
rebate rates, costs of derivative trading, and even the amount of institutional trading in the
market.9 As agents inside the di¤erent investor classes are identical, I drop the subscript k
from now on.
Finally, there are noise traders in the market, whose trading behavior is not derived from
utility maximization. Noise traders simply buy u shares. I will refer to their trade order as
demand shock.10
Regarding the distribution of random variables, I assume that fundamental f is drawn
7For simplicity, I assume that uninformed traders are not subject to short-sale constraints. Such an
extension would only a¤ect the equilibrium price level by inuencing the demand of uninformed traders, but
would not change the information content of the market price.
8The qualitative results of the model do not depend on the exact proportions of the three di¤erent trader
classes. The cardinal question is whether w = 0 or w > 0. As discussed later, the assumption w < 1 impies
that there are always unconstrained informed traders, the stock price always reects the fundamental f up to
some noise, and the equilibrium stock price does not exhibit a jump.
9See the Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10a-1, Almazan et al. (2004), Du¢ e et al. (2002),
Jones and Lamont (2002), Ofek and Richardson (2003), and Nagel (2005), respectively, for these proxies on
the di¢ culty of short-selling.
10As it is standard in models with informational heterogeneity, the presence of noise trading u makes sure
that the price does not reveal f perfectly, and hence the Grossman-Stiglitz paradox does not apply.
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from an improper uniform distribution on the real line. The unlearnable noise component is
given by n  N  0; 2n =  1n , and the demand shock is given by u  N  0; 2u =  1u , where
2x denotes the variance of random variable x, and x denotes its precision. Throughout the
chapter  (:) denotes the probability density function (pdf) of a standard normal distribution,
 (:) is its corresponding cumulative distribution function (cdf), and  1 (:) is the inverse of
the cdf.
1.2.3 Equilibrium concept
I dene an equilibrium of the nancial market as follows.
Denition 1 A rational expectations equilibrium (REE) of the asset market is a collection
of a price function P (f; u), and individual strategies for constrained informed, unconstrained
informed and uninformed traders, xc (f; p), xuc (f; p), and xui (p), respectively, such that
1. demand is optimal for informed traders:
xc (f; p) 2 arg max
x2R+
E [W cjf ]  
2
V ar [W cjf ] , (1.1)
and
xuc (f; p) 2 arg max
x2R
E [W ucjf ]  
2
V ar [W ucjf ] ; (1.2)
2. demand is optimal for uninformed traders:
xui (p) 2 arg max
x2R
E

W uijP (f; u) = p  
2
V ar

W uijP (f; u) = p ; (1.3)
3. market clearing:
wxc (f; p) + (1  w)xuc (f; p) + (1  )xui (p) + u = S, (1.4)
Conditions (1:1)-(1:4) dene a competitive noisy rational expectations equilibrium for
the trading round. In particular, condition (1:1) states that individual asset demands are
optimal for informed traders subject to short-sale constraints, conditioned on their private
information. Similarly, condition (1:2) states that individual asset demands are optimal
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for informed traders with no restriction on shorting, given their private information. Also,
condition (1:3) states that individual asset demands are optimal for uninformed traders,
conditioned on any information they infer from the price. Finally, (1:4) imposes that the
asset market clears: aggregate demand equals supply.
1.3 Equilibrium in the nancial market
This section solves for the equilibrium of the trading round and studies the informational
e¤ects of short-sale constraints on market prices. The model is solved in the general case
with w  0, then I contrast the results for w = 0 and w > 0, that is in absence and presence
of short-selling constraints, respectively.
Given the optimization problems (1:1), (1:2) and (1:3), optimal demands are the following:
an unconstrained informed trader submits demand function
xuc (f; p) =
f   p
2n
, (1.5)
a short-sale constrained informed trader demands
xc (f; p) = max

f   p
2n
; 0

= 1fp
f   p
2n
, (1.6)
and an uninformed trader demands
xui (p) =
E [f jP = p]  p
 (V ar [f jP = p] + 2n)
. (1.7)
Solving for equilibrium requires three fairly standard steps. First, I postulate a REE
price function. Given the price, I derive the optimal demand of uninformed traders. Finally,
I show that the market indeed clears at the conjectured price.
I conjecture the equilibrium price of the form
P = f +
8<: A (u  C) if u  CB (u  C) if u > C , (1.8)
with constants A, B and C to be determined in equilibrium, where A;B > 0.
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Uninformed agentsinformation set is given by I = fP (f; u) = pg. They observe neither
f , nor u, only the price realization p; and they know that in equilibrium this is a piecewise
linear function of the two unknown variables, described in (1:8). From the price realization
p they form a probabilistic estimate about the fundamental f , while also guessing whether
short-sale restrictions bind for constrained traders. Given the conjectured price function (1:8)
and the Gaussian distribution of u, uninformed investorsposterior is characterized by the
conditional probability density function
g (f jP = p) = 1f<pg (f jP = p) + 1fpg (f jP = p) (1.9)
=
1
Bu
1f<p

f   (p+BC)
Bu

+
1
Au
1fp

f   (p+AC)
Au

,
where I use that for any X random variable with density function gX (x) and a ' (:) contin-
uous, di¤erentiable, and injective transformation, the density function of Y = ' (X) is given
by
gY (y) = gX
 
' 1 (y)
 ' 10 .
The above density function in turn allows uninformed traders to compute the conditional
expectation and variance of payo¤ f given p:
E [f jP = p] = p+D and V ar [f jP = p] = E  D2, (1.10)
where
D   A
CZ
 1
(u  C) (u) du B
1Z
C
(u  C) (u) du, and
E  A2
CZ
 1
(u  C)2  (u) du+B2
1Z
C
(u  C)2  (u) du.
The conjectured REE price function must equate demand and supply for each possible
resolution of f and u. Substituting the optimal demands (1:6) (1:7) into the market clearing
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condition (1:4) gives
w1fp
f   p
2n
+ (1  w)f   p
2n
+ (1  ) p+D   p
 (E  D2 + 2n)
+ u = S,
where the resulting coe¢ cients must equal the conjectured A, B and C, which leads to the
following result:
Theorem 2 A piecewise linear REE of the model exists in the form
P = f +
8<: A (u  C) if u < CB (u  C) if u  C , (1.11)
where
A =
2n

and B =
2n
(1  w) ,
and C is the solution of
0 = L (C)  C + 1  

D (C)
E (C) D2 (C) + 2n
  S. (1.12)
The omitted technicalities are provided in the appendix.
To see why the model has such an elegant solution, regardless of the distributional as-
sumptions on n and u, notice that the demand of uninformed traders is constant, independent
of the price p:
xui =
E [f jP = p]  p
 (V ar [f jP = p] + 2n)
=
D
 (E  D2 + 2n)
.
It is due to the di¤use prior assumption, which implies that uninformed traders have only
one source of information, namely the market price. Thus, a change in the price p is fully
o¤set by a change in their expectation E [f jp], while the precision of their information, given
by V ar [f jp], remains constant. Hence, the di¤use prior assumption makes the the inference
problem of uninformed traders trivial, and simplies the analysis relative to Yuan (2005,
2006).
To see the intuition behind the piecewise linear structure and the presence of a kink
at u = C, consider the aggregate demand of informed investors, given by wxc (f; p) +
(1  w)xuc (f; p), for the price p being close to fundamental payo¤ f . As long as p  f ,
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the short-selling constraint does not bind, and a unit mass of informed investors are present
in the market, submitting a total demand of (f   p) =A. However, for price and fundamental
realizations such that p > f , some informed traders are barred from the market, and in-
formed investorsaggregate demand is (1  w) (f   p) =A, less in absolute terms. It implies
that when p > f , a less aggressive informed demand meets the residual demand, dened as
the demand of uninformed traders, plus the demand of noise traders, minus the asset supply,
i.e. u + xui   S, which is simply a linear function of the demand shock u. Therefore, the
equilibrium price is more sensitive to large demand shocks, implying B  A, and is a linear
function of state variables f and u, conditional on both the constraint binding or not.
Figure 1-1 illustrates the main result of this section. The graph shows the asymmetric
change in the equilibrium price due to the presence of short-sale constraints. When shorting
is allowed (left panel), the slope of the price p as a function of demand shock u is the same for
every realization of the shock. When shorting is prohibited (right panel), the price function
is steeper for large demand shocks than for small (negative) demand shocks. It means that
when the constraint binds for some speculators, a small increase in the demand shock has
a larger upward price impact. Thus, the price reveals information about the payo¤ f at
di¤erent rates in the two regions: it provides more information when the constraint does not
bind, i.e. the demand shock is low, and less information, when the constraint does bind, i.e.
the demand shock is high.
1.3.1 Properties of the equilibrium price
The rest of the section illustrates how certain properties of the equilibrium price change due
to short-sale constraints. In order to determine the direct e¤ect of introducing short-sale
constraints in a market, one can compare conditional moments of the fundamental f . My
main focus is on the information content of the price, illustrated by the conditional variance
and skewness. All the results are proven in the Appendix.
Notice rst that A = 2n= does not depend on w. Let Bw, Cw, Dw and Ew denote
the equilibrium constants B, C, D and E as a function of the w proportion of short-sale-
constrained informed traders. Similarly, one can dene Pw to be the equilibrium price function
as a function of w, for given f and u realizations and with the corresponding equilibrium
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coe¢ cients Bw and Cw. The absence of short-sale constraints, i.e. w = 0, implies A = B0 =
2n=, and solving for the equilibrium price, (1:12) yields
C0 =
+ A2u
1 + A2u
S.
If the asset is in positive net supply, S > 0, C0 is positive, and D0 = AC0 > 0, which
means that uninformed investors expectation about the asset payo¤ is above the market
price, E [f jP0 = p] = p + D0 > p, and they demand a discount of D0 > 0 to hold the asset.
The equilibrium price thus becomes
P0 (f; u) = f +A (u  C0) , (1.13)
which implies a conditional second moment of
V ar [f jP0 = p] = A22u. (1.14)
As (1:9) shows, in the presence of short-sale constraints, the conditional distribution
changes because of the di¤erent impact of the demand shock on the price for high and low
prices, that is when the constraint binds or not. The following proposition compares the
informativeness of market prices with and without short-sale constraints:
Proposition 3 Short-sale constraints lead to a decrease in price informativeness, which is
dened as the inverse of the conditional variance of the payo¤. Formally, for any price
realization p,
V ar [f jPw = p] > V ar [f jP0 = p] . (1.15)
Condition (1:15) shows that short-sale constraints increase uninformed tradersperceived
uncertainty about the asset payo¤, because they decrease the information content of the
market price for high demand shock realizations.11 Uninformed investors demand a larger
discount for this increase in uncertainty, implying Dw > D0.
11The increase in the conditional variance is present in Bai et al. (2006) and Marin and Olivier (2008) as
well, but, as discussed shortly, in those models short-sale constraints decrease the information content of the
market price for low price realizations.
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It is also interesting to see the implications of short-sale constraints on the equilibrium
price volatility. From equations (1:11) and (1:13) one can obtain
V ar [Pwjf ] = Ew  D2w and V ar [P0jf ] = A22u.
Comparing the volatility with and without short-sale constraints gives the following result:
Proposition 4 Short-sale constraints lead to an increase in price volatility:
V ar [Pwjf ] > V ar [P0jf ] .
This nding is in line with previous empirical results. Indeed, Ho (1996) nds an increase
in stock return volatility when short sales were restricted during the Pan Electric crisis in the
Singapore market in 1985-1986. Boehmer et al. (2009) document a sharp increase in intraday
volatility during the September 2008 emergency order.
The asymmetric e¤ect of short-sale constraints on prices and price informativeness can
be easily tested by analyzing return skewness. In the static model presented here, one can
dene two returns. Following Bai et al. (2006), I dene the announcement-day return of the
stock as the dollar return made between the trading round, date 0, and the nal date 1,
and the market return as the return made between a hypothetical date  1, before trading
commences, and date 0. For simplicity, I assume that the price at this date  1, denoted by
p 1 is constant. Formally, the announcement-day return is given by r (f; u) = f   P (f; u),
and the market return is given by R (f; u) = P (f; u)  p 1.
Hong and Stein (2003) argue that short-sale constraints can lead to negative skewness
in stock returns, which they relate to market crashes. On the empirical side, Reed (2007)
documents that under short-sale constraints, the distribution of announcement day stock
returns is more left-skewed. He also reports that returns have larger absolute values, when
short-selling is constrained. Calculating properties of the announcement-day return with and
without short-sale constraints gives the following results:
Proposition 5 Short-sale constraints lead to more negatively skewed announcement-day re-
turns:
Skew [rw (f; u)] < Skew [r0 (f; u)] ,
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and an increase in the absolute value of returns:
E [jrw (f; u)j] > E [jr0 (f; u)j] .
The intuition for the negative skewness and is that short-sale constraints impede the
negative information to be incorporated into the price, which leads to larger realized losses
when the nal payo¤ becomes public knowledge. Market prices reect positive information
more, and hence announcement day returns are smaller in this case. Moreover, absolute
returns increase simply because losses become larger.
Regarding empirical evidence, Bris et al. (2007) nd that in markets where short-selling is
either prohibited or not practiced, market returns display signicantly less negative skewness.
Analyzing market returns with and without short-sale constraints gives the following result:
Proposition 6 Short-sale constraints lead to less negatively skewed market returns:
Skew [Rw (f; u)] > Skew [R0 (f; u)] .
Because of short sale constraints, negative information is less incorporated to the mar-
ket price and hence downward price movements and negative market returns are smaller in
markets where shorting is prohibited.
To conclude this section with a technical sidenote, it is interesting to mention that there
are di¤erences in the asset pricing implications of two branches of asymmetric information
models with portfolio constraints. The rst type of these models includes Bai et al. (2006)
and Marin and Olivier (2008). In both of these papers, noise in the market (from the point
of view of uninformed traders) comes from the unknown endowment of insiders, and trading
constraints limit the positions of all informed traders. These assumptions have two implica-
tions: the constraint status of informed investors can be directly inferred from the equilibrium
price, and the constraint for insiders is binding for low prices. Therefore, in these models,
high prices are more informative than low prices. The model presented here belongs to the
other branch, together with Barlevy and Veronesi (2003), and Yuan (2005, 2006). In these
studies noise arrives to the market from noise tradersdemand or random supply, and only
a subset of informed investors are subject to the short-selling constraint. Importantly, un-
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informed traders have to guess the probability that the constraint binds, and the constraint
binds for high prices. Therefore, low prices are more informative than high prices.12
1.4 Short-sale constraints and conditional variance
According to the prevailing view, the introduction of short-sale constraints reduces the infor-
mativeness of the market price, which is conrmed by the analysis of the previous section.
Indeed, (1:15) states that the perceived uncertainty of uninformed traders increases with a
partial ban on shorting. This section investigates the e¤ect of short-sale constraints, when
an outside observer (e.g. a creditor from Section 1.5) with additional private information
tries to learn from the market price. I show that in presence of short-sale constraints the
information content of the market price (which constitutes a public signal) varies with the
private signal of this agent. In particular, if this information content is measured by the
variance conditional on the private and the public signal, then it is a non-monotonic function
of the private signal. Moreover, for some private signal realizations the conditional variance
is lower in presence of short-sale constraints than for the same private signal in absence of
the constraint.
First, I restate the equilibrium price provided in (1:11), with the emphasis on the infor-
mation content of the price, characterized by the pdf of the payo¤, conditional on observing
only the market price p:
Proposition 7 A piecewise linear REE of the nancial market exists with
P = f +
8<: A (u  C) if u < CB (u  C) if u  C,
where the equilibrium constants A, B  A, and C are uniquely determined. Moreover,
conditional on the price observation, the payo¤ f is only locally Gaussian, with a jump
12The model presented in this paper here does not cover the w = 1 case, which is the subject of Bai et al.
(2006) and Marin and Olivier (2008). When the constraint binds, the aggregate demand of all rational traders
would be price-inelastic, and hence no price could clear the market with the random noise trading.
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around the price realization p:
g (f jP = p) = 1
Bu
1f<p

f   (p+BC)
Bu

+
1
Au
1fp

f   (p+AC)
Au

. (1.16)
When w = 0, that is A = B, the conditional distribution simplies to a normal distribution:
g (f jP0 = p) = 1
Au


f   (p+AC0)
Au

.
Figure 1-2 illustrates the distribution of f conditional on the market-clearing price p in
absence and presence of short-sale constraints. The left panel shows that the distribution
without short-sale constraints is normally distributed with mean p+AC0 and precision Au 
1=
 
A22u

. The right panel shows that under short-sale constraints the distribution is only
locally normal, but not globally. For states of the world when the constraint does not bind,
i.e. f  p, it is normally distributed with mean p + AC and precision Au. For states
of the world when the constraint binds in the nancial market, i.e. f < p, it is normally
distributed with mean p+BC and precision Bu  1=
 
B22u

. The variance increases, that
is the precision decreases, because in this case there is less informed trading in the market.
Consider now a creditor who, besides observing the market price realization p, is also
endowed with private signal t. For the tractability of the analysis, I assume that this private
signal is given by t = f + , where   N  0; 2t =  1t .
Suppose rst that there are no short-sale constraints in the market. Due to the jointly
Gaussian distribution of f , t and p, the inference problem of the agent is simple: her posterior
about the f is normally distributed with mean  t t+Au t +
Au
 t+Au
(p+AC0) and precision
 t + Au. That is, her conditional pdf is given by
g (f jt; P0 = p) = 1
( t + Au)
 1
0@f  
h
 t
 t+Au
t+ Au t+Au (p+AC0)
i
( t + Au)
 1=2
1A , (1.17)
and due to the characteristics of normal distributions, her conditional variance is independent
of the private signal realization t:
V ar [f jt; P0 = p] = ( t + Au) 1 .
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Consider now the case with short-sale constraints. A creditor must combine her private
signal t, which is normally distributed, with the public signal p, whose distribution is only
locally normal, given in (1:16). A simple application of Bayesrule implies that her posterior
becomes
g (f jt; P = p) =   g (f jt; P = p; f < p) + (1  )  g (f jt; P = p; f  p) , (1.18)
where   Pr (f < pjt; p) and 1     Pr (f  pjt; p) are the probabilities the agent assigns
to the constraint binding or not, respectively, and the conditional pdfs g (f jt; P = p; f < p)
and g (f jt; P = p; f  p) belong to truncated normal distributions on the respectable ranges
f < p and f  p. In particular,
g (f jt; P = p; f < p) = 1f<p 1
( t + Bu)
 1=2

 
f  tt+Bu(p+BC)
t+Bu
( t+Bu)
 1=2
!

 
p  tt+Bu(p+BC)
t+Bu
( t+Bu)
 1=2
!
is the pdf of a truncated normal distribution with mean  t t+Bu t +
Bu
 t+Bu
(p+ CB) and
precision  t+Bu, because if the short-sale constraint binds in the nancial market, the price
equals p = f +B (u  C). Similarly,
g (f jt; P = p; f  p) = 1fp 1
(Au +  t)
 1=2

 
f  tt+Au(p+AC)
t+Au
( t+Au)
 1=2
!
1  
 
p  tt+Au(p+AC)
t+Au
( t+Au)
 1=2
!
is the pdf of a truncated normal distribution with mean  t t+Au t +
Au
 t+Au
(p+AC) and
precision  t + Au, because if the short-sale constraint does not bind in the nancial market,
the price equals p = f +A (u  C).
The conditional variance of a creditor in presence of short-sale constraints, as a function of
the private signal t is illustrated on Figure 1-3. In general, the computation of this conditional
variance becomes analytically intractable, but Figures 1-4 and 1-5 help to understand the
intuition behind it.
Let us x p, and consider two special cases. First, suppose that the creditor receives a
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much higher private signal, i.e. t!1. As it implies
lim
t!1 = Pr (f < pjt; p) = 0 and limt!1Pr (f  pjt; p) = 1,
the creditor is sure that the constraint does not bind in the nancial market, which implies
that all informed traders trade, and hence the precision of the price signal is Au. Therefore,
the posterior precision of the information available to her is given by  t + Au, as if there
were no short-sale constraints in the market at all. Figure 1-3 illustrates that in this case the
conditional variances do not di¤er with and without the constraint.
Suppose now that the creditor receives a private signal much lower than the market price,
i.e. t!  1. It implies that
lim
t! 1 = Pr (f < pjt; p) = 1 and limt! 1Pr (f  pjt; p) = 0,
hence she is sure that the constraint binds in the nancial market, which implies that only
a subset of informed traders trade, and hence the precision of the price signal is Bu, lower
than without the short-sale constraints. Therefore, the posterior precision of the information
available to her is given by  t+Bu, again lower than without the constraint. Put it di¤erently,
her posterior variance, as illustrated on Figure 1-3, increases. Thus, short-sale constraints
decrease price informativeness for agents with private signals much smaller than the price
realization.
Finally, consider the cases when the two signals are close to each other. Figures 1-4
and 1-5 illustrate the change in the conditional distribution due to short-sale constraints
for a creditor with a private signal greater than the price, t > p, and for a creditor with a
private signal smaller that the price, t < p, respectively. Contrasting the signal distributions
without and with short-sale constraints, it is easy to see that when t > p, the introduction
of short-sale constraints means that the creditor puts smaller weights on low payo¤ states
of the world that she would consider unlikely based only on her private signal. The reason
for this is that when constraint binds in the security market, i.e. when f < p, the demand
shock is amplied due to the short-sale constraint. Therefore, the same price realization
means a lower fundamental. However, if t > p, the private signal of the creditor suggests that
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the fundamental is high, thus low fundamental states are even more improbable. The agent
knows that the market price is more likely to contain more positive information in general,
therefore she becomes more certain about the payo¤ being high. Short-sale constraints hence
conrm and strengthen her private information, as Figure 1-4 suggests. When t ! 1, this
e¤ect gets weaker, and in the limit disappears. Hence, for t ! 1, short-sale constraints do
not alter the conditional distribution, and thus the conditional variance is not a¤ected either.
When t < p, the opposite e¤ect arises. Comparing the signal distributions without and
with short-sale constraints, when t < p, the introduction of short-sale constraints means
that the creditor puts larger weights on states of the world that she thought to be unlikely
based on her private signal. That is, short-sale constraints force the agent to consider some
previously irrelevant states of the world. She knows that the market price is more likely to
contain more positive information in general, therefore when her private signal is below the
price realization, her uncertainty about whether the constraint binds in the nancial market
increases, and hence her uncertainty about the payo¤ increases, too. Short-sale constraints
dispute her private information, and hence weaken her posterior precision, as Figure 1-5
suggests. When t !  1, this e¤ect gets weaker, and in the limit disappears. However, the
agent becomes certain that the constraint binds, and in this case the precision of the price
signal is lower. Hence, for t !  1, short-sale constraints alter the conditional distribution
by a¤ecting its precision, and thus the conditional variance increases.
As the following proposition states, short-sale constraints can increase the information
content of the price for high enough private signal realizations, measured by the variance
conditional on the private and the public signal:
Proposition 8 There exists constant t such that the posterior variance of the asset payo¤
conditional on observing price p and private signal t, V ar [f jt; p], is lower under short-sale
constraints (i.e. when w > 0 or B > A), if and only if t   p  t. The threshold t is a
decreasing function of w, and limt t = 0.
The following section studies how this non-monotonic change in the conditional variance
due to short-sale constraints a¤ects coordination in a game with strategic complementarities.
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1.5 Economy with a nancial market and creditors
This section extends the previous setup by embedding a coordination game between dates
0 and 1. Suppose that a nancial institution (e.g. investment bank, or bank, for short) is
nanced through a combination of short-term and long-term debt. Long-term debt holders
are passive - in the past they have decided to provide capital that cannot be withdrawn.
Short-term debt matures at date t = 1, on which occasion it can be renewed.
The state of fundamentals is characterized by  that is interpreted as the cash-ow the
banks assets generate at date 1. Higher values of  correspond to higher quality/liquidity
projects. I assume that the bank has outstanding debt with size normalized to 1, from which
the short-term debt amounts to ! and the long-term debt is 1  !. Short-term debt holders
(creditors, for short from now on) can decide to roll over their debt. For simplicity, I assume
that the banks assets generate su¢ ciently large cash-ows in the long run, but they only
have  to pay out creditors who demand capital payo¤ at date 1. Therefore, the bank remains
solvent if and only if   ! (1  I), where I denotes the proportion of creditors who roll over,
and hence ! (1  I) is the amount to be paid out to creditors who recall their loans.
Creditors are a continuum of risk-neutral agents with measure one, and indexed by j 2
[0; 1].13 Each creditor can choose between two actions. They either provide capital (i.e. roll
over the short-term debt), ij = 1, the risky action, or refrain from doing so (i.e. recall the loan
or withdraw money), ij = 0, the safe action. The net payo¤ from withdrawing is normalized
to zero. The net payo¤ from lending to the bank is 1  c if the bank remains solvent and  c
otherwise, where c 2 (0; 1) parametrizes the private costs of lending, which can be interpreted,
for example, as transaction costs, administrative fees, or taxes.14 It follows that the payo¤
of creditor j is
U (ij ; I; ) = ij
 
1!(1 I)   c

, (1.19)
13The security market and debt market (i.e. the capital provision environment of creditors) are assumed to
be segmented markets, that is the asset price is fully exogenous from the point of view of creditors, and hence
it does not incorporate their private information, as in Angeletos and Werning (2006). See the discussion
later.
14As creditors are assumed to be risk-neutral, this setting is equivalent to any set of payo¤s fH ; L; 0g,
where providing capital pays either H in case of the bank remaining solvent and L < H in case of failure,
while recalling the loan gives a sure payo¤ 0 that satises L < 0 < H . The utility of a creditor in this
setting would simply be a linear function of the utility given in (1:19), and hence would lead to the same
optimal action.
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where 1!(1 I) is the indicator of the bank remaining solvent, and takes the value of 1 if
  ! (1  I) and 0 otherwise.15
If creditors know the value of  perfectly before making their decision, there exist a
tripartite classication of the state, in the spirit of Obstfeld (2004). Based on this, the optimal
strategy of creditors is as follow: If   0, then the dominant strategy is to withdraw deposits
from the bank, irrespective of what other capital providers do, because the bank always fails.
In turn, if   !, then the dominant strategy is to give money to the bank, irrespective of
what other creditors do, because it always remains solvent. When the bank asset value 
lies in the interval (0; !), there is a coordination problem among capital providers. On one
hand, if every other creditor rolls over the debt, the bank survives, and lending yields more
than withdrawing: 1  c > 0. On the other hand, if every other creditor withdraws, the bank
fails, and withdrawing yields more than nancing the bank: 0 >  c. Therefore, both I = 1
and I = 0 is an equilibrium whenever  2 (0; !): the former outcome represents the rst
best, while the latter is considered a coordination failure. In this interval the banks future
depends on the size of the credit run.16
Following standard global game setups in the spirit of Carlsson and van Damme (1993)
and Morris and Shin (1998), I assume that information is imperfect, so that the state  is
not common knowledge. In the beginning of the game, nature draws  from a di¤use uniform
distribution over the real line, which constitutes the agentsinitial common prior about the
state of the world. Investor j then receives a private signal tj =  + j , where j has a
Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation t, j is independent of , and
independently and identically distributed across short-term debt holders. The precision of
the private signal is given by  t = 1=2t .
To connect the security trading and the credit run, I assume that the payo¤ of the asset,
15The coordination setup presented here is a simplied version of models on bank runs, e.g. Diamond and
Dybvig (1983), Rochet and Vives (2004) and Goldstein and Pauzner (2005); or Morris and Shin (2004), who
study coordination among creditors of a distressed borrower. In contrast to those papers, I choose to work
with a parsimonious model, as my aim is to analyze the e¤ect of short-sale constraints on coordination, instead
of providing a more realistic setting. In particular, I will abstract away from the rst movers advantage and
demand-deposit insurance, emphasized by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), or
the price at which the debt is issued, as in Morris and Shin (2004).
16There exist other interpretations of coordination, here presented using the terminology of creditor runs.
In models of currency crises, as in Obstfeld (1986, 2004) or Morris and Shin (1998), speculators decide whether
to attack a currency by shorting it. Chamley (1999), Morris and Shin (1999) and Dasgupta (2007) consider
investment complementarities.
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f , correlates with the quality of the banks assets. Thus, the price of the nancial asset,
p, can provide additional (public) information regarding the state of the world beyond the
private signals, and hence can facilitate or hurt coordination among capital providers. For
simplicity, I assume f = , and think about the traded asset as the (only) security that the
bank has on the asset side of the balance sheet, a zero-net-supply nancial derivative on the
banks equity, or as an industry index that includes the bank. Thus, the price is an exogenous
signal from the viewpoint of creditors, in the sense that the , but is nevertheless correlated
with the fundamental .
Because the two parts of the economy are segmented, with an information spillover from
the nancial market to the credit run in the form of the price p, without the outcome of the
coordination game a¤ecting the market price, the equilibrium of the whole economy is also
separable into two parts. In fact, it is just a simple conjugate of the equilibrium of the trading
round, dened in Denition 1 and discussed in Section 1.3, and the equilibrium of the run,
conditional on the realization of the market price. Thereby, I only dene the equilibrium of
the coordination game:
Denition 9 Let p denote the price of the asset with payo¤ f =  emerging from the nancial
market. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the credit run consists of individual strategies for
investing, i (tj ; p), and the corresponding aggregate, I (; p), such that
1. decision is optimal for creditors:
i (tj ; p) 2 arg max
i2f0;1g
E [U (i; I (; p) ; ) jtj ; p] for j 2 [0; 1] ; (1.20)
2. proportion of short-term debt rolled over is
I (; p) =
R 1
0 i (tj ; p) dj; (1.21)
3. agents update their beliefs according to Bayesrule.
This section hence only solves for the equilibrium of a standard global game setup with
private and public information, fully characterized by conditions (1:20) and (1:21). Combining
the equilibrium of the credit run with the equilibrium of the nancial market would provide
an equilibrium of the whole economy.
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I restrict my attention to monotone equilibria, dened as perfect Bayesian equilibria such
that, for a given realization p of the public signal, a creditor provides capital to the bank
if and only if the realization of her private signal is at least some threshold t (p); that is
i (tj ; p) = 1 i¤ tj  t (p). It implies that the bank can be characterized in a similar way: the
bank with asset quality  survives if and only if this quality is higher that some threshold
 (p); formally if    (p).17
1.6 Credit runs and portfolio constraints
After trading in the nancial market has taken place, but before the payo¤ at date 1 happens,
creditors decide whether to roll over short-term debt, thereby providing capital to the bank
in need of liquidity, or to withdraw it. Since the payo¤ of the nancial asset f and the bank
asset value  are correlated, the equilibrium price of the nancial market, p, provides an
observable public signal regarding the unknown parameter , and creditors can coordinate
their actions based on it. In the following subsections, I solve the coordination model, rst
without constraints on short-selling, then with the short-sale constraints.
1.6.1 Equilibrium analysis with no short-sale constraints
In this section I provide a solution to the coordination game among capital providers when
short-selling is allowed for everyone. To pin down the equilibrium of the model, characterized
by the pair ft; g, I solve for the optimal  while taking t as given, and for the optimal t
if  is assumed to be given. The joint solutions of these two conditions describe the equilibria
of the credit run.
In a monotone equilibrium described above, creditors with private signals tj  t pro-
vide capital. Based on the joint distribution of  and the private signals tj , the aggregate
proportion of creditors who roll over is given by
I (; p) = Pr (t  t (p) j) = 1   (p t (t (p)  )) .
17My results concerning multiple equilibria are obtained even within this restricted class. Moreover, in
absence of short-sale constraints, uniqueness within this class implies overall uniqueness, see Morris and Shin
(1998, 1999).
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The right hand side of this equation increases in , therefore a better bank receives more
capital rolled over. The bank avoids bankruptcy if and only if    (p), where  (p) is the
quality of the marginal bank that solves  = ! (1  I (; p)). Therefore,
t (p) =  (p) +
1p
 t
 1

 (p)
!

. (1.22)
Condition (1:22) characterizes the banks that survives withdrawals for a given switching
strategy t (p). There are several remarks to be made about this equation. First, notice that
the right-hand side of (1:22) is strictly increasing in  (p), therefore there is a unique  (p)
that satises the equation for a given t (p). Secondly, the bank survival threshold  (p) is an
increasing function of the creditor cuto¤ t (p), as a lower switching strategy from creditors
implies more capital rolled over, and hence a bank with lower asset payo¤ surviving. Thirdly,
as
dt (p)
d (p)
= 1 +
1p
 t!
1


 1

(p)
!
 > 1,
it must be that d=dt < 1. The presence of strategic complementarities implies that any
increase in the cuto¤ t (p) results in a smaller increase in the marginal banks value, because
no creditor can be certain about the signals received by others and hence the strategy of
others. Finally, in the limit when private signals become arbitrarily precise,  t !1, creditors
become certain about otherssignals as well, and the bank survival threshold  (p) becomes
exactly the individual capital provision threshold t (p).
Next, consider the derivation of the equilibrium cuto¤ strategy t (p) as a function of the
threshold  (p). Creditors receive payo¤ 1 if the bank avoids distress, and 0 if not, while
paying a cost c. Because they do not observe the state  directly, the payo¤ from rolling over
the loan must be calculated from the posterior distribution over the states, conditional on the
private and public signal. If creditor j knows that the bank solvency threshold is  (p), she
assigns probability Pr (   (p) jtj ; p) to the bank surviving, based on all her information,
which implies that the expected payo¤ from rolling over is Pr (   (p) jtj ; p)  c. As with-
drawing yields a payo¤ normalized to 0, the signal of the marginal agent, who is indi¤erent
between withdrawing or not, must solve the indi¤erence condition Pr (   (p) jtj ; p) = c.
In absence of short-sale constraints, the market price is p =  + A (u  C0). As u is
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normally distributed with mean zero and precision u = 1=2u, the precision of the price signal
is Au  u=A2. Therefore, the posterior of agent j about  is normally distributed with mean
 t
 t+Au
tj+
Au
 t+Au
(p+AC0) and precision  t+Au. Thus, the indi¤erence condition becomes

p
 t + Au

 (p)   t
 t + Au
t (p)  Au
 t + Au
(p+AC0)

= 1  c,
which is equivalent to
 (p) =
 t
 t + Au
t (p) +
Au
 t + Au
(p+AC0) +
1p
 t + Au
 1 (1  c) , (1.23)
and implies a linear relationship between  and t. Figure 1-6 illustrates the the critical
mass condition, (1:22), and the individual optimality condition without short-sale constraints,
(1:23), respectively.
An equilibrium is the joint solution to conditions (1:22) and (1:23), which lead to
Aup
 t
 (p)   1

 (p)
!

=
r
1 +
Au
 t
 1 (1  c) + Aup
 t
(p+AC0) .
As the left-hand side of the equation is a continuous function of , which takes the value
 1 for  = ! and 1 for  = 0, the equation always has a solution. Moreover, the solution
is unique for every p0 if and only if the left-hand side of the equation is a strictly decreasing
function of , that is if and only if Au 
p
2 t.18
The following proposition states the above result:
Proposition 10 (Morris and Shin) In absence of short-sale constraints, the equilibrium
is unique if and only if the private noise is small relative to the price noise, that is for
t 
p
2A22u. Moreover, in the limit as private noise vanishes so that t ! 0, a creditor
with private signal below t (p) = c! recalls her loan, and the bank with asset quality below
 (p) = c! fails.
Proposition 10 conrms the uniqueness result of Morris and Shin (1999, 2001). For any
positive level of noise in the public signal, u > 0, uniqueness is ensured by su¢ ciently
18As Figure 1-6 suggests, this is equivalent to the slope of the critical mass condition (1:22) always being
below the slope of the individual optimality condition, (1:23).
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small noise in the private signal. The intuition is that as the private signal becomes much
more precise than the public signal, creditors stop relying on the public signal and use only
their private information. This implies that the equilibrium dependence on the common
noise component u vanishes, and makes it harder to predict the actions of others, heightening
strategic uncertainty. When strategic uncertainty is strong enough, multiplicity breaks down.
It is interesting to note that the equilibrium run size and outcome outcome does not depend
on public signal p (or common noise component u), which is the second nding of Morris and
Shin (1999). In what follows, I will refer to this equilibrium as the informationally e¢ cient
equilibrium,. It is important to mention that this informationally e¢ cient equilibrium is
di¤erent from the rst best or allocationally e¢ cient equilibrium, i.e. I = ! and  = 0.
This di¤erence is due to the presence of the coordination externality.
1.6.2 Equilibrium analysis with short-sale constraints
As shown in Section 1.3, the introduction of short-sale constraints has an adverse e¤ect on
the market price. The fact that the price reveals information about the payo¤ at di¤erent
rates for high and low realizations of the demand shock implies that short-sale constraints
notably change the inference problem of creditors, as presented in Section 1.4.
To solve for the equilibrium in presence of short-sale constraints, one needs to repeat the
steps of the previous subsection. First, given that the joint distribution of the state  and the
private signals does not change, the critical mass condition (1:22) that determines the quality
of the marginal bank as a function of individual strategies, does not change either. However,
short-sale constraints do a¤ect the posterior of creditors after observing both the price and
the private signal. The public signal p is now only locally Gaussian, but not globally, as given
in (1:16) and illustrated on Figure 1-2.
As shown in Section 1.4, in presence of short-sale constraints the posterior pdf can be
given in the following way (see (1:18)):
g (jt; P = p) =   g (jt; P = p;  < p) + (1  )  g (jt; P = p;   p) .
In this equation,   Pr ( < pjt; P = p) and 1    Pr (  pjt; P = p) denote probabilities
that the creditor with private signal t associates with the short-sale constraint binding in
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the nancial market or not, respectively. Moreover, the conditional pdfs g (jt; P = p;  < p)
and g (jt; P = p;   p) belong to the class of truncated normal distributions, with means
 t
 t+Bu
t + Bu t+Bu (p+ CB) and
 t
 t+Au
t + Au t+Au (p+ CA), and precisions  t + Bu and
 t + Au, respectively, because in the rst case the creditor knows the short-sale constraint
binds in the nancial market, and hence the price equals p =  + B (u  C), while in the
second case this creditor knows the constraint does not bind, and hence the price equals
p =  +A (u  C).
As before, the expected net payo¤ of agent j from providing capital to the bank, for a
xed success threshold , is Pr ( > jtj ; P = p) c and hence t must solve the indi¤erence
condition Pr (  jtj ; P = p) = c, which is equivalent to
 (p) =
8<:
 t
 t+Bu
t (p) + Bu t+Bu (p+BC) +
1p
 t+Bu
 1

(1  c) B

if  (p)  p
 t
 t+Au
t (p) + Au t+Au (p+AC) +
1p
 t+Au
 1

1  c1 A1 

if  (p) > p,
(1.24)
where   Pr ( < pjt; p) is the probability the marginal agent assigns to the short-sale
constraint binding in the market, B  Pr ( < pjt; p =  +B (u  C)) is the probability
that the marginal agent assigns to informed traders shorting/selling in a market with no
constraints but volatility  1Bu, and 

A  Pr ( < pjt; p =  +A (u  C)) is the probability
that the marginal agent assigns to informed traders shorting/selling in a market with no
constraints but volatility  1Au. It is easy to see that when there are no short-sale constraints,
i.e. B = A,  = A = 

B, and (1:24) is equivalent to (1:23).
Figure 1-7 illustrates the critical mass condition, (1:22), and the individual optimality
condition in presence of short-sale constraints, (1:24), respectively. The former displays the
quality of the marginal bank, , given that creditors follow the threshold strategy with t,
that is a capital provider leaves her money in the bank if and only if she receives private signal
tj  t. As the  threshold is determined only by the joint distribution of the fundamental
and the private signals, short-selling constraints do not alter it.
What changes is the optimal switching strategy of creditors for a xed  bank solvency
threshold. However, as the distributions are not jointly Gaussian, the posterior (1:18) is not
Gaussian any more, and hence it is not possible to simplify condition (1:24) further more,
and to provide a simple necessary and su¢ cient condition for the number of equilibria. The
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reason for this is that, as seen on Figure 1-7, the slope of (1:24) is not monotonic. Instead,
short-sale constraints create a hump shape on the individual optimality condition, with the
slope d=dt of the individual optimality condition taking values between the upper slope
at the kink, d=dtj!p+, where it is clearly the smallest, and when  !  1, where it is
the largest,  t+Bu t . Thus, a su¢ cient condition for uniqueness would be that
d
dt
j!p+ >
1
1 + 1p t!
p
2
. (1.25)
However, as shown in Appendix 1.9.3, there exists a constant t > 0 such that for every 0 <
t < t, there is a price realization p such that (1:25) does not hold, and hence the individual
optimality condition and the critical mass condition have three intersections. Thereby, there
are multiple equilibria of the system of equations (1:22) and (1:24). The following proposition
formally states this result:
Proposition 11 In presence of short-sale constraints, there are multiple equilibria in invest-
ment strategies when t is su¢ ciently small. Moreover, multiplicity remains as private noise
vanishes so that t ! 0: the switching strategies become
t (p) =  (p) =
8<: c! for all pp if c! < p < c!, (1.26)
and hence for every  2 [p; c!) both the informationally e¢ cient equilibrium and a high
capital provisionequilibrium exist whenever c!  p  c!, where  = A2
(1 c)B2+cA2 < 1.
The technical bits of the proof are in Appendix 1.9.3.
The informationally e¢ cient equilibrium is the same as the unique equilibrium of the
unconstrained economy: a bank with asset quality above c! remains solvent. However, there
exists an equilibrium with more capital provision: creditors also nance banks with lower
asset quality, between the public signal realization p and c!. This is an informationally
ine¢ cient equilibrium, as agents put excessive weight on the public signal. It is characterized
by overinvestment compared to the informationally e¢ cient equilibrium, because agents with
lower signals provide capital too, hence I refer to it as the high investmentequilibrium.
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1.7 Discussion
In this section I discuss my results on multiplicity, allocational e¢ ciency, provide comparative
statics, and refer to some policy implications.
1.7.1 Multiplicity
Canonical papers in the literature on transparency show that releasing more information is
not necessarily good. Indeed, in Morris and Shin, while without a public signal the market
may be in a uniqueness region, by adding a precise enough public signal, the economy has
multiple equilibria.
Since Morris and Shin (2001), several authors have considered ways that reinstate mul-
tiplicity in coordination games. The existing literature mainly focuses on the endogenous
nature of the public signal. For example, Angeletos and Werning (2006) study nancial mar-
ket prices, which aggregate the dispersed information of agents, or direct noisy signals about
othersactivity. Information aggregation can overturn the Morris and Shin (1998) unique-
ness result and lead to multiplicity if the precision of public information increases faster
than the precision of the private information. Hellwig et al. (2006) and Tarashev (2007) also
study coordination games with nancial prices being endogenous public signals. Because all
these papers stay in the class of jointly Gaussian distributions, the informational content of
the public signal does not vary for its di¤erent realizations and hence across the multiple
equilibria.
In contrast, the model presented here provides a fundamentally di¤erent setting. What is
cardinal for the analysis is that agents with di¤erent private signals interpret the same public
signal in di¤erent ways. In particular, the information they infer from the public signal
changes with the distance of their private and public signal. Holding the price constant
and increasing the private signal can provide more information about the composition of the
market price: a high price is more likely to be the result of a high demand shock than a low
price to be the result of a low demand shock, because in the rst case the fewer informed
traders have a smaller corrective e¤ect on the market price.
According to the prevailing view, the introduction of short-sale constraints reduces the
informativeness of the market price, i.e. decrease its precision, and hence, following the
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Morris and Shin logic, should not lead to coordination failures. Indeed, (1:15) states that the
perceived uncertainty of uninformed traders increases with a ban on shorting. The surprising
nding of this model is that, in contrast to the existing literature, I show that short-sale
constraints can make asset prices contain more information for some creditors with additional
information, as demonstrated in Proposition 8.19
Although both the setup and the motivation are di¤erent, the results of this chapter
are close in spirit to Angeletos et al. (2006). They examine the informational role of policy
decisions in a coordination setting. They show that policy interventions create endogenous
public information and can lead to multiple equilibria.20 There are two di¤erences though.
First, in their paper the public signal reveals that the state of the world is neither too
high, nor too low. In contrast, short-sale constraints help to rule out only lower states
of the world by making creditorsposterior distributions more left-skewed. This has strong
implications on allocational e¢ ciency, discussed below. Second, in their analysis the signal
is the equilibrium action of a policy maker, whereas the present article takes the constraint
as given. I show that, even abstracting from signaling and analyzing the constraint on short-
selling as an endogenous decision of regulators, short-sale constraints are nevertheless capable
of suggesting that prices, inuenced by demand shocks, are lower than economic fundamentals
would imply. It would be interesting to see how introducing signaling (i.e. endogenizing the
authoritys decision to introduce short-sale constraints in a security market) would inuence
the results of the model.
19 It is interesting to refer back to similarities and di¤erences with Bai et al. (2006), and Marin and Olivier
(2008). What is crucial in the analysis is that short-sale or other trading constraints result in a varying
information content across di¤erent price levels. Therefore, even if the asset pricing implications of the two
types of models are di¤erent, qualitative results, such as the increasing information content of the price under
short-sale constraints for some agents with additional private information, and the possibility of multiple
equilibria would not be a¤ected. However, with a nancial market model, where high asset prices are more
informative than low prices, the informationally e¢ cient equilibrium would be allocationally more e¢ cient as
well.
20The two types of equilibria that they identify are also in line with the ndings of this paper. Their inactive-
policy equilibrium, where agents coordinate on a strategy that is insensitive to the policy, is analogous to my
informationally e¢ cient level of creditor run, and their continuum of active-policy equilibria correspond to
equilibria when capital provision depends on the price p.
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1.7.2 E¢ ciency
An interesting result of the chapter is that in the second equilibrium creditors always provide
more capital than in the informationally e¢ cient equilibrium. It is shown in 1.26: the second
equilibrium only exists for c! < p < c!.
The intuition is the following. As shown in Proposition 8, asset prices under short-sale
constraints provide more information to creditors with high private signals. First, consider
the case when p > c!. Without short-sale constraints, in the informationally e¢ cient (unique)
equilibrium, creditors rely only on their private signals, and based on their assessments about
the banks asset value, agents with private signals tj  c! provide capital to the bank. In
presence of short-sale constraints, agents with private signals above p will become more
informed about both the fundamental  and hence about other creditorsbeliefs. Therefore
short-sale constraints weaken strategic uncertainty among these creditors, leading to the
possible multiplicity of equilibria. In one equilibrium they all provide capital, but as they all
provide capital in the informationally e¢ cient equilibrium, it would not change bankruptcy
outcomes. In the other equilibrium they all refrain from doing so, which implies that only
agents with medium signals (between c! and p) would invest, which is not a monotone
equilibrium. Therefore when p > c!, the uniqueness of the equilibrium survives.
Consider now the case when p < c!. In this case, agents with signals above p become more
informed due to short-sale constraints. Those with signals above c will become more certain
about what others do, which only reinforces their willingness to invest. The main di¤erence
is that now creditors with signals p < tj < c!, who would have stayed out in absence of the
constraint, obtain more precise information. Therefore strategic uncertainty weakens among
these creditors, and they all become more informed about both the fundamental  and about
the beliefs of other creditors who have signal realizations between p and c!. Self-fullling
beliefs and the resulting multiplicity hence arise in this group of creditors with medium
realizations of the private signal. If they all stay out, we obtain an equilibrium equivalent to
the informationally e¢ cient equilibrium. However, there exist another equilibrium in which
they all provide capital. In this second equilibrium creditors rely more on the public signal.
As the second equilibrium only emerges when p < c!, the second equilibrium, with
bankruptcy threshold  = p is closer to the rst best ( = 0) than the informationally
43
e¢ cient equilibrium ( = c!). I conclude that short-sale constraints improve economic
e¢ ciency by mitigating the adverse e¤ect of the coordination externality. In contrast to
Morris and Shin (2002), who show that an increase in transparency might decrease welfare,
short-sale constraints provide a good typeof transparency, recreating multiplicity only when
it is desirable.21
1.7.3 Comparative statics and policy implications
The two main parameters of the coordination game are the proportion of informed investors
barred from shorting, w, and creditorsprivate cost of providing capital, c.
As motivated in Section 1.2, the interpretation of w is quite broad. Here I focus mainly
on regulatory restrictions such as a short-sale ban, the uptick rule, or legal restrictions on
institutional trading. As shown in Section 1.6, w only a¤ects the lower threshold for existence
of the high investment equilibrium, through inuencing
 =
A2
(1  c)B2 + cA2 ,
which simplies to
 =
(1  w)2
(1  c) + c (1  w)2 .
It is easy to verify that
@
@w
=   2 (1  w) (1  c)h
(1  c) + c (1  w)2
i2 < 0,
i.e. tighter short-selling constraints lead to a higher probability of multiple equilibria. One
interpretation of this multiplicity in the bankruptcy outcome is an increase in ex ante un-
certainty about the outcome of the coordination, which can be interpreted as undesirable
excess volatility. Clearly, to make predictions about the impact of certain policy measures,
one needs to be able to nd robust patterns across certain equilibria, as in Angeletos et al.
(2008).
21This is clearly not a welfare analysis of the whole economy, which would have to take into account
that short-sale constraints compromise market liquidity and price discovery, and certainly make constrained
informed investors worse o¤.
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The other crucial parameter of the coordination model is the private cost of capital provi-
sion, c. Parameter c a¤ects the net benet or loss for creditors if they choose the risky action.
Clearly, a higher c makes capital provision less desirable from the point of view of creditors,
which implies that in the informationally e¢ cient equilibrium, with  = c! in the limit,
banks receive less capital and hence they need a higher asset quality to remain solvent. The
e¤ect on the lower threshold for a high investment equilibrium, c!, is more subtle. After
some simple algebra one nds that
@
@c
= (1  w)2 1  (1  w)
2h
1  c+ c (1  w)2
i2  0,
which also implies that as long as short-selling is restricted, i.e. w > 0, c! increases in c.
Moreover, one can characterize the benet of short-sale constraints by the proportion
of additional banks that get nanced, c!   c! = (1  ) c!, which can be interpreted as
the ex ante probability of multiple equilibria. Here the lower bound, c! decreases in w,
hence tighter short-sale constraints increase the benets in the real economy. Furthermore,
it satises
@
@c
((1  ) c!) =
"
1  c
c
2
  (1  w)2
#
!
1  (1  w)2h
1 c
c + (1  w)2
i2 ,
which implies an inverse U-shaped relationship. For small c values the derivative is positive,
hence the ex ante probability of multiplicity, or the potential benet of short-sale constraints,
increases, while for c close to 1, this benet decreases.
Finally, as the analysis of the previous section shows that tighter short-sale constrains
can promote allocational e¢ ciency, one can reect on the short-sale bans around the globe
in late 2008 and the following year. In fact, a sudden jump in c, implied for example by
news that the investment opportunity worsens, increases the bankruptcy threshold for the
bank. Introducing strict enough shorting restrictions, by increasing w, can create a second
equilibrium and hence partly o¤set the increase in c. Empirical studies about the e¤ect of
short-sale bans in and after 2008, such as Boehmer et al. (2009) and Beber and Pagano
(2011), conclude that if the SECs and other regulators goal with the short-sale ban was
to articially raise prices on nancial stocks, they failed, and in the meantime compromised
market quality. However, the SEC might have just been trying to avert a credit run on the
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largest investment banks. My model shows that while short-sale constraints increase market
volatility, they can also a¤ect the information that agents learn from prices, and can lead
to outcomes where creditors do not withdraw money from low quality banks. Washington
Mutual and Wachovia did go bankrupt during the 3-week shorting ban, collapsing under
the weight of their bad loans, suggesting that their fundamentals were below the threshold
c!. But, while it is now clear that other nancial rms such as Citigroup had extremely
troubled fundamentals, the introduction of short-sale constraints could have contributed to
their survival.
1.8 Concluding remarks
The model presented in this chapter examines the informational e¤ects of short-sale con-
straints when asset prices provide guidance for decisions made in a coordination environment.
I present a model that shows although short-selling constraints make asset prices more volatile
and decrease price informativeness, they can provide more information for certain agents of
the economy, who are endowed with additional private information too. Due to learning
more in presence of short-sale constraints, creditors with moderate private signals are willing
to lend more, if they think others with similar signals lend as well, which leads to a second
equilibrium with higher allocational e¢ ciency. My result thus implies that the decrease in
average informativeness is more than compensated by an increase in informativeness to some
agents.
The existing literature studying the e¤ects of short-sale constraints identies both bene-
ts and detriments of these restrictions. The rst group include prevention from speculative
shorting that otherwise could lead to bear raids. On the other hand, introducing a ban
on short-selling has been shown to decrease market liquidity and reduce price informative-
ness. In this chapter, I show that, allowing for a richer structure than in previous models,
short-sale constraints can increase the information content of market prices. Although it
leads to informational ine¢ ciency in capital provision, it can increase allocative e¢ ciency
and prevent nancial institutions from collapsing in uncertain times, when a fear of distress
prevents creditors to roll over short-term debt. In particular, short-sale constraints improve
the information of creditors with private signals above the market price realization. If this
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increase in precision is strong enough, short-sale constraints can create a second equilibrium
in which creditors provide more capital, leading to less severe credit runs. My model hence
suggests that emergency orders such as the one in September 2008 can increase e¢ ciency
even in absence of manipulative shorting, if the foregone costs of a potential collapse of part
of the banking industry and systemic risk (i.e. the increase in allocational e¢ ciency in the
real economy) are large enough to dominate the costs of compromised market quality (i.e.
the fall in informational e¢ ciency in the nancial market) in troubled times.
The model considered here studies information aggregation in a coordination game, with
an external public signal emerging from a market subject to trading constraints. A more
straightforward way to study information aggregation and portfolio restrictions would be to
assume that investors with dispersed information are actually participants in the market, and
hence the market price aggregates their information in presence of the short-selling constraint.
Such a model must be more complicated because of the dual role of the price (for the inference
and market clearing), but the present analysis suggests that it could shed more light on the
interaction between asymmetric information and portfolio constraints.
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1.9 Appendix
1.9.1 REE in the nancial market
Optimal demands. Investor ks optimization problem is given by
max
xk
U (Wk) = E [WkjIk]  
2
V ar [WkjIk]
= xk (E [f jIk]  p)  
2
x2k
 
V ar [f jIk] + 2n

.
Solving the FOC without short-sale constraints, one obtains
xk =
E [f jIk]  p
 (V ar [f jIk] + 2n)
.
From here the optimal demands for all three types of traders are straightforward.
Proof of Theorem 2. The derivation in the main text provides the step-by-step solution
to the problem. There are three issues left for this appendix: (i) to derive the conditional
expectations E [f jp] and E f2jp, and the conditional variance V ar [f jp], (ii) to prove the
existence of the equilibrium, and (iii) to analyze uniqueness.
(i) The conditional distribution (1:9) implies that the expectation simply becomes
E [f jP = p] =
pZ
 1
1
Bu
f

f   (p+BC)
Bu

df +
1Z
p
1
Au
f

f   (p+AC)
Au

df = p+D,
where
D  Bu
  C
uZ
 1

v +
C
u

 (v) dv +Au
1Z
  C
u

v +
C
u

 (v) dv
= AC   (B  A)u
1Z
C
u

w   C
u

 (w) dw,
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and similarly
E

f2jp = CZ
 1
[p A (u  C)]2  (u) du+
1Z
C
[p B (u  C)]2  (u) du = p2 + 2pD + E,
with
E  A2
CZ
 1
(u  C)2  (u) du+B2
1Z
C
(u  C)2  (u) du
= A2

2u + C
2

+
 
B2  A2 1Z
C
(u  C)2  (u) du.
Therefore
V ar [f jp] = E f2jp  E2 [f jp] = E  D2,
that is independent of p. From here, the calculations end in the main text, and C solves
0 = L (C)  C + 1  

D (C)
E (C) D2 (C) + 2n
  S. (1.27)
Consider the case when w = 0, that is B0 = A; it implies that
D0 = AC0 and E0 = A2

2u + C
2
0

,
therefore
V ar [f jp0] = E0  D20 = A22u,
and hence
C0 =
+ A2u
1 + A2u
S = kS,
where 0  k  1. As S  0, we also get that C0  0. In particular, if the asset is in positive
net supply, S > 0, C0 is positive, and D0 = AC0 > 0, which means that uninformed investors
demand a discount of D0 > 0 to hold the asset.
(ii) To show the existence of a real C that satises L (C) = 0, notice that when B > A,
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for C = C0,
L (C0) = C0 +
1  

D (C0)
E (C0) D2 (C0) + 2n
  S
<  1  

B  A
E (C0) D2 (C0) + 2n
1Z
C0
(u  C0) (u) du < 0.
Moreover, from (1:27) one can rewrite L (C) as
L (C) = C +
1  

D (C)
E (C) D2 (C) + 2n
  S
=
V ar [f jp] + 2n
V ar [f jp] + 2n
C   1  

B  A
V ar [f jp] + 2n
1Z
C
(u  C) (u) du  S,
where S is constant, V ar [f jp] is nite (see below in the proof of Proposition 3), and for
C !1,
1R
C
(u  C) (u) du! 0. Therefore,
lim
C!1
L (C) =1. (1.28)
As L (C) is continuos, combining it with L (C0) < 0 and (1:28), it must have a real root above
C0.
(iii) For the proof of uniqueness, notice rst that for every C < C0, D (C) < D (C0) and
V ar [f jp] > V ar [f jp0], therefore
L (C) < L (C0) < 0.
Thus, there is no such C < C0 that satises L (C) = 0. Regarding the case C > C0, simple
algebra shows that
dD
dC
= A  (B  A) d
dC
1Z
C
(u  C) (u) du > A > 0,
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and
E  D2 = A2 2u + C2+  B2  A2 1Z
C
(u  C)2  (u) du
= A22u + 2 (B  A)A
1Z
C
u (u  C) (u) du+ (B  A)2 V ar [max f0; u  Cg] ,
hence
d
dC

E  D2 < 0.
Therefore, D(C)
E(C) (D(C))2+2n
is increasing in C, and
d
dC
L (C) = 1 +
d
dC
D (C)

h
E (C)  (D (C))2
i
+A
> 1.
As L (C) is strictly increasing and continuous, the L (C) = 0 equation must have a unique
solution.
Proof of Proposition 3. From (1:10),
V ar [f jp] = E  D2
= A22u +
 
B2  A2
24 1Z
C
(u  C)2  (u) du 
0@ 1Z
C
(u  C) (u) du
1A235
+ 2 (B  A)AC
1Z
C
(u  C) (u) du+ 2A (B  A)
0@ 1Z
C
(u  C) (u) du
1A2 ,
where the second term of the RHS is nonnegative due to Jensens inequality applied on the
random variable w  max f0; u  Cg and the convex function x 7! x2: E w2  E2 [w], and
the third and fourth components are trivially non-negative too. Therefore
V ar [f jp]  A22u = V ar [f jp0] . (1.29)
Proof of Proposition 4. Due to the improper prior assumption, V ar [pjf ] = V ar [f jp] =
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E   D2 and V ar [p0jf ] = V ar [f jp0] = A22u, hence (1:29) also implies that V ar [pjf ] 
V ar [p0jf ].
Proof of Proposition 5. As r0 = f   p0 = A (u  C0), where u has a symmetric
distribution around 0, which implies Skew [r0] = 0. Therefore, to have Skew [r] < Skew [r0],
it is su¢ cient to show E
h
(r   E [r])3
i
< 0. From its denition,
r = f   p =  
8<: A (u  C) if u  CB (u  C) if u > C ,
and
E
h
(r   E [r])3
i
= E

r3
  3E r2E [r] + 2E3 [r]
where
E [r] = D = AC   (B  A)
1Z
C
(u  C) (u) du,
E

r2

= E = A2
 
2u + C
2

+
 
B2  A2 1Z
C
(u  C)2  (u) du, and
E

r3

= A3C
 
32u + C
2
   B3  A3 1Z
C
(u  C)3  (u) du.
After some tedious algebra, the negativity of the skewness follows from the fact that the
skewness of the random variable w = max f0; u  Cg is positive.
To prove the second part of the proposition, notice that
E [jr0j] = E [A juj] = 2A
1Z
0
max fu;C0g (u) du
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and
E [jrj] = B
1Z
C
(u  C) (u) du A
CZ
 1
(u  C) (u) du
= (B +A)
1Z
C
u (u) du  (B  A)C
1Z
C
 (u) du+ 2AC
CZ
0
 (u) du,
thus simple algebra yields
E [jrj]  E [jr0j] = (B  A)
1Z
C
(u  C) (u) du+ 2A
1Z
0
(max fu;Cg  max fu;C0g) (u) du.
On the right-hand side both components are non-negative, therefore E [jrj]  E [jr0j].
Proof of Proposition 6. As R = p   p 1 = f   r   p 1, Skew [Rjf ] = Skew [ r]
and Skew [R0jf ] = Skew [ r0], hence Skew [Rjf ] > Skew [R0jf ] is straightforward from
Skew [r] < Skew [r0].
1.9.2 Information content of the price under short-sale constraints
The posterior of a creditor with private signal t and price signal p that comes from a nancial
market with short-sale constraints is given by
g (f jt; P = p) =   g (f jt; P = p; f < p) + (1  )  g (f jt; P = p; f  p) ,
where, using the simplifying notation
1 = 
 
p   tt+Bu(p+BC) t+Bu
(Bu +  t)
 1=2
!
and 2 = 1  
 
p   tt+Au(p+AC) t+Au
(Au +  t)
 1=2
!
,
the variable
 = Pr (f < pjt; P = p)
=
(Bu+ t)
 1=2
 1t 
 1
Bu


t (p+BC)
( 1Bu+
 1
t )
1=2

1
(Bu+ t)
 1=2
 1t 
 1
Bu


t (p+BC)
( 1Bu+
 1
t )
1=2

1 +
(Au+ t)
 1=2
 1t 
 1
Au


t (p+AC)
( 1Au+
 1
t )
1=2

2
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gives the probability that the creditor assigns to the constraint binding in the nancial market,
Pr (f  pjt; P = p) = 1  , and the conditional distributions are given by
g (f jt; P = p; f < p) = 1f<p 1
(Bu +  t)
 1=2 1

 
f    tt+Bu(p+BC) t+Bu
(Bu +  t)
 1=2
!
and
g (f jt; P = p; f  p) = 1fp 1
(Au +  t)
 1=2 2

 
f    tt+Au(p+AC) t+Au
(Au +  t)
 1=2
!
.
When no informed trader is subject to the short-sale constraint, i.e. w = 0 or B = A,
both truncated normal pdfs belong to the same normal distribution, with mean  t t+Au t +
Au
 t+Au
(p+AC0) and precision  t + Au, and the probabilities simplify to
Pr (f < pjt; P0 = p) = 
 
p   tt+Bu(p+AC0) t+Au
(Bu +  t)
 1=2
!
and
Pr (f  pjt; P0 = p) = 1  
 
p   tt+Bu(p+AC0) t+Au
(Bu +  t)
 1=2
!
.
1.9.3 Global game solution under short-sale constraints
General notations
As shown in Section 1.4, in presence of short-sale constraints the posterior pdf becomes
g (jt; P = p) =   g (jt; P = p;  < p) + (1  )  g (jt; P = p;   p) ,
hence a simple integration yields that
G (xjt; P = p) =  G (xjt; P = p;  < p) if x  p,
and
G (xjt; P = p) =  G (pjt; P = p;  < p) + (1  ) G (xjt; P = p;   p) if x > p.
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Combining it with the indi¤erence condition Pr (  jt; P = p) = c gives
1  c =  G (jt; P = p;  < p) if   p,
and
1  c =  G (pjt; P = p;  < p) + (1  ) G (jt; P = p;   p) if  > p,
which leads to (1:24) with the notation
A = 
 
p   tt+Au(p+AC) t+Au
( t + Au)
 1=2
!
and B = 
 
p   tt+Bu(p+BC)Bu+ t
( t + Bu)
 1=2
!
and
  Pr ( < pjt; p)
=
(Bu+ t)
 1=2
 1t 
 1
Bu


t (p+BC)
( 1Bu+
 1
t )
1=2

B
(Bu+ t)
 1=2
 1t 
 1
Bu


t (p+BC)
( 1Bu+
 1
t )
1=2

B +
(Au+ t)
 1=2
 1t 
 1
Au


t (p+AC)
( 1Au+
 1
t )
1=2

1  A
 .
Multiplicity
First, I characterize the critical mass and individual optimality curves, (1:22) and (1:24),
respectively. It is easy to see that both of them imply  is a continuous and strictly increasing
function of t.
Condition (1:22) yields that the slope of the critical mass curve (CM , for simplicity) is
given by
dt
d
= 1 +
1p
 t!
1


 1


!
 ,
or by its inverse
CM  d

dt
=
1
1 + 1p t!
1
( 1( 

! ))
for the  that solves
t =  +
1p
 t
 1


!

:
Thus, CM can be interpreted as a function of t. In particular, as 0 <  (x) < 1=
p
2 for
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every x 2 R, we have a lower and an upper threshold for the slope:
0 < CM < CM  1
1 + 1p t!
p
2
,
and it reaches its maximum for
 =
!
2
,
or for the t value of
t =
!
2
:
Moreover, as  (x) is strictly increasing for x < 0 and strictly decreasing for x > 0, and  is
an increasing function of t, the slope CM is strictly increasing in t for t < !2 and strictly
decreasing for t > !2 . Therefore, CM takes every value in
 
0; CM

for t  !2 , and every
value between CM and 0, when t increases from !2 to 1, where CM < 1.
Now I turn my attention to the individual optimality curve (IO, for simplicity), given in
(1:24), which, for tractability, is restated here:
 =
8<:
 t
 t+Bu
t + Bu t+Bu (p+BC) +
1p
 t+Bu
 1

(1  c) B(p;t)(p;t)

if   p
 t
 t+Au
t + Au t+Au (p+AC) +
1p
 t+Au
 1

1  c1 A(p;t)1 (p;t)

if  > p.
The rst observation I make is that this condition can be rewritten with the introduction of
     p and t  t   p:
 =
8<:
 t
 t+Bu
t+ Bu t+BuBC +
1p
 t+Bu
 1

(1  c) B(t)(t)

if   0
 t
 t+Au
t+ Au t+AuAC +
1p
 t+Au
 1

1  c1 A(t)1 (t)

if  > 0,
(1.30)
where
A (t) = 
 
  tt+ AuAC
( t + Au)
1=2
!
and B (t) = 
 
  tt+ BuBC
( t + Bu)
1=2
!
, (1.31)
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and
 (t) =
=
(Bu+ t)
 1=2
 1t 
 1
Bu


t BC
( 1Bu+
 1
t )
1=2

B (t)
(Bu+ t)
 1=2
 1t 
 1
Bu


t BC
( 1Bu+
 1
t )
1=2

B (t) +
(Au+ t)
 1=2
 1t 
 1
Au


t AC
( 1Au+
 1
t )
1=2

1  A (t)
 .
(1.32)
It means that on the (t; ) plane every solution-pair (t (p) ;  (p)) of (1:24) is given by
an appropriate shift of the point (t;) along the 45-degree line, where t and  solve
(1:30)   (1:32), and are only functions of the parameters of the model and the equilibrium
constants of the nancial market, and do not depend on p. It also implies that the slope and
convexity attributes of the curve do not depend on p either.
The characterization of the solution to (1:30)  (1:32) is as follows. The slope of the curve
is given by
IO (t) =
8<:
 t
 t+Bu
+ 1p
 t+Bu
d
d(t)
 1

(1  c) B(t)(t)

if   0
 t
 t+Au
+ 1p
 t+Au
d
d(t)
 1

1  c1 A(t)1 (t)

if  > 0,
=
8>>><>>>:
 t
 t+Bu
+ (1 c)p
 t+Bu

 1

(1 c)

B
(t)
(t)
 d
d(t)

B(t)
(t)

if t  t0
 t
 t+Au
  cp
 t+Au

 1

1 c 1 

A
(t)
1 (t)
 d
d(t)

1 A(t)
1 (t)

if t > t0.
where t0 is the unique solution to
 (t0) = 1  c,
i.e. t0 is the t value that gives  = 0 in (1:31). Moreover, after some demanding
calculations, omitted here, it is possible to show that:
1. dd(t)

B(t)
(t)

> 0 for t  t0 and dd(t)

1 A(t)
1 (t)

< 0 for t > t0;
2. IO is increasing in t for both ( 1;t0) and (t0;1);
3. In the limits t! 1 we have limt! 1 IO (t) =  t t+Bu and limt!1 IO (t) =
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 t
 t+Au
4. There is a kinkat t0, and thus the IO curve is not di¤erentiable: on the two sides
of t = t0, the slopes are nite but di¤erent. In particular, I dene  (t0) and
 (t0) such that  t t+Bu <
1
(t0)
 limt!t0  IO (t) < 1 and 0 <  (t0) 
limt!t0+ IO (t) <
 t
 t+Au
, are well-dened, and satisfy  (t0) < 1(t0) ;
5. The slope IO (t) is increasing in t and takes every value in

 t
 t+Bu
; 1(t0)

for
t < t0, and is increasing and takes every value in

 (t0) ;
 t
 t+Au

for t > t0.
In what follows, for simplicity, I refer to this (t0; 0) point as the kinkof the IO curve.
The next observation is that the uniqueness or multiplicity of the solutions for a given
parameter set depends only on which part of the CM curve the kinkof the IO condition
would get shifted to. In particular, if the kinkis shifted to a part of the CM curve where its
slope is su¢ ciently small such that CM  (t0), there is a unique solution. This is because
both before and after the kink the IO curve is steeper than the CM curve, and hence there
cannot be any more intersections. However, if at this point the slope satises CM > (t0),
multiplicity can be ensured by choosing the appropriate p: if the kink is before t = !2 ,
as IO starts to increase from  (t0), and as CM decreases, a slight increase in p would
ensure that they have multiple equilibria, and if the kink is after t = !2 , as IO increases
from  (t0), and as CM increases too, a slight decrease in p would ensure that they have
multiple equilibria. Therefore, in what follows, I solve for the point where the kinkgets
shifted to, and determine the relationship of the two slopes CM and IO.
First, suppose that  (t0) CM ; in this case there is a unique solution. This condition
hence requires
 (t0)  1 
p
2p
2 +
p
 t!
.
Second, suppose that 0 <  (t0) < CM . It means that there are two points of the CM
curve such that the slope is exactly  (t0): they are pinned down by
 = !

1  

 1

1
!
p
 t
 (t0)
1   (t0)

<
!
2
and


= !

 1

1
!
p
 t
 (t0)
1   (t0)

>
!
2
,
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where  1 (y) denotes the unique non-negative x such that  (x) = y for y  1=p2. There-
fore, if the shifted kink has    or   , the solution is unique, and if  <  < ,
there are multiple equilibria.
As the kinkhas coordinates (t0; 0) on the (t; ) plane, shifting it is equivalent to
moving it to the point (p+ t0; p). It is thus on the CM curve if and only if
p+ t0 = p+
1p
 t
 1
 p
!

,
that is if it is shifted by bp = !  p tt0, to the point  !  p tt0+ t0; !  p tt0.
Therefore, there are multiple equilibria if and only if
 < ! (
p
 tt0) < 

,
that is
1
!
p
 t
 (t0)
1   (t0) <  (
p
 tt0) <
1p
2
,
or, equivalently,
 (t0) < 1  1
1 + !
p
 t
 p
 tt0
 .
But what is exactly  (t0)  limt!t0+ IO (t)? Using the relevant part of the IO
function, and the fact that  (t0) = 1 c, the (upper) slope IO close to the kinkbecomes
 (t0) = lim
t!t0+
IO (t)
= (1  c)  t
 t + Au
+ c
 t
 t + Bu
Bu
Au
 cBu
Au
1p
 t + Bu


t0 BC
( 1t +
 1
Bu)
1=2



t0 AC
( 1t +
 1
Au)
1=2


t0 AC
 1t +
 1
Au
  t0 BC
 1t +
 1
Bu



   tt0+BuBCp
 t+Bu



   tt0+AuACp
 t+Au
 .
Because of the elaborate expression above, it is impossible to characterize the number
of equilibria as a function of the precisions  t and u in the general case. Instead, I only
consider the special case, when u is held constant and  t ! 1, because this is the case
where Morris and Shin provide uniqueness. In fact, it is easy to show that  (t0) = 1  c
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implies t0 = 0,and hence
  lim
 t!1
 (t0) = (1  c) + cBu
Au
=
(1  c)B2 + cA2
B2
< 1.
For multiplicity it must be that
 (t0) < 1  1
1 + !
p
 t
 p
 tt0
 ,
but when  t !1, the RHS converges to 1, and in the limit indeed
 =
(1  c)B2 + cA2
B2
< 1.
Therefore, when the private signal becomes arbitrarily precise, there are still multiple equi-
libria of the coordination problem. Similarly one can show that in the limit  t ! 1 the
lowerslope of the IM curve becomes
1

 lim
 t!1
1
 (t0)
= (1  c) + cAu
Bu
=
(1  c)B2 + cA2
A2
> 1.
The next question is what the exact thresholds are in these multiple equilibria. First,
one derived intersection is at the kink, which provides an equilibrium of the model. By its
denition, the kink satises 0 = 0, which in the limit  t ! 1 implies t0 = 0, and thus
the shifting by p gives the solution t =  = p.
For a second intersection to be derived, one needs to nd the joint solution of equations
(1:22) and (1:24) in the limit when  t !1. Instead of solving for the explicit joint solutions,
I instead guess and verify that the solution is t =  = c!, and only when p < c!. Indeed,
assuming that  = c!, the CM equation gives
t =  +
1p
 t
 1


!

= c! +
1p
 t
 1 (c) ,
and hence when  t !1, the RHS converges to c!, therefore we have lim t!1 t = c!.
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Suppose now that t = c!, and plug it in the IM equation. First, if  > p,
lim
 t!1
1  A (p; t = c!)
1   (p; t = c!) = 1 +
2664A2B2


  (p c!)+BC

 1=2
Bu



  (p c!)+AC

 1=2
Au
   1
3775 lim t!1 (p t (p  c!)) ,
where lim t!1
 p
 t (p  c!)

is bounded and hence always nite. Therefore, in the limit
it satises
lim
 t!1
1p
 t + Au
 1 (:) = 0,
and hence lim t!1 
 = c!. Therefore, in the limit the other intersection satises t =  =
c!.
Second, suppose that   p. When t = c!, in the limit  t !1 again
lim
 t!1
B (p; t
 = c!)
 (p; t = c!)
= lim
 t!1
 (
p
 t (p  c!))
+
B2
A2


  (p c!)+AC

 1=2
Au



  (p c!)+BC

 1=2
Bu
 1  lim
 t!1
 (
p
 t (p  c!))

,
which is always nite, and hence in the limit (1:24) simplies to lim t!1 
 = c!. Therefore,
in the limit the other intersection satises t =  = c!.
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Figure 1-1: The equilibrium price as a function of the fundamental and demand shock, in
absence and presence of short-sale constraints.
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The demand shock (u) is on the x axis and the payo¤ (f) is on the y axis. The left panel shows
the price when informed investors are not short-sale constrained, and the right panel shows
the price when w > 0 proportion of informed investors are subject to short-sale constraints.
The parameters are set to S = 0, 2n = 1,  = 0:5 and w = 0:9, which imply A = 1 and
B = 10. The equilibrium value of C depends on the assumption about the demand shock
distribution gu; without making any distributional assumptions I set C = 0:1.
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Figure 1-2: Distribution of f conditional on p, in absence and presence of short-sale con-
straints.
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The left panel shows that the distribution without short-sale constraints is Gaussian. The
right panel shows that in presence of short-sale constraints (dashed line), the distribution is
only locally normal, with di¤erent means and variances on the two segment, and with a jump
at the price p. For comparison, the continuous line represents the conditional distribution
without the constraint.
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Figure 1-3: Variance of f , conditional on the private signal t and the price p, without and
with short-sale constraints.
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The solid line shows the variance of f conditional on the private signal t and the price p
with no short-sale constraints. The dashed line shows the same in presence of short-sale
constraints. When t!1, short-sale constraints do not change price informativeness. When
t!  1, short-sale constraints, intuitively, decrease price informativeness. For intermediate
t values, creditors can actually learn more from prices under short-sale constraints. The
parameters are set to t = 0:2, u = 0:5, n = 1,  = 1,  = 0:5 and w = 0:9, implying A = 2
and B = 20.
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Figure 1-4: Conditional distribution of f based on t, p, and both t and p, in absence and
presence of short-sale constraints, when t > p.
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The top left panel shows g (f jt) and g (f jp), and the top right panel shows g (f jt; p), without
short-sale constraints. The bottom left panel shows g (f jt) and g (f jp), and the bottom
right panel shows g (f jt; p), with short-sale constraints. The parameters are set to t = 0:5,
u = 0:7, n = 1,  = 1,  = 0:5, and w = 0:6. Signal realizations are t =  0:2 and p = 0:14.
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Figure 1-5: Conditional distribution of f based on t, p, and both t and p, in absence and
presence of short-sale constraints, when t < p.
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The top left panel shows g (f jt) and g (f jp), and the top right panel shows g (f jt; p), without
short-sale constraints. The bottom left panel shows g (f jt) and g (f jp), and the bottom
right panel shows g (f jt; p), with short-sale constraints. Signal realizations are t = 0:2 and
p =  0:14.
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Figure 1-6: IO and CM conditions without short-sale constraints.
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This gure plots the critical mass condition, (1:22), thin line, and the individual optimality
condition without short-sale constraints, (1:23), dotted line. The cuto¤ strategy for invest-
ment, t, is shown on the x axis, and the success threshold, , is on the y axis. The
parameters and variable realizations used here are n = 1, u = 0:5, t = 0:3, ! = 0:8,
c = 0:7 and p = 0:25.
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Figure 1-7: IO and CM conditions with short-sale constraints.
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This gure plots the critical mass condition, (1:22), thin line, and the individual optimality
condition with short-sale constraints, (1:24), dashed line. The cuto¤ strategy for investment,
t, is shown on the x axis, and the success threshold, , is on the y axis. The parameters
and variable realizations used here are n = 1, u = 0:5, t = 0:3, ! = 0:8, c = 0:7 and
p = 0:25. For comparison, the dotted line shows the individual optimality condition without
short-sale constraints, (1:23).
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Chapter 2
Financially constrained strategic
arbitrage
2.1 Introduction
Large traders, such as dealers, hedge funds and other nancial institutions play an important
role in nancial markets when exploiting the relative mispricing of assets: through their
trading, these arbitrageurs bring prices closer to fundamentals and provide liquidity to other
market participants. However, their willingness to provide liquidity can be subject to many
factors. For example, institutional investors trades can have signicant price impact as
their strategies often involve dealing with large positions in assets held by a relatively few
number of investors. Also, wealth constraints and risk management policies crucially a¤ect
arbitrageursallocation of capital to trading opportunities. Therefore, when a small number
of arbitrageurs are present in a market, in addition to internalizing their own price impact
when making investment decisions, they also internalize the impact of their trades on the
constraints and portfolio decisions of other large traders.
This chapter studies how wealth constraints of strategic arbitrageurs a¤ect their will-
ingness to invest, and the dynamics of prices. Arbitrageurs can invest in a fundamentally
riskless arbitrage opportunity. They are required to have positive mark-to-market capital
at all times, and if they violate this constraint, they have to liquidate their risky positions.
As their portfolio is evaluated at up-to-the-minute market information, some arbitrageurs
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can adversely a¤ect market prices and hence trigger the liquidation of others. I show that
whether arbitrageurs behave cooperatively or engage in predatory behaviour depends on their
size of investment in the arbitrage opportunity. When arbitrageurs have similar proportions
invested in the arbitrage, they behave cooperatively, and spread their orders over several
trading periods to minimize price impact. However, if there is signicant di¤erence in this
ratio, the trader with low proportion of wealth invested in the arbitrage predates on the
trader with high proportion of wealth in the arbitrage, and forces her to exit the market.
Moreover, I show that the threat of predation can make arbitrageurs reluctant to invest in
the rst place, and they only exploit the mispricing shortly before it disappears.
To analyze the e¤ect of wealth constraints on arbitrage trading I consider the follow-
ing setup, which partially builds on the models of Gromb and Vayanos (2002) and Kondor
(2009). Two assets with identical payo¤s are traded in segmented markets at di¤erent prices,
and arbitrageurs take long-short positions to exploit this mispricing. In the absence of arbi-
trageurs, the gap between prices would be constant for a nite time horizon, then it would
exogenously disappear. Therefore, the arbitrage is fundamentally riskless. Arbitrageurs, by
trading, endogenously determine the size of the gap. If arbitrageurs on aggregate buy more
of the cheap asset and short more of the expensive asset, i.e. they short the gap, prices of
the assets converge, and the gap shrinks. On the other hand, if arbitrageurs sell the cheap
asset and buy the more expensive, i.e. they go long in the gap, prices diverge, and the gap
widens. I consider a nite set of large arbitrageurs who invest in this arbitrage opportunity.
Arbitrageurs have two important features. They are strategic, that is, they realize hey have
a price impact on the gap, and they face wealth constraints, that is, they must fully collat-
eralize for losses. Moreover, when their capital is insu¢ cient, arbitrageurs must close their
positions and leave the market. The wealth constraint thus implies that arbitrageurscapital
limits the positions they can take if they do not want to violate the constraint. However,
the liquidation constraint can also provide incentives for some arbitrageurs to make prices
diverge and trigger the insolvency of other traders.
The main results are obtained in a framework with two arbitrageurs. Suppose rst that
arbitrageurs already have some bets in place about the gap. I show that their behaviour
depends on their exposure to the arbitrage opportunity. In particular, if traders have similar
proportion of capital invested in the assets, they behave cooperatively, and the equilibrium
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gap decreases quickly. Arbitrageurs compete with each other and rush to the market, hence
prices converge, and the wealth constraint never binds. However, if there is a signicant
di¤erence in the proportion of their capital invested in the arbitrage opportunity, the trader
with lower proportion of wealth invested in the gap predates on the trader with high pro-
portion of wealth invested in the gap: the former (short-)sells the cheap asset and buys the
expensive one, thus prices diverge. Arbitrageurs su¤er losses, but these losses are higher
for the arbitrageur who has invested more in the gap. If she violates her wealth constraint,
she is forced to close her positions in the following period. This in turn widens the price
gap even more, and makes future investment opportunities even better for the sole solvent
arbitrageur.1
Given the cooperative or predatory behaviour discussed above, I also examine whether
arbitrageurs are willing to invest in the arbitrage opportunity at the rst place if they know
they can become exposed to predation by other arbitrageurs. It is important to emphasize
that the possible future losses are all due to predatory behaviour as opposed to unforeseen
shocks, and are all subject to more than one arbitrageur being present in the market. As
liquidation is costly, the threat of predation by other arbitrageurs implies that strategic
traders reduce their initial investments so that liquidation does not happen in equilibrium.
However, as long as one arbitrageur has a much higher level of capital than the other, it
does not a¤ect the gap path signicantly, because the increased investment of the former
compensates for the small position taken by the latter. I show that the wealth constraint
has its strongest e¤ect on the gap process when arbitrageurs start with similarly low level of
capital. In this case arbitrageurs are reluctant to invest much, as shorting one more unit of
1The following quote provides an insight on the recent forced liquidation of Focus Capital, by suggesting that
arbitrageurs occasionally decide to withdraw liquidity from markets, making prices diverge from fundamentals
and forcing distressed institutions to unwind some of their positions at great losses:
"In a letter to investors, the founders of Focus, Tim OBrien and Philippe Bubb, said it had
been hit by violent short-selling by other market participants, which accelerated when rumors
that it was in trouble circulated. Sharp drops in the value of its investments led its two main
banks to force it to sell last Tuesday, according to the letter." (Financial Times, March 4, 2008)
Other famous examples of predatory trading include the near-collapse of Long-Term Capital Management
(LTCM) in 1998, when Goldman Sachs and other counterparties strategically traded against LTCM to ag-
gravate its situation. The proposal of UBS Warburg, to take over Enrons traders without taking over its
trading positions, was opposed on the same ground - it presented potential predatory risk (AFX News Lim-
ited, AFX-Asia, January 18, 2002). See Edwards (1999) and Loewenstein (2000) for detailed analyses on the
LTCM crisis, and Table I of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) for an extensive list on examples of predatory
trading.
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the gap has a large e¤ect on the proportion of wealth put into the arbitrage opportunity, and
exposes the trader to become a prey of the other arbitrageur. Therefore, the gap changes
very little initially, and agents only race to the arbitrage opportunity later.
These results are very much in contrast to the case with a single (monopolistic) arbi-
trageur. She knows that she faces a one-sided bet: if the trader shorts the gap, prices
converge. This implies that her mark-to-market wealth never decreases, and the wealth con-
straint never binds. In the absence of other arbitrageurs, she gradually provides liquidity
to the local markets to minimize her price impact, and her prots are not competed away.
My analysis suggests that as the presence of other arbitrageurs creates predatory risk, in-
creased competition in liquidity provision does not always imply that market segmentation
and abnormal prots disappear quickly.
The model presented here is related to several strands of the literature, in addition to
that on nancial constraints. It is connected to models of limited arbitrage, including Shleifer
and Vishny (1997), Xiong (2001), Gromb and Vayanos (2002), and Liu and Longsta¤ (2004).
A large part of this literature focuses on potential losses in convergence trading due to in-
stitutional frictions or capital constraints. The common element in these models is that
their mechanisms amplify exogenous shocks: arbitrageurs have to liquidate part of their po-
sitions after an initial shock to prices which creates further adverse price movements and
liquidations. In my model, the amplication mechanism is endogenized and entirely strate-
gic. Arbitrageurs are not fully competitive, and hence some of them can exploit their price
impact to force others into distress. This type of strategic interaction, which is missing from
the above papers, makes a fundamentally riskless arbitrage opportunity risky.
The two papers closest to my analysis on nancially constrained arbitrage are Kondor
(2009) and Attari and Mello (2006). Kondor (2009) develops an equilibrium model of con-
vergence trading and its impact on asset prices, where arbitrageurs optimally decide how to
allocate their limited capital over time. He shows that prices of identical assets can diverge
even if the constraints faced by arbitrageurs are not binding, and that in equilibrium arbi-
trageursactivity endogenously generates losses with positive probability, even if the trading
opportunity is fundamentally riskless. Whereas he works with one representative arbitrageur
and his focus is on the endogenous determination of the price gap, I study the trading be-
haviour of imperfectly competitive arbitrageurs, who try to exploit the vulnerability of each
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other by engaging in predatory trading. Attari and Mello (2006) analyze the trading strategy
of a monopolistic arbitrageur who can, to some extent, inuence the dynamics of prices on
which capital requirements are based. They show that nancial constraints are responsible
for volatile prices and for time variation in the correlations of prices across markets. In con-
trast, my model allows for heterogeneity among arbitrageurs and focuses on the strategic
interaction among them. Moreover, the lack of uncertainty allows me to provide analytical
solution in my setting, while they can only numerically solve their model.
The model also belongs to those on predatory trading (i.e. trading that induces and/or
exploits the need of other investors to reduce their positions) and forced liquidation. Brun-
nermeier and Pedersen (2005) show that if a distressed trader needs to sell for exogenous
reasons, others also sell and subsequently buy back the asset. This leads to price overshoot-
ing and a reduced liquidation value for the distressed trader. Hence, the market is illiquid
when liquidity is most needed. Carlin et al. (2007) analyze how episodic illiquidity can arise
from a breakdown in cooperation between market participants. They consider a repeated
setting of a predatory stage game and show that while most of the time traders provide ap-
parent liquidity to each other, when the steaks are high, cooperation breaks down, leading to
sudden and short-lived illiquidity. In these papers liquidation is exogenously imposed on some
agents, as arbitrageurs become distressed due to an adverse shock and have to liquidate, while
solvent traders take advantage of them. In contrast, the model presented here endogenizes
the solvency of arbitrageurs: as capital requirements depend on observed prices, arbitrageurs
might be able to induce the distress of others by manipulating the price, thus giving rise to
predatory risk, which discourages investors from investing in the arbitrage opportunity.2
Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002, 2003) also provide a model with limited willingness of
arbitrageurs to exploit a mispricing. They consider a setup where arbitrageurs want to invest
while other arbitrageurs are investing, but asymmetric information causes a coordination
problem. In contrast, in the model of this chapter information is symmetric, and arbitrageurs
want to invest when others do not. It creates an incentive to drive other investors out from
the market, which in turn prevents arbitrageurs with limited capital from investing much in
the rst place.
2See also papers that concentrate on endogenous risk as a result of amplication due to nancial constraints,
e. g. Bernardo and Welch (2004), Danielsson et al. (2004, 2011), and Morris and Shin (2004).
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The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 presents the general model. Section 2.3
solves the case with a single arbitrageur. Section 2.4 derives the equilibrium of the model
with two strategic arbitrageurs. Section 2.5 analyzes the e¤ect of predatory threat on the
initial investment decisions. Finally, Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Model
The model is similar to the setups of Gromb and Vayanos (2002) and Kondor (2009). Time
is discrete and there are four periods, t = 0; 1; 2, and 3. There is a set of arbitrageurs
who can invest in two traded assets: a riskless bond and a fundamentally riskless arbitrage
opportunity. The riskless bond has a constant return, normalized to one. The arbitrage
opportunity is called a (price) gap, denoted by gt in period t = 0; :::; 3. I assume that this
gap starts at an initial level of g > 0 and disappears due to an exogenous shock at date 3,
i.e. g3 = 0. I also assume, and then conrm in equilibrium, that it is always non-negative.
The natural interpretation of the gap is the di¤erence between the prices of two risky
assets with identical payo¤s that are traded in segmented markets by local traders, and only
a set of arbitrageurs can trade in both of them.3 The prices can be di¤erent due to an
initial supply shock to the local traders in one market, which disappears at date 3. In this
setting, arbitrageurs can take long-short positions by buying the cheaper asset and shorting
the expensive asset. This strategy gives a fundamentally riskless arbitrage opportunity if held
until the price di¤erence disappears at date 3, which can also be thought of as the maturity
of the gap. Investing more into the arbitrage opportunity, which is essentially betting on the
converge of the prices of the two assets, happens by increasing the long position in the cheap
asset and increasing the short position (in absolute terms) in the expensive asset. I also refer
to this as shorting the gap.4
There are a nite number arbitrageurs, denoted by I, which for simplicity is either one
3See Gromb and Vayanos (2002) for a microfoundation in this spirit. Not modelling the local markets and
using the shortcut of a gap asset means that arbitrageurs are not allowed to take asymmetric positions in the
two assets.
4As the focus of this analysis is on the strategic interaction among large traders facing an arbitrage oppor-
tunity, I take market segmentation for local traders as given. Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Zigrand (2004) and
Kondor (2009) use similar assumptions. See Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009, 2010) for an information-
based mechanism that results in endogenous market segmentation.
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or two. Arbitrageurs behave strategically. In particular, when there is a single arbitrageur,
I = 1, she has monopoly power over providing liquidity in the local markets. I refer to the
case with two arbitrageurs, I = 2, as a duopoly of strategic traders. Arbitrageurs, indexed
by i = 1; :::; I, are assumed to be risk neutral. They start with positive capital M i in the
bond and no initial endowment in the arbitrage opportunity, xi = 0, and maximize expected
utility of their date 3 wealth.
Arbitrageursactivity a¤ects the di¤erence between the prices of local assets. In particu-
lar, when arbitrageurs in aggregate short xt units of the gap, its level is given by
gt = g   xt, t = 0; 1; 2, (2.1)
where  > 0 is an exogenously given illiquidity parameter that describes the price impact of
arbitrage trades.5 Equation (2:1) can also be given in the dynamic form:
gt = gt 1    (xt   xt 1) (2.2)
for t = 0; 1; 2, and with g 1  g and x 1  0. Equation (2:2) shows that when arbitrageurs
increase their long position in the cheaper asset and their short position in the expensive
asset by one unit, the price di¤erence decreases, and the gap shrinks by .
Moreover, arbitrageurs are subject to wealth constraints. In particular, they are required
to have non-negative marked-to-market wealth at all times.6 If a trader violates this con-
straint, i.e. she defaults, she has to close all her positions in the following period. I refer to
this as re-sale or liquidation. Formally, if arbitrageur i has M it 1 in the riskless bond and a
short position of xit 1 units of the gap after trading at date t   1, then her mark-to-market
wealth is M it 1   gt 1xit 1, and the constraint can be written as:
if M it 1   gt 1xit 1 < 0, it must be that xit = 0.
5 I assume that increasing the short position in the gap by one unit always has the same price impact (as
long as xt < g=). It holds, for example, if local traders having exponential utility and asset payo¤s are
normally distributed.
6The specic wealth constraint considered in this model is just one of many nancial constraints that
are based on market prices, e.g. margin constraints (Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and Garleanu and
Pedersen (2011)), or value at risk (VaR) constraints (Garleanu and Pedersen (2007)). They would lead to
qualitatively similar results.
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The wealth constraint requires that arbitrageurs can always cover their accumulated losses
from their bond positions. As long as they do not default, they do not face any restrictions
on their orders in the following trading period. However, when they do default, they must
close their positions immediately, i.e. sell all the risky assets that they hold and buy back
what they short in the following period.7
Arbitrageur is optimization problem is as follows:
max
fxitg2t=0
W i3
 
M i

= M i +
2P
t=0
gt
 
xit
  
xit   xit 1

, (2.3)
subject to the evolution of the gap:
gt = gt 1   
IP
i=1
 
xit   xit 1

for t = 0; 1; 2, (2.4)
and the wealth constraint:
xit = 0 if M
i
t 1 < gt 1x
i
t 1 for t = 0; 1; 2, (2.5)
where g 1  g, M i 1  M i and xi 1  0 for i = 1; :::; I. In each trading period t = 0; 1; 2,
rst it is determined whether an arbitrageur is solvent. Second, the risky asset is traded.
The equilibrium of the economy is dened as follows:
Denition 12 A dynamic Nash-equilibrium of the trading game consists of the gap fgtg2t=0
and the holdings of arbitrageurs

xit
	2
t=0
for i = 1; :::; I, such that

xit
	2
t=0
solve (2:3) subject
to (2:4) and (2:5).
Before proceeding to the solution of the model, I make two observations about the opti-
mization problem and the wealth constraint.
First, it is important to notice that as long as there is a single arbitrageur, i.e. she has
monopoly power in providing liquidity, the market price used to evaluate her portfolio only
7The combination of the wealth constraint and the liquidation can be thought of as a shortcut for the joint
e¤ect of two well-known phenomena. On one hand, the relationship between past performance and fund ows
has been documented for various asset classes. See, for example, Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Sirri and
Tufano (1998), or Berk and Green (2004), who provide a model of active portfolio management when fund
ows rationally respond to past performance. On the other hand, Coval and Sta¤ord (2007) show that funds
experiencing large outows decrease existing positions by engaging in re-sales, which creates price pressure.
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depends on her risky holdings. However, when there are at least two strategic agents, the
trade order of one of them inuences the market clearing price and hence a¤ects the constraint
status of the other arbitrageur. In particular, widening the gap between the prices of the two
assets creates losses to someone who is betting on the convergence of prices, and might even
trigger her re-sale. When this distressed trader is forced to close her positions, this further
widens the gap, and creates a more protable opportunity to agents still solvent. Therefore,
although it is costly to trade against price convergence, there is also a benet of having a
better investment opportunity later on. Moreover, an arbitrageur close to bankruptcy might
not mind violating her constraint at all. When others are betting on divergence and thus
are e¤ectively widening the gap, it can be very costly to support the price to ensure that she
remains solvent.
Second, there is a natural way to simplify the wealth constraint (2:5). Since the dynamics
of the riskless position can be expressed as
M it = M
i
t 1 + gt
 
xit   xit 1

(2.6)
for t = 0; 1; 2, it is easy to show that requiring non-negative capital at time t, M it   gtxit  0,
is equivalent to
M it 1  gtxit 1. (2.7)
If it does not hold, arbitrageur i is forced to liquidate in the following period: xit+1 = 0.
However, in this 4-period economy, marking to market is only relevant after period 1. This
is because for t = 0, condition (2:7) is equivalent to M i  g0xi, which always holds as
arbitrageurs start with positive bond positions (M i > 0) and no endowment in risky assets
(xi = 0). In addition, violating the constraint at t = 2 would mean that an arbitrageur has
to liquidate her risky position in period 3, but there is no trading at date 3 as assets already
pay o¤. Therefore the wealth constraint is only relevant after period t = 1: if arbitrageur i
fails to satisfy
M i0  g1xi0, (2.8)
she must liquidate at period 2, i.e. have xi2 = 0.
Further simplication of (2:8) can provide additional intuition regarding the nature of the
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constraint. In particular, from (2:6), (2:8) is equivalent to
M i  (g1   g0)xi0. (2.9)
The left hand side of this inequality is the mark-to-market wealth of arbitrageur i at date
0, which is positive by assumption, and hence the agent is not distressed at date 0. The
right hand side of the inequality represents the loss arbitrageur i makes on her positions
between date 0 and 1. Hence, (2:9) requires the arbitrageurs wealth before trading at date
1 to be enough to cover all the losses su¤ered on her initial position. However, it might not
always hold. In particular, when initially arbitrageur i is shorting the gap, xi0 > 0, but it
actually widens, g1 > g0, the wealth constraint gets tighter and she can become distressed if
her starting capital is not su¢ ciently high. Similarly, arbitrageur is wealth constraint gets
tighter if she bets on price divergence, xi0 < 0, while the gap shrinks, g1 < g0. On the other
hand, as long as arbitrageur i bets on the convergence (divergence), and prices do converge
(diverge), the constraint gets relaxed.
2.3 Monopoly
In this section I solve for the optimal trades of the unconstrained and the constrained monop-
olist arbitrageur. With a sole arbitrageur, I = 1, the trading game simplies to a portfolio
choice problem, subject to a wealth constraint that a¤ects the trading speed of the agent.
Dropping the superscript referring to the only arbitrageur i = 1, her optimization problem
can be written as:
max
fxtg2t=0
W i3 (M) = M +
2P
t=0
gt (xt) (xt   xt 1) (2.10)
subject to market clearing:
gt = gt 1    (xt   xt 1) for t = 0; 1; 2, and g 1  g,
and the insolvency constraint:
x2 = 0 if M < (g1   g0)x0: (2.11)
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First, I solve the optimization problem without (2:11). The optimal trades and the gap
process in absence of the wealth constraint are summarized in the following result:
Proposition 13 The unconstrained monopolist arbitrageur gradually provides liquidity in
the local markets, i.e. she trades the same amount in every period. Formally,
x0;u =
1
4
g, x1;u =
1
2
g, and x2;u =
3
4
g,
and the gap decreases linearly over time:
g0;u =
3
4
g, g1;u =
1
2
g, and g2;u =
1
4
g.
Proposition 13 states that in case there is a single strategic trader taking advantage of
the mispricing across markets, her early trades only compete with her later trades. As she
can commit to a strategy that minimizes her price impact, she smoothes her orders across
several dates, and hence trades the same amount in each period. This is illustrated on Figure
2-1.
Suppose now that the monopolist arbitrageur is subject to wealth constraint (2:11), which
might prevent her to supply liquidity as in Proposition 13. The main question is whether a
trader endowed with positive capital and facing a riskless arbitrage opportunity would ever
get to a state where she faces liquidation. The answer is negative:
Proposition 14 The wealth constraint never binds on the equilibrium gap path. Therefore it
does not a¤ect the trading of a monopolist arbitrageur, and does not inuence the convergence
speed of the two prices.
The result of Proposition 14 is rather straightforward. It is obvious that the constrained
arbitrageur can never be better o¤ than the unconstrained arbitrageur of Proposition 13.
However, she can achieve the same terminal wealth. This is because when a single strategic
trader shorts the gap, the convergence is purely the e¤ect of her trade. Consequently, she
is making prots throughout the whole process, and the gap decreases, g1   g0 < 0. The
wealth constraint thus never binds, and in fact never a¤ects the equilibrium trading of the
arbitrageur.
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2.4 Duopoly
2.4.1 Benchmark case
Similarly to the monopoly case, I start with characterizing the equilibrium orders and the
gap process when there are two strategic arbitrageurs, I = 2, and they face no constraints on
the positions taken in the gap asset. However they are aware that investing one more unit of
capital at a certain date decreases the return on future investments of both arbitrageurs. It
has two contrasting implications regarding their trading behaviour. First, they would like to
trade slowly to minimize their price impact. Second, both of them would still like to trade
faster than the other arbitrageur. Formally, I obtain the following results:
Proposition 15 The equilibrium holdings of unconstrained duopolist arbitrageurs are give
by
xi0;u =
385
1299
g, xi1;u =
182
433
g, and xi2;u =
205
433
g, for i = 1; 2,
and the gap decreases as
g0;u =
529
1299
g, g1;u =
69
433
g, and g2;u =
23
433
g.
Figure 2-2 illustrates the evolution of the gap and the holdings of the duopolist arbi-
trageurs, and contrasts the gap processes in the monopoly and duopoly cases. The main
message of Proposition 15 is that when there are two strategic traders taking advantage of
the mispricing across markets, these competing arbitrageurs race to the market, and the price
gap decreases much faster than with a single arbitrageur.
This result is clearly intuitive. As before, illiquidity gives arbitrageurs an incentive to
spread trades over time, in order to minimize their price impact. However, now the trade
order of an arbitrageur at a certain date not only competes with her later investments, but
also with all the present and future investments of the other arbitrageur. As arbitrageurs
face a downward sloping demand curve, they both try to trade before the other arbitrageur
trades, and the presence of another arbitrageur leads to competition between them. The
equilibrium strategy shows that the second e¤ect is stronger than the rst. This is why
duopolist strategic traders cannot commit to a strategy that minimizes their joint price
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impact and takes advantage of the mispricing the most e¢ cient way (from the viewpoint of
arbitrageurs in aggregate). Instead they both race to the market at date 0. As Figure 2-2
shows, trading volume is large in the early periods; and the gap converges faster than with a
single arbitrageur, and slows down later.
2.4.2 Constrained case
In the remainder of this section I consider a subgame of the optimization program (2:3) to
study how wealth constraints a¤ect arbitrage activity with two strategic traders. I assume
that some trading at date 0 has already taken place: the price gap is given by g0, and
arbitrageurs already have short positions xi0 in the gap asset and bond holdingsM
i
0, i = 1; 2.
8
I proceed to the overall solution in Section 2.5 after discussing the equilibria of the subgame
and the notion of predatory threat.
The optimization problem of agent i is the following:
max
xi1;x
i
2
W i3
 
M i0; x
i
0; g0

= M i0 + g1
 
xi1
  
xi1   xi0

+ g2
 
xi2
  
xi2   xi1

.
subject to market clearing:
gt = gt 1   
 
xit   xit 1 + x it   x it 1

for t = 1; 2 and i = 1; 2,
where  i denotes the other agent; and the insolvency constraints:
xi2 = 0 if M
i <
 
g1
 
xi1
  g0xi0, and x i2 = 0 if M i <  g1  xi1  g0x i0 .
The second wealth constraint indicates that arbitrageur i is aware of the constraint for arbi-
trageur  i, and hence can inuence the price to trigger her re-sale.
To dene an equilibrium, I dene the states of the world and two notions of value functions
as follows:
Denition 16 At date 1 each arbitrageur can be in one of three states: (i) state n for the
8One reason for being endowed with the risky assets before trade starts would be because traders previously
enjoyed some (unmodelled) private benets from holding them.
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constraint being satised and not binding at the equilibrium holding and gap, i.e. M i > 
g1
 
xi1
  g0xi0; (ii) state b for the constraint binding, M i =  g1  xi1  g0xi0; or (iii)
state v for the constraint being violated, M i <
 
g1
 
xi1
  g0xi0.
At date 2 each arbitrageur can be in one of two states: (i) state s for solvent (i.e. trade
freely), or (ii) state l for liquidated/insolvent (i.e. having to close her risky position).
The dynamics of states are as follows: (i) If arbitrageur i satises her wealth constraint,
she can freely trade in period 2. Formally, if arbitrageur i is in state n or b at date 1, she
gets to state s at date 2; (ii) On the other hand, if the arbitrageur violates the constraint, she
must liquidate in period 2. Formally, if agent i is in state v at date 1, she gets to state l at
date 2.
Given the denition of states, one can dene the state-dependent value functions:
Denition 17 The state-dependent (or conditional) value function of agent i = 1; 2 in period
t = 1; 2 and arbitrageur states fjkg is denoted by Vt;jk
 
M it ; x
i
t;M
 i
t ; x
 i
t

, where
j and k are the states of arbitrageur i and  i, respectively; j; k 2 fn; b; vg if t = 1, and
j; k 2 fs; lg if t = 2;
M it and x
i
t are the after-trade holdings of arbitrageur i; and
M it and x
 i
t are the after-trade holdings of arbitrageur  i.
Based on the state-dependent value functions I dene the value function such that the
optimization problem is the problem of choosing the optimal demand and the state jointly:
Denition 18 The value function of agent i at date t is the merger of di¤erent conditional
value functions from di¤erent states of the world given as
V it
 
M it ; x
i
t;M
 i
t ; x
 i
t

=
P
j;k
1jkVt;jk
 
M it ; x
i
t;M
 i
t ; x
 i
t

where 1jk is an indicator, and takes the value of 1 if, based on their date 1 mark-to-market
portfolio value, arbitrageur i is in state j and arbitrageur  i is in state k, and zero otherwise.
Finally, given the value function, I take the standard denition of a Nash-equilibrium:
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Denition 19 A Nash-equilibrium of the economy is a vector of demands

xit
	
i=1;2;t=1;2
such that xit solves the program
max
x
V it
 
M it ; x
i
t;M
 i
t ; x
 i
t jx it ;M it 1; xit 1;M it 1; x it 1

= V it
 
M it 1 + gt (x)
 
x  xit 1

; x;M it 1   gt (x)
 
x it   x it 1

; x it

where gt (x) is the market-clearing gap in period t when agent i submits the demand x, and
agent  i submits her equilibrium demand x it .
Before proceeding to the equilibria of this game, let me make an observation about the
wealth constraint. As described in (2:8), the wealth constraint can be expressed as M i 
(g1   g0)xi0 for i = 1; 2. Thus, if arbitrageur i enters period 1 with a zero position in the
risky assets, xi0 = 0, her constraint will never bind. Suppose now that both arbitrageurs have
taken non-zero positions at date 0. Then M1=x10 and M
2=x20 exist, and they describe the
inverse of the proportion of wealth invested in the gap. Suppose further that both x10 and
x20 are positive (as it is going to be in equilibrium), that is arbitrageurs initially bet on the
convergence of prices. It implies that the wealth constraints can be rewritten in the form
M1
x10
 g1   g0 and M
2
x20
 g1   g0.
It is easy to see that as long as the proportion invested in the gap asset is di¤erent between
agents, for example M1=x10 > M
2=x20, there is a natural order between arbitrageurs. If
arbitrageur 2 is solvent, arbitrageur 1 remains solvent too. On the other hand, if arbitrageur
1 is insolvent, arbitrageur 2 has to liquidate too. Moreover, there always exists a gap level
g1 such that arbitrageur 1 remains solvent while arbitrageur 2 goes bankrupt. Therefore the
trader with higher M i=xi0 ratio, i.e. lower proportion of wealth invested in the arbitrage
opportunity, can always be more aggressive, while the arbitrageur with higher proportion of
wealth invested in the gap must be more cautious with her trades. In the characterization of
the equilibrium I will refer to them as arbitrageurs a and c.9
9 IfM10 =x
1
0 =M
2
0 =x
2
0, the constraint binds for them at the same time. It implies that either both arbitrageurs
remain solvent, or they both go bankrupt. Also, when, for example, arbitrageur 1 does not trade in period 0,
i.e. x10 = 0, the constraint will never bind for her. This case can be thought of as the limit when M
1
0 =x
1
0 !1.
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Before proceeding to the solution of the model, I discuss the methodology of the equi-
librium construction. The above problem can be solved backwards. First I solve for the
optimal trades at date 2 given the conjectured state arbitrageurs are in (ss, sl, or ll), and
obtain value functions representing their continuation utilities. Then I solve for the optimal
trades of period 1. The complexity of the solution arises here regarding how to deal with
the liquidation constraint. The possibility of forced liquidation implies that the optimization
problem of an arbitrageur is globally non-continuous and non-concave, so local conditions
for the equilibrium are not su¢ cient. However, the optimization problem is locally concave
almost everywhere. Figures 2-3 and 2-4 illustrate the utility of an arbitrageur as a function
of her trade at date 1 while holding the other arbitrageurs date-1 trade constant in two
particular cases. It is straightforward that the optimization problem can always be divided
into three segments that correspond to the states of the world such that the utility function
is concave in each segment.10 The possible portfolios of an arbitrageur in one segment lead
to a di¤erent continuation state from portfolios in another segment: if a trader increases her
short position su¢ ciently, the gap shrinks and both arbitrageurs remain solvent. However if
an arbitrageur decides to go long in the gap, the gap widens, and can push (at least) one
arbitrageur into distress. Consequently, for each portfolio choice of the other trader, an arbi-
trageur compares the locally optimal investment strategies in the three segments, and picks
the one with highest utility.
Because of the local concavity, given the other arbitrageurs investment decision, there is
an optimal portfolio within each state of the world. Combining these conditions for the two
arbitrageurs gives a set of candidate equilibria, satisfying that none of the traders want to
alter their strategies as long as the state of the world remains the same. Therefore, it must
be also checked whether these trades are globally optimal too, i.e. whether any arbitrageur
would prefer to deviate in such a way that changes the state of the world.
10The three states from the viewpoint of the aggressive arbitrageur are ss, sl and ll. From the viewpoint
of the cautious arbitrageur the possible states are ss, ls and ll. This is because the roles of arbitrageurs
imply that it is impossible to have a case when the cautious arbitrageur remains solvent and the aggressive
arbitrageur becomes insolvent.
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Candidate equilibria
I describe the equilibria of the economy in two steps. First, I provide the set of candidate
equilibria with the locally optimal portfolios, which also determine the gap path. The derived
date-1 gap g1, combined with (2:9), thus provides a straightforward necessary condition on
the proportion of wealths invested for such an equilibrium to exists. Then I discuss the actual
equilibria of the economy for the three cases when (i) both arbitrageurs remain solvent; (ii) the
aggressive arbitrageur remains solvent, but the cautious is insolvent; or (iii) both arbitrageurs
go bankrupt. These are di¤erent from the candidate equilibria because the globally optimal
portfolios must satisfy more requirements than local optimality. For tractability, I only discuss
the cases when arbitrageurs initially short the gap asset, i.e. xa0; x
c
0 > 0, which will be the
case in equilibrium. All the other cases are described in an internet appendix.
Proposition 20 When both arbitrageurs remain solvent, the locally optimal strategies and
the gap path are given by
xi1   xi0 =
7
23
g0 and xi2   xi1 =
3
23
g0 for i = a; c. (2.12)
and
g1 =
9
23
g0 and g2 =
3
23
g0.
Such a candidate equilibrium exists for every 0 < M c=xc0 < M
a=xa0. Moreover, the wealth
constraint is not binding for any arbitrageur.
Suppose that both arbitrageurs remain solvent, and it happens without the constraint
binding for the cautious arbitrageur. It implies that the locally optimal strategies are those
that would emerge in the equilibrium of the economy with no wealth constraint.11 As before,
since arbitrageurs face a downward sloping demand curve, they both try to trade before the
other arbitrageur trades. It leads to competition between them: arbitrageurs race to the
market, and the gap shrinks quickly. Since the gap decreases, g1 < g0, arbitrageurs record
prots throughout the convergence, thus they indeed remain solvent even if they start with
11For this note that substituting the date-0 unconstrained gap, g0;u, into g0 gives the same portfolios that
were derived in Proposition 15.
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very low capital. Moreover, the constraint of arbitrageur c cannot bind in equilibrium, because
that would imply the gap must widen, g1 > g0. However, in this case both arbitrageurs would
be willing to short the gap a little bit more to trade before the other arbitrageur, hence the
gap would shrink, and the constraint would not bind any more.
Proposition 21 When the aggressive arbitrageur remains solvent and the cautious liqui-
dates:
(i) There exists a candidate equilibrium where the wealth constraint is not binding for the
aggressive arbitrageur. The locally optimal strategies and the gap path are given by
xi1   xi0 =
1
5
(g0   xc0) for i = a; c,
xa2   xa1 =
1
2
(g1 + x
c
1) and x
c
2 = 0,
and
g1 =
3
5
g0 +
2
5
xc0 and g2 =
2
5
g0 +
3
5
xc0.
The candidate equilibrium requires xc0 >
1
g0 and 0 < M
c=xc0 <  25 (g0   xc0) Ma=xa0.
(ii) There exists a candidate equilibrium where the wealth constraint is binding for the
aggressive arbitrageur when 0 < M c=xc0 < M
a=xa0 <  25 (g0   xc0). As the constraint is
binding for the aggressive arbitrageur, the locally optimal strategies and the gap path satisfy
g1   g0 = Ma=xa0. Moreover, there are many possible optimal trades as this case corresponds
to a corner solution.
The proposition states that as long as the constraint does not bind for arbitrageur a, the
locally optimal strategies satisfy that arbitrageurs sell the same amount from the cheap asset
and buy the same amount from the expensive asset, driving the gap up at date 1. In fact, the
cautious trader knows that if the aggressive trader goes long in the gap asset to widen the gap,
she does not have enough capital to cover her losses emerging due to the price divergence,
and she will be forced to close her position. As arbitrageurs face a downward sloping demand
curve, the cautious trader wants to avoid a round-trip transaction (buying and then being
forced to sell, or selling and then buying), because it would lead to additional losses. She also
wants to minimize her price impact when liquidating. Therefore, she conducts the re-sale
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in two periods, and closes part of her positions already at date 1 and the rest at date 2.
In the meantime, at date 1 the aggressive arbitrageur nds it optimal to do exactly the
same the cautious arbitrageur does. Notice that the condition xc0 >
1
g0 implies that the gap
widens through time, i.e. g2 > g1 > g0. Hence when trader c nishes the re-sale, trader a
will face a better arbitrage opportunity to invest than in the very beginning, as the gap is
wider. In fact, the aggressive trader withdraws liquidity instead of providing liquidity exactly
when the cautious arbitrageur would need it the most. This is in the spirit of Brunnermeier
and Pedersen (2005). However, in this model predation happens endogenously, unlike in
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005), where the prey is passive. Here arbitrageur c could avoid
bankruptcy by taking a su¢ ciently large long position and ensuring she su¤ers no losses
between periods 0 and 1, but she realizes it would be too costly for her. The constraints on the
proportion of the wealth invested correspond to the fact that the aggressive arbitrageur can
indeed cover her losses due to the gap diverging from g0 to g1, while the cautious arbitrageur
cannot.
Proposition 21 also states that a qualitatively similar candidate equilibrium (but with
di¤erent trades) can happen even if arbitrageur a has lower level of capital (or higher propor-
tion of capital invested in the arbitrage opportunity). This is because with M c=xc0 < M
a=xa0
the aggressive arbitrageur can always set the gap such that her losses are still covered by her
starting wealth while violating the wealth constraint of the cautious arbitrageur.
Proposition 22 When both arbitrageurs become insolvent, the locally optimal strategies and
the gap path are given by
xi1   xi0 =  
1
3
 
xi0 + x
 i
0

and xi2 = 0 for i = a; c.
and
g1 = g0 +
2
3
(xa0 + x
c
0) and g2 = g0 +  (x
a
0 + x
c
0) .
Such a candidate equilibrium exists if 0 < M c=xc0 < M
a=xa0 < 2 (x
a
0 + x
c
0) =3.
When both arbitrageurs violate the constraint and become insolvent, they have to strate-
gically liquidate their positions through two periods. Arbitrageurs know that they are facing
a downward sloping demand curve, and want to minimize their price impact while liquidating.
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To close their positions, they have to buy the expensive asset and sell the cheap asset, hence
they both want to buy/sell before the other arbitrageur. Thus they race to the market. In
equilibrium, they liquidate the same amount at date 1, namely 2=3 of their aggregate asset
holdings, and at date 2 they liquidate the remaining 1=3.
Equilibrium characterization
Given the locally optimal strategies, it is possible to analyze under what circumstances they
are globally optimal too. Regarding the equilibrium with both arbitrageurs solvent, I obtain
the following result:
Proposition 23 There exists an equilibrium of the trading game with both arbitrageurs re-
maining solvent (state ss) if and only if
Ma
xa0
>
M c
xc0
 1nn;nv (g0; xc0) , (2.13)
where the function 1nn;nv (; ) > 0 is given in Appendix 2.7.2.
According to Proposition 20, it was possible to have a candidate equilibrium such that
both arbitrageurs remain solvent for any proportions of wealth invested in the arbitrage
opportunity, because prices converged and arbitrageurs made prots throughout the whole
trading process. When looking for an actual equilibrium, turns out this is not the case.
In particular, as the aggressive arbitrageur is aware of the wealth constraint of the cautious
agent, arbitrageur a can engage in the manipulation of date-1 prices. Facing a downward
sloping demand curve, this manipulation is costly because of the price impact. However,
manipulation can be protable due to two sources of prots. First, if the cautious arbitrageur
goes bankrupt, the aggressive arbitrageur has monopoly power in providing liquidity to local
traders at date 2. Second, as arbitrageur c has a short position in the gap after period 1, i.e.
xc1 = x
c
0 +
7
23g0 > 0, her re-sale widens the gap and makes forced liquidation even more
desirable for the aggressive trader. The cost of manipulation is decreasing in the proportion
of arbitrageur cs wealth invested into the arbitrage opportunity, i.e. increasing in M c=xc0,
while the prot of the re-sale is increasing in xc1, i.e. in both the cautious arbitrageurs
holding before date 1, xc0, and the initial gap g0. Combining these observations, there exists
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a threshold for M c=xc0 such that if the proportion of arbitrageur cs wealth invested into the
arbitrage opportunity is low enough, forcing her to liquidate is too costly, and an equilibrium
with both agents remaining solvent exists.
Next, I present the conditions under which predation happens.
Proposition 24 There exists an equilibrium with the aggressive arbitrageur remaining sol-
vent and the cautious arbitrageur becoming insolvent (state sl) if and only if
0 <
M c
xc0
 cnv;nn (g0; xc0) and
Ma
xa0
 cnv;vv (g0; xa0; xc0) , (2.14)
where cnv;nn (; ) ;cnv;vv (; ) > 0 are given in Appendix 2.7.2.
Comparing Propositions 21 and 24, the main di¤erence is that the wealth requirements
are tighter. For an equilibrium it must be that the locally optimal strategies are globally
optimal too. It is apparent that the key is whether the cautious arbitrageur would be better
o¤ avoiding liquidation as a result of some costly price manipulation at date 1 that changes
the state of the world.
The cautious arbitrageur starts trading with an initial long position in the arbitrage
opportunity, but due to her limited capital, she cannot sustain losses caused by the activity
of the aggressive arbitrageur in the short run. It is apparent that if arbitrageur c wants to
remain solvent, she can always do so. This is because if arbitrageur a widens the gap, trader
c can always engage in exactly the opposite trade that leaves the gap unchanged, and thus
leaves the state untouched as well. The question is how costly it is.
In particular, suppose the aggressive arbitrageurs strategy is xed at buying a very large
amount of the gap asset, which makes prices diverge. Arbitrageur c, being subject to the
wealth constraint, can do two things. First, she can short enough so that she neutralizes the
e¤ect of the aggressive arbitrageurs trades and brings g1 su¢ ciently close to the the original
level g0. In this case she remains solvent. As she faces a downward sloping demand curve,
shorting a large amount of the gap asset is costly, as it diminishes future returns on the assets
she is holding. On the other hand, the benet of this strategy is that the arbitrageur remains
solvent and can invest again at date 2. Alternatively, she can accept that she is pushed to
insolvency. In that case the optimal liquidation strategy means shorting less at date 1, which
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leads to smaller price impact. Moreover, since the other trader is still solvent at date 2, the
cautious arbitrageur can liquidate at more favourable prices.
Whether the cautious trader thus nds it optimal to liquidate or not, given the selling
pressure of the aggressive trader, depends on the relative costs and gains of these two strate-
gies. In particular, the prot from remaining solvent increases in her initial position xc0, and
in the gap size g0. This implies that the threshold for equilibrium on the proportion of wealth
invested by the cautious arbitrageur, cnv;nn (; ), is an increasing function of both xc0 and g0.
Finally, regarding equilibria in which both agents get liquidated I obtain the following
result:
Proposition 25 There exists no equilibrium of the trading game with both arbitrageurs being
insolvent.
This result is rather intuitive. Indeed, liquidation imposes a cost on both agents, because
they have to close the positions they previously created to bet on the convergence of prices.
Put it di¤erently, arbitrageurs must sell assets at lower prices than they have bought them,
or buy back previously shorted assets at prices higher than when they started to short them.
Given that the divergence in prices is solely the e¤ect of their own activities, arbitrageurs
could avoid these self-imposed costs by not trading at all in period 1. By simply holding on
to their existing positions the gap would not change, and the constraint would not get tighter
than before. Arbitrageurs would remain solvent and their optimal unconstrained trades in
period 2 could not make them worse o¤ than the forced liquidation.
The di¤erent regions for the proportions of wealth invested in the arbitrage opportunity
described in Propositions 23 and 24 are illustrated on Figure 2-5.
2.5 Predatory threat and arbitrage
So far I have taken the initial positions xi0 and the gap g0 as given. In this section I endogenize
xi0 by extending the previous analysis with an investment phase at date 0. Arbitrageurs know
that the initial positions they take and hence the gap they face a¤ect which state of the world
they get into after date 0. I show that liquidation does not happen in equilibrium, but as
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long as one arbitrageur has a much higher level of capital than the other, it does not a¤ect
the gap path signicantly. I show that the wealth constraint has its strongest e¤ect on the
gap path when arbitrageurs start with similarly low level of capital. In this case the gap
decreases very little in period 0, then both agents rush to the arbitrage opportunity.
When solving the date-0 optimization problem, I restrict the (on- and o¤-equilibrium)
action space of arbitrageurs to trades with which they end up in either an ss or an sl
equilibrium. It means that for a given x20, arbitrageur 1 must choose her position x
1
0 in such
a way that arbitrage positions maximize her utility while satisfying either (2:13) or (2:14).
Of course when deciding on the initial investment xi0, arbitrageur i also realizes that as long
as her proportion of wealth invested into the arbitrage opportunity is higher than that of the
other trader, i.e. M i=xi0 < M
 i=x i0 , the wealth constraint is tighter for her, and hence she
takes the role of the cautious arbitrageur. Formally, I look for a dynamic equilibrium where
arbitrageur i solves the problem
xi0 2 arg maxx W
i
3 = V0
 
xjM i;M i; x i0

,
where
V0
 
xjM i;M i; x i0

=
8>>><>>>:
V0;ss
 
M i0; x
i
0;M
 i
0 ; x
 i
0

if satisfy conditions for ss equilibrium
V0;sl
 
M i0; x
i
0;M
 i
0 ; x
 i
0

if satisfy conditions for sl equilibrium
V0;ls
 
M i0; x
i
0;M
 i
0 ; x
 i
0

if satisfy conditions for ls equilibrium,
As the optimization programs of arbitrageurs with these constraints become di¢ cult to
solve in closed form (it includes solving 4th order equations), I make some simplifying steps
and then solve the problem numerically. In particular, rst I solve the optimization problems
given that both agents remain solvent while satisfying the constraints for an ss equilibrium,
i.e.
max
xi0
V0;ss
 
M i0; x
i
0;M
 i
0 ; x
 i
0
 M i0 + 72232g20 = M i + g0xi0 + 72232g20
subject to (2:13), and then I conrm that none of the agents have incentives to deviate to the sl
state when the other arbitrageur chooses the optimal strategy x i0 that solves her program.
12
12The deviations allowed here include those when the arbitrageur goes long in the gap, i.e. xi0 < 0, even
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Propositions 26 and 27 describe the equilibrium date-0 trading of strategic arbitrageurs:
Proposition 26 None of the arbitrageurs are forced to liquidate in equilibrium.
This result is rather intuitive. It shows that arbitrageurs reduce their initial investments
such that liquidation does not happen in equilibrium. This is because liquidation is rather
costly. As there is no uncertainty in the model, no strategic agent wants to buy an asset that
she has to sell later with certainty, since buying an asset pushes its price up while selling
decreases its price, both working against the prot of this kind of round-trip transaction. It
implies that liquidation does not happen in equilibrium, but the threat of liquidation is still
present on the o¤-equilibrium path.
Proposition 27 Based on the initial capital of traders, the e¤ect of the wealth constraint on
arbitrageur activity can be divided into four cases.
(I) There exists a constant 
 > 0 such that for M1;M2  1
g2, arbitrageur strategies
and the gap path are the same as in the unconstrained case, discussed in Proposition 15.
(II) There exists a function  (:) such that when 0 < M2 < 1
g
2 and M1    M2,
arbitrageur 2 is the cautious trader, and the constraint (2:13) binds for her. As a result, she
trades less at date 0 than in the unconstrained case.
(III) Similarly, when 0 < M1 < 1
g
2 and M2    M1, arbitrageur 1 becomes the
cautious trader, and the constraint (2:13) binds for her. She trades less at date 0 than in the
unconstrained case.
(IV) When both arbitrageurs have low level of capital, M1;M2 < 1
g
2, and they are
close to each other such that M1 < 
 
M2

and M2 < 
 
M1

, both arbitrageurs invest less
than in the unconstrained case, and hence the gap remains larger.
The four regions for cases (I)-(IV) are illustrated on Figure 2-6. Arbitrageurs remain
solvent in all cases. Moreover,  (:) is positive, strictly increasing, satises  (x) > x for
0 < x < 1
g
2, and  (x) = x for x = 0 or x = 1
g
2.
Proposition 27 describes the initial trades as a function of arbitrage capital. First, if
both arbitrageurs start with su¢ ciently high level of capital, the wealth constraint does not
though those cases were not discussed in Section 2.4.
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a¤ect their trades and hence the dynamic equilibrium of the model is exactly the same as in
unconstrained case, described in Proposition 15. As arbitrageurs have a lot of cash on hand
that can provide a cushion against very large adverse movements in the gap, they race to the
market and take large bets on the convergence of prices. Traderspositions and the evolution
of the gap are illustrated on Figure 2-2.
When at least one arbitrageur has a low capital level to start with, while the other has
(relatively) more, e.g. M1    M2, the wealth constraint a¤ects the date 0 trading through
a¤ecting agent 2s willingness to invest. Arbitrageur 2 must short less compared to the case
when the constraint is not e¤ective, x20 < x
i
0;u, because she wants to avoid liquidation later
on. In fact, she takes such a small position that it is not worth for arbitrageur 1 to push her
to insolvency. On the other hand, arbitrageur 1 can invest more, x10 > x
i
0;u, as long as she
has a lower proportion in the gap asset. This is rather protable for her, as the threat of
potential liquidation restricts the ability of arbitrageur 2 to provide liquidity to local traders,
and agent 1 has almost monopoly power in doing so. The large position that arbitrageur
1 takes compensates for the small holdings by arbitrageur 2 so the date 0 gap is not very
di¤erent from the case when both arbitrageurs have high level of capital. This is illustrated
on Figure 2-7.
Finally, when both arbitrageurs have low capital level to start with, and they are close
to each other so that M1 < 
 
M2

and M2 < 
 
M1

, the wealth constraint is impor-
tant for both arbitrageurs. In particular, suppose that the proportion of wealth invested
in the arbitrage opportunity is xed for both agents, and it is larger for arbitrageur 2, i.e.
M1=x10 > M
2=x20. It implies that agent 2 is the cautious arbitrageur and faces a tighter
wealth constraint, so she must reduce her holdings if she wants to avoid forced liquidation.
However, by investing less she decreases her proportion of wealth in the arbitrage opportu-
nity to below that of arbitrageur 1, that is she makes M1=x10 < M
2=x20. Now arbitrageur 1
becomes the cautious arbitrageur, she is more prone to predatory risk, so she should reduce
her initial investment. This drives the M1=x10 ratio above M
2=x20, and so on. In the end,
both arbitrageurs trade very little at date 0, x10; x
2
0  xi0;u, and the gap level remains high,
g0  g0;u. Given that both of them remain solvent, in the next period they both race to the
arbitrage opportunity, and the gap quickly shrinks. This is illustrated on Figure 2-8.
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2.6 Final remarks
This chapter presents an equilibrium model of endogenous predation and forced liquidation
among strategic arbitrageurs who are subject to capital constraints. Arbitrageurs bet on the
convergence of prices of two assets, but when prices actually diverge and their marked-to-
market portfolio value becomes negative, traders have to unwind their risky holdings imme-
diately and leave the market. This implies that arbitrageurswealth limits the positions they
can take as long as they do not want to violate the constraint. Strategic traders may trigger
the bankruptcy of weakeragents, which creates predatory risk and implies that even if the
investment opportunity is a fundamentally riskless arbitrage, traders might be reluctant to
invest in it.
First I study a model when agents are already endowed with positions in the risky assets.
I show that when traders have similar proportion of wealth invested in the arbitrage opportu-
nity, they behave cooperatively, and prices converge through time, as in a benchmark model
without the constraint. However, if there is a signicant di¤erence in their proportion of
wealth invested, the arbitrageur with lower proportion invested in the arbitrage opportunity
predates on the other trader by manipulating the price and forcing her to unwind her position
at a large discount.
Then I examine whether a strategic trader is willing to build up a portfolio if it makes
her prone to predation and hence large losses. I show that in the equilibrium of the full
model liquidation never happens, but the threat of predation makes arbitrageurs reluctant
to invest much in the arbitrage opportunity because of the presence of other arbitrageurs.
In particular, the wealth constraint seriously a¤ects the gap between the asset prices when
arbitrageurs have similarly low level of capital, and implies that instead of racing to the
opportunity arbitrageurs stay out, and the gap decreases gradually.
In the model presented here there is no informational asymmetry about the opportunity
among arbitrageurs, and prices and positions are always deterministic. Naturally, this pro-
vides an opportunity to extend the framework in several dimensions. For example, it would
be interesting to allow for asymmetric positions in the two risky assets and see what e¤ect
it would have if some strategic traders only had information about one leg of the trades of
other arbitrageurs, as anecdotal evidence recalls about the trading counterparties of LTCM.
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Moreover, it would be important to evaluate the empirical signicance of the presented mech-
anism and to distinguish it from others that result in similarly slow trading of large traders,
e.g. Kyle (1985). These are left for future work.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Optimal trading of the monopoly
First I solve the problem without the wealth constraint.
Proof of Proposition 13. The arbitrageurs optimization program is given by
max
fxtg2t=0
W3 = M +
2P
t=0
gt (xt) (xt   xt 1) (2.15)
where gt = gt 1    (xt   xt 1) for t = 0; 1; 2 and g 1  g. Writing it as a dynamic program
it becomes
max
x2
W3 = M1 + g2 (x2) (x2   x1) ,
and the FOC yields 0 = g2 +
dg2
dx2
(x2   x1) = g1   2 (x2   x1), i.e.
x2   x1 = 1
2
g1 and g2 =
1
2
g1. (2.16)
Moreover, W3 = M1 + g2 (x2) (x2   x1) = M1 + 14g21. Going back one more period the
optimization program becomes
max
x1
W3 = M1 +
1
4
g21 = M0 + g1 (x1   x0) +
1
4
g21
= M0 + (g0    (x1   x0)) (x1   x0) + 1
4
(g0    (x1   x0))2 ,
and the FOC yields 0 = g0   2 (x1   x0)    12 (g0    (x1   x0)), or x1   x0 = 13g0.
Therefore, g1 = 23g0 and W3 = M0 +
1
3g
2
0. Going back to the date 0 optimization it becomes
max
x0
W3 = M0 +
1
3
g20 = M + g0x0 +
1
3
g20
= M + (g   x0)x0 + 1
3
(g   x0)2 ,
so the FOC yields 0 = g 2x0  23 (g   x0), or x0 = 14g. Therefore, g0 = 34g, which implies
that the monopoly gradually provides liquidity in the local markets:
xt;u   xt 1;u = 1
4
g for t = 0; 1 and 2,
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that is
x0;u =
1
4
g, x1;u =
1
2
g, and x2;u =
3
4
g,
and the gap decreases linearly over time:
g0;u =
3
4
g, g1;u =
1
2
g, and g2;u =
1
4
g,
where the subscript u refers to the arbitrageur being unconstrained.
Proof of Proposition 14. For the full consideration of the e¤ect of the constraint on
the optimal portfolio choice of the monopolistic arbitrageur, one should analyze the 2-period
subgame in which the constraint a¤ects the optimal trades, given the gap g0 and the positions
she has after trading at date 0, M0 and x0, and then consider the portfolio choice problem
at date 0. However, on the unconstrained equilibrium path the gap converges to zero, i.e.
g1   g0 < 0, and (2:8) is always satised. Given that arbitrageur can never achieve higher
utility in the constrained portfolio choice problem than in the unconstrained problem, but
the unconstrained optimum is feasible when incorporating the constraint, it does not a¤ect
the equilibrium holdings and gap for a monopolistic arbitrageur.
2.7.2 Optimal trading of the duopoly
Following the same footsteps as with the monopoly, rst I solve the problem without the
wealth constraint.
Proof of Proposition 15. Arbitrageur is optimization program, i = 1; 2, is given by
max
fxitg2t=0
W i3 = M
i +
2P
t=0
gt
 
xit
  
xit   xit 1

, (2.17)
where gt = gt 1   
 
xit   xit 1
    x it   x it 1 for t = 0; 1; 2 and g 1  g. In period 2 it is
given by
max
xi2
W i3 = M
i
1 + g2
 
xi2
  
xi2   xi1

= M i1 +
 
g1   
 
xi2   xi1
    x i2   x i1   xi2   xi1 ,
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and the FOCs yield
xi2   xi1 = x i2   x i1 =
1
3
g1 and g2 =
1
3
g1. (2.18)
Moreover,W i3 = M
i
1+g2
 
xi2   xi1

= M i1+
1
9g
2
1. Going back one more period the optimization
problem becomes
max
xi1
W i3 = M
i
1 +
1
9
g21
= M i0 +
 
g0   
 
xi1   xi0
    x i1   x i0   xi1   xi0
+
1
9
 
g0   
 
xi1   xi0
    x i1   x i0 2 ,
and the FOC yields xi1 xi0 = x i1  x i0 = 723g0. Therefore, g1 = 923g0, andW i3 = M i0+ 72232g20.
Going back to the date 0 optimization, it becomes
max
xi0
W i3 = M
i
0 +
72
232
g20 = M
i +
 
g   xi0   x i0

xi0 +
72
232
 
g   xi0   x i0
2
,
so the FOC yields xi0 = x
 i
0 =
385
1299g. Therefore, g0 =
529
1299g, which implies that the duopoly
gradually provides liquidity in the local markets: xi0 =
385
1299g, x
i
1 =
182
433g, and x
i
2 =
205
433g,
for i = 1; 2,and the gaps evolution is given by g0 = 5291299g, g1 =
69
433g, and g2 =
23
433g.
Next I consider the case with the wealth constraint. First I characterize the optimal
trades in period 2 conditional on the status of the two agents, and derive the value functions
given the states and positions.
Suppose that the positions before trade happens at date 2 are M i1 and x
i
1, and M
 i
1
and x i1 , for agents i and  i in the riskless and the risky assets, respectively. As a reminder,
subscript ft; jkg refers to time period t and status of traders i and  i, respectively, where the
date 2 state can take two values: j; k 2 fs; lg, i.e. solvency or liquidation, and it corresponds
to whether the agents satised or violated the wealth constraint. For example, g2;sl
 
xi1; x
 i
1

denotes the gap in period 2 as a function of the position xi1 of the arbitrageur who remains
solvent and the position x i1 of the arbitrageur who is liquidated.
The following propositions state the optimal trades, equilibrium gaps and value functions
in three possible cases at date 2. First, I restate a previous result without proof for the ss
state, then I solve for the equilibria of the sl and ll states.
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Proposition 28 In period 2, conditional on both agents being solvent, the rst-best trade
orders and equilibrium gap are given by
xi2;ss   xi1;ss =
1
3
g1 for i = 1; 2, and g2;ss =
1
3
g1. (2.19)
Proof. Straightforward from (2:18). It also results in a continuation value function of
V1;ss
 
M i1; x
i
1;M
 i
1 ; x
 i
1

= M i1 +
1
9g
2
1.
Proposition 29 In period 2, conditional on agent i being solvent and  i being liquidated,
the rst-best trade order and the equilibrium gap are given by
xi2;sl
 
xi1; x
 i
1

= xi1 +
1
2
 
g1 + x
 i
1

, xi2;ls = 0 and g2;sl
 
xi1; x
 i
1

=
1
2
 
g1 + x
 i
1

. (2.20)
Proof. The optimization problem of agent i is the same as in the ss case as she remains
solvent, which yields the same FOC
0 = g1   2
 
xi2   xi1
    x i2   x i1  . (2.21)
As agent  i has to close her position, x i2;ls = 0. Substituting into (2:21), it becomes
xi2;sl = x
i
1 +
1
2
 
g1 + x
 i
1

,
and the gap is
g2;sl
 
xi1; x
 i
1

=
1
2
 
g1 + x
 i
1

.
The value functions for the two agents are V1;sl
 
M i1; x
i
1;M
 i
1 ; x
 i
1

= M i1 +
1
4
 
g1 + x
 i
1
2
,
and V1;ls
 
M i1; x
i
1;M
 i
1 ; x
 i
1

= M i1   12
 
g1 + x
i
1

xi1.
Proposition 30 In period 2, conditional on both agents being liquidated, the trade orders
and the equilibrium gap are given by
xi2;ll = 0 and g2;ll = g1 + 
 
xi1 + x
 i
1

. (2.22)
The value functions are V1;ll
 
M i1; x
i
1;M
 i
1 ; x
 i
1

= M i1  
 
g1 + 
 
xi1 + x
 i
1

xi1, i = 1; 2.
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Suppose now that Ma=xa0 > M
c=xc0, hence we can dene
x  xa0 + xc0  
1

M c
xc0
> x  xa0 + xc0  
1

Ma
xa0
as the thresholds on trades at date 1 that change the state of the world for arbitrageurs. It
implies that at date 1 arbitrageur i faces the following optimization problem:
max
x
M i0 + g1 (x)
 
x  xi0

+ 1Mi
xi0
;M
 i
x i0
g1(x) g0
1
9
g1 (x)
2 + 1Mi
xi0
g1(x) g0>M i
x i0
1
4
 
g1 (x) + x
 i
1
2
  1M i
x i0
g1(x) g0>Mi
xi0
1
2
(g1 (x) + x)x  1Mi
xi0
;M
 i
x i0
<g1(x) g0
 
g1 (x) + 
 
x+ x i1

x,
where I have combined the continuation values for the four states of the world, given above.
From here it is easy to show that the FOCs become
0 = g1    (xa1   xa0) 
2
9
g1 if xa1 > x  xc1,
0  g1    (xa1   xa0) 
2
9
g1 if xa1 = x  xc1,
0 = g1    (xa1   xa0) 
1
2
(g1 + x
c
1) if x  xc1 > xa1 > x  xc1,
0  g1    (xa1   xa0) 
1
2
(g1 + x
c
1) if x
a
1 = x  xc1,
0 = g1    (xa1   xa0)  (g1 +  (xa1 + xc1)) if xa1 < x  xc1
for the aggressive trader and
0 = g1    (xc1   xc0) 
2
9
g1 if xc1 > x  xa1,
0  g1    (xc1   xc0) 
2
9
g1 if xc1 = x  xa1,
0 = g1    (xc1   xc0) 
1
2
(g1 + x
c
1) if x  xc1 > xc1 > x  xa1,
0  g1    (xc1   xc0) 
1
2
(g1 + x
c
1) if x
c
1 = x  xa1,
0 = g1    (xc1   xc0)  (g1 +  (xc1 + xa1)) if xc1 < x  xa1
for the cautious trader. Combining these gives the following cases:
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 Suppose xa1 + xc1 > x, then the FOCs yield
xa1   xa0 = xc1   xc0 =
7
23
g0.
The condition xa1 + x
c
1  x is equivalent to
M c   14
23
g0x
c
0,
which always holds.
 Supposexa1 + xc1 = x, hence the FOCs simplify to
xa1   xa0 
7
9

g0 +
M c
xc0

and xc1   xc0 
7
9

g0 +
M c
xc0

.
It implies that
g1 = g0    [xa1 + xc1   (xa0 + xc0)]   

5
9
g0 +
14
9
M c
xc0

< 0
which cannot happen if M c=xc0 > 0.
 Suppose we have x > xa1 + xc1 > x, which implies that
xa1   xa0 = xc1   xc0 =
1
5
(g0   xc0) ,
hence
g1 = g0   2
5
(g0   xc0) ,
and it must be that
0 <
M c
xc0
<  2
5
(g0   xc0) 
Ma
xa0
.
 Suppose xa1 + xc1 = x, then the FOCs become
xa1 +
1
2
xc1 
1
2

g0 +
Ma
xa0

+ xa0
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and
xc1 
1
3

g0 +
Ma
xa0

+
2
3
xc0:
Also it must be that xa1 + x
c
1 = x = x
a
0 + x
c
0   1 M
a
xa0
.
 Finally, suppose xa1 + xc1 < x, then we have
xa1   xa0 = xc1   xc0 =  
1
3
(xa0 + x
c
0) ,
and it requires xa1 + x
c
1 < x, i.e.
0 <
M c
xc0
<
Ma
xa0
<
2
3
 (xa0 + x
c
0) .
These conditions describe the locally optimal trades and the trivial constraints on the
proportion of wealth invested, presented in Propositions 20-22. What is left is to check
whether they are globally optimal too, i.e. whether any arbitrageur wants so deviate while
changing the state too.
Optimal trading conditional on getting to state ss
There is no candidate equilibrium with the constraint binding for arbitrageur c. Besides the
above requirements on arbitrageur capital, in an equilibrium with not binding constraints it
must also be checked whether arbitrageur a would like to deviate and trigger the bankruptcy
of arbitrageur c. This is because agent cs position in the rst best solution is not equivalent
to full liquidation, thus it might be protable for agent a to trigger agent cs bankruptcy.
For this, suppose that arbitrageur a deviates so that she remains solvent but arbitrageur c is
liquidated. She is better o¤ if and only if
V1;sl
 
Ma0 + g1 (x
a
1   xa0) ; xa1;M c0 + g1
 
xc1;nn   xc0

; xc1;nn

> V1;ss
 
Ma0 + g1;nn
 
xa1;nn   xa0

; xa1;nn;M
c
0 + g1;nn
 
xc1;nn   xc0

; xc1;nn

,
that is if her utility from getting into state sl with positions Ma0 + g1 (x
a
1   xa0) and xa1 in the
riskless and the risky assets, respectively, is higher than the utility she derives in state ss from
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holding positionsMa0 +g1;nn
 
xa1;nn   xa0

and xa1;nn (which are the locally optimal holdings in
that state), while assuming that arbitrageur c stays with the equilibrium holding xc1;nn. After
some algebra, she is better o¤ deviating i¤ xa1 2
 
xann;nv   ann;nv; xann;nv + ann;nv

, where
xann;nv =
3
23
g0 + x
a
0 +
1
3
xc0,
and
ann;nv =
2
3
vuut 15  2p6
23
g0 + xc0
! 
15 + 2
p
6
23
g0 + xc0
!
.
Given g0  0 and the assumption xc0 > 0, the discriminant is non-negative and ann;nv exists.
As arbitrageur 1 can only push arbitrageur 2 into liquidation by increasing the gap while
making sure she does not get liquidated, i.e. by choosing a trade
  1

Ma=xa0  
 
xc1;nn   xc0
  xa1   xa0 <   1M c=xc0    xc1;nn   xc0 ,
her deviation can increase her utility if and only if both   1Ma=xa0 
 
xc1;nn   xc0

< xann;nv  
xa0 + 
a
nn;nv and x
a
nn;nv   xa0   ann;nv <   1M c=xc0  
 
xc1;nn   xc0

hold. Hence a simple
reorganization of these inequalities implies that a necessary condition for the existence of the
equilibrium is that either Ma=xa0   1023g0 + 13xc0   ann;nv or M c=xc0   1023g0 + 13xc0 +
ann;nv. As M
a=xa0 > 0, it must be that M
c=xc0  ann;nv   1023g0 + 13xc0 + ann;nv.
Optimal trading conditional on getting to state sl
To check whether an equilibrium with arbitrageur a being solvent and arbitrageur c having to
liquidate exists, it must be checked whether arbitrageur c would prefer to change her trading
speed and remain solvent, whether she would prefer to force arbitrageur 1 to distress, or
whether the constrained arbitrageur a would prefer to liquidate.
Equilibrium with non-binding constraint The possible deviations are when arbitrageur
c forces arbitrageur a into distress, or when arbitrageur c rescues herself. As the constraint
might not bind in equilibrium when arbitrageurs start with di¤erent positions, it must also
103
be checked whether arbitrageur c wants to trigger the distress of arbitrageur a while rescuing
herself.
Agent c forces agent a into liquidation. Arbitrageur c is better o¤ forcing the
liquidation or arbitrageur a i¤
V1;ll
 
M c0 + g1 (x
c
1   xc0) ; xc1;Ma0 + g1
 
xa1;nv   xa0

; xa1;nv

> V1;ls
 
M c0 + g1;nv
 
xc1;vn   xc0

; xc1;vn;M
a
0 + g1
 
xa1;nv   xa0

; xa1;nv

,
that is if her utility from getting into state ll with positions M c0 + g1 (x
c
1   xc0) and xc1 in the
riskless and the risky assets, respectively, is higher than the utility she derives in state ls from
holding positions M c0 + g1;nv
 
xc1;vn   xc0

and xc1;vn (which are actually the optimal holdings
in that state), while assuming that arbitrageur a stays with the equilibrium holding xa1;nv.
After some algebra, she is better o¤ deviating i¤ xc1 2
 
xcnv;vv   cnv;vv; xcnv;vv + cnv;vv

, where
xcnv;vv =  
1
2
xa0 +
3
5
xc0  
1
10
g0,
and
cnv;vv =
1p
3
s
1
10
g0   1
2
xa0 +
7
5
xc0

  9
10
g0   3
2
xa0  
3
5
xc0

,
with the discriminant being negative (hence a deviation cannot increase her utility) i¤
0 < xa0 <
1
5
g0 +
14
5
xc0.
Suppose that the discriminant is non-negative and hence cnv;vv exists.
Since xa0 > 0, arbitrageur c can push arbitrageur a into liquidation by increasing the
gap, i.e. by choosing a trade xc1   xc0 <   1Ma=xa0  
 
xa1;nv   xa0

. She can deviate while
increasing her utility if and only if   1Ma=xa0  
 
xa1;nv   xa0

> x2nv;vv   xc0   cnv;vv. Hence a
simple reorganization of this inequality implies that in equilibrium it must be that Ma=xa0 
  110g0 + 12xa0 + 35xc0 + cnv;vv. Notice that as xc0 > 0, arbitrageur c will remain distressed
when pushing arbitrageur a into bankruptcy, and hence no other condition is needed.
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Agent c rescues herself. Arbitrageur c is better o¤ rescuing herself i¤
V1;ss
 
M c0 + g1 (x
c
1   xc0) ; xc1;Ma0 + g1
 
xa1;nv   xa0

; xa1;nv

> V1;ls
 
M c0 + g1;nv
 
xc1;vn   xc0

; xc1;vn;M
a
0 + g1
 
xa1;nv   xa0

; xa1;nv

,
that is if her utility from getting into state ss with positions M c0 + g1 (x
c
1   xc0) and xc1 in the
riskless and the risky assets, respectively, is higher than the utility she derives in state ls from
holding positionsM c0 +g1;nv
 
xc1;vn   xc0

and xc1;vn (which are actually the optimal holdings in
that state), while assuming that arbitrageur a stays with the equilibrium holding xa1;nv. After
some tedious algebra, she is better o¤deviating i¤xc1 2
 
xcnv;nn   cnv;nn; xcnv;nn + cnv;nn

with
xcnv;nn =
7
20
g0 +
87
80
xc0 and
cnv;nn =
3
p
457
80
vuut 228 + 20p2
457
g0 + xc0
! 
228  20p2
457
g0 + xc0
!
.
Given g0  0 and the assumption xc0 > 0, the discriminant is non-negative and 2nv;nn exists.
Since xa0; x
c
0 > 0, arbitrageur c can rescue herself by shrinking the gap, i.e. by choosing a
trade xc1   xc0    1M c=xc0  
 
xa1;nv   xa0

. She can deviate while increasing her utility if and
only if   1M c=xc0 
 
xa1;nv   xa0

< xcnv;nn xc0 + cnv;nn. Hence a simple reorganization of this
inequality implies that in equilibrium it must be that M c=xc0   1120g0 + 980xc0   cnv;nn.
Summary for unconstrained sl equilibrium. Combining the initial constraints that
are based on the equilibrium price and the above constraints regarding potential deviations
yields that the unconstrained sl equilibrium exists if 0 < M c=xc0  cnv;nn and Ma=xa0 
cnv;vv, where 
c
nv;nn =  1120g0 + 980xc0   cnv;nn and
cnv;vv = max

 2
5
 
g0   x20

;  1
10
g0 +
1
2
xa0 +
3
5
xc0 + 
c
nv;vv

.
Equilibrium with binding constraint The possible deviations from the equilibrium
trades are when arbitrageur c either forces arbitrageur a into distress or rescues herself,
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and when arbitrageur a decides to liquidate.
Agent c forces agent a into liquidation. Arbitrageur c is better o¤ forcing the
liquidation or arbitrageur 1 i¤
V1;ll
 
M c0 + g1 (x
c
1   xc0) ; xc1;Ma0 + g1
 
xa1;bv   xa0

; xa1;bv

> V1;ls
 
M c0 + g1;bv
 
xc1;vb   xc0

; xc1;vb;M
a
0 + g1
 
xa1;bv   xa0

; xa1;bv

,
that is if her utility from getting into state ll with positions M c0 + g1 (x
c
1   xc0) and xc1 in
the riskless and the risky assets, respectively, is higher than the utility she derives in state
ls from holding positions M c0 + g1;bv

xc1;vb   xc0

and xc1;vb (which are actually the optimal
holdings in that state), while assuming that arbitrageur a stays with the equilibrium holding
xa1;bv. After some algebra, she is better o¤ deviating i¤ x
c
1 2

xcbv;vv   cbv;vv; xcbv;vv + cbv;vv

,
where
xcbv;vv =
1
6
g0   1
2
xa0 +
1
3
xc0 +
2
3
Ma
xa0
, and
cbv;vv =
1p
3
s
Ma
xa0
+
1
2
g0   1
2
xa0 + x
c
0

Ma
xa0
 

1
2
g0 +
3
2
xa0 + x
c
0

,
with the discriminant being negative (hence a deviation cannot increase her utility) i¤
 1
2
g0 +
1
2
xa0   xc0 <
Ma
xa0
<
1
2
g0 +
3
2
xa0 + x
c
0.
Suppose now that the discriminant is non-negative and hence cbv;vv exists. As x
a
0; x
a
0 > 0,
arbitrageur c can push arbitrageur a into liquidation by increasing the gap, i.e. by choosing
a trade xc1 < x
c
1;vb. She can deviate while increasing her utility if and only if x
c
1;vb > x
c
bv;vv  
cbv;vv. A simple reorganization of this inequality implies that a necessary condition for the
equilibrium is Ma=xa0 + g0 + 2x
c
0  0, which cannot happen. Therefore the equilibrium can
only exist if  12g0 + 12xa0   xc0 < Ma=xa0 < 12g0 + 32xa0 + xc0.
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Agent a decides to liquidate. She is better o¤ triggering her own liquidation i¤
V1;ll
 
Ma0 + g1 (x
a
1   xa0) ; xa1;M c0 + g1;bv
 
xc1;vb   xc0

; xc1;vb

> V1;sl
 
Ma0 + g1
 
xa1;bv   xa0

; xa1;bv;M
c
0 + g1;bv
 
xc1;vb   xc0

; xc1;vb

,
that is if her utility from getting into state ll with positions Ma0 + g1 (x
a
1   xa0) and xa1 in
the riskless and the risky assets, respectively, is higher than the utility she derives in state
ls from holding positions Ma0 + g1

xa1;bv   xa0

and xa1;bv (which are the optimal holdings in
that state), while assuming that arbitrageur c stays with the equilibrium holding xc1;vb. After
some algebra, she is better o¤ deviating i¤ xa1 2

xabv;vv   abv;vv; xabv;vv + abv;vv

, where
xabv;vv =  
1
2

1
3
Ma
xa0
+
1
3
g0   xa0 +
2
3
xc0

, and
abv;vv =
1
2
s
Ma
xa0
+ g0 + xa0

11
3
Ma
xa0
  1
3
g0   3xa0  
8
3
xc0

,
with the discriminant being negative (hence a deviation cannot increase her utility) i¤
0 <
Ma
xa0
<
1
11
g0 +
9
11
xa0 +
8
11
xc0.
Suppose that the discriminant is non-negative and hence abv;vv exists.
As xa0; x
c
0 > 0, arbitrageur a can trigger her own liquidation by increasing the gap, i.e. by
choosing a trade xa1 < x
a
1;bv. She can deviate while increasing her utility if and only if x
a
1;bv >
xabv;vv abv;vv. A simple reorganization of this inequality implies that a necessary condition for
the equilibrium is thus either 0 < Ma=xa0 <
1
11g0 +
9
11x
a
0 +
8
11x
c
0 or
1
11g0 +
9
11x
a
0 +
8
11x
c
0 
Ma=xa0   17g0 + 37xa0 + 47xc0. As this latter would also imply 3g0 + 5xa0 + 2xc0  0, which
never holds, therefore the equilibrium only exists if 0 < Ma=xa0 <
1
11g0 +
9
11x
a
0 +
8
11x
c
0.
Agent c rescues herself. Arbitrageur c is better o¤ rescuing herself i¤
V1;ss
 
M c0 + g1 (x
c
1   xc0) ; xc1;Ma0 + g1
 
xa1;bv   xa0

; xa1;bv

> V1;ls
 
M c0 + g1;bv
 
xc1;vb   xc0

; xc1;vb;M
a
0 + g1
 
xa1;bv   xa0

; xa1;bv

,
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that is if her utility from getting into state ss with positions M c0 + g1 (x
c
1   xc0) and xc1 in the
riskless and the risky assets, respectively, is higher than the utility she derives in state ls from
holding positionsM c0 +g1;bv

xc1;vb   xc0

and xc1;vb (which are actually the optimal holdings in
that state), while assuming that arbitrageur a stays with the equilibrium holding xa1;bv. After
some tedious algebra, she is better o¤ deviating i¤ xc1 2

xcbv;nn   cbv;nn; xcbv;nn + cbv;nn

with
xcbv;nn =
7
12

g0 +
Ma
xa0

+
41
48
xc0 and
cbv;nn =
p
7
4
vuut Ma
xa0
+ g0 +
23 + 3
p
2
14
xc0
! 
Ma
xa0
+ g0 +
23  3p2
14
xc0
!
,
where xa0; x
c
0 > 0 implies that the discriminant is non-negative and hence 
2
bv;nn exists.
As xc0 > 0, arbitrageur c can rescue herself by shrinking the gap, i.e. by choosing a trade
xc1   xc0    1M c=xc0  

xa1;bv   xa0

. She can deviate while increasing her utility if and only
if   1M c=xc0  

xa1;bv   xa0

< xcbv;nn   xc0 + cbv;nn. A simple reorganization of this inequality
implies that a necessary condition for the equilibrium is M c=xc0  34Ma=xa0   14g0   316xc0  
cbv;nn.
However, given M c=xc0 > 0, it should be that 
c
bv;nn <
3
4M
a=xa0   14g0   316xc0. After
substituting in for cbv;nn and using that M
a=xa0 > 0 as well, it can be shown that it cannot
hold. Therefore agent c always rescues herself, and a constrained sl equilibrium thus never
happens.
Optimal trading conditional on getting to state ll
As it is shown below, it is enough to consider the possible deviation when arbitrageur 1 rescues
herself, as it already implies there is no equilibrium with both agents becoming distressed.
Arbitrageur a rescues herself. If, for example, it is shown that arbitrageur a deviates,
there is no equilibrium with double liquidation at all. She is better o¤ rescuing herself i¤
V1;sl
 
Ma0 + g1 (x
a
1   xa0) ; xa1;M c0 + g1
 
xc1;vv   xc0

; xc1;vv

> V1;ll
 
Ma0 + g1;vv
 
xa1;v   xa0

; xa1;vv;M
c
0 + g1;vv
 
xc1;vv   xc0

; xc1;vv

,
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that is if her utility from getting into state sl with positions Ma0 + g1 (x
a
1   xa0) and xa1 in the
riskless and the risky assets, respectively, is higher than the utility she derives in state ll from
holding positions Ma0 + g1;vv
 
xa1;v   xa0

and xa1;vv (which are actually the optimal holdings
in that state), while assuming that arbitrageur 2 stays with the equilibrium holding xc1;vv.
After some, she is better o¤ deviating i¤ xa1 2
 
xavv;nv   avv;nv; xavv;nv + avv;nv

with
xavv;nv = x
a
0 +
1
3

g0 +
2
3
xa0  
1
3
xc0

and
avv;nv =
2
3
g0 + 53xa0 + 23xc0
 .
As xa0; x
c
0 > 0, agent a has to decrease the gap, i.e. buy more (or short less) to make sure
Ma=xa0  g1   g0, and for this she needs a trade of xa1    1Ma=xa0   xc1;vv. Combining
with the other condition yields that she can deviate i¤   1Ma=xa0   xc1;vv < xavv;nv + avv;nv.
However, as this constraint is equivalent to 0 < g0 + xa0 + M
a=xa0, which always holds as
all three components are non-negative, arbitrageur a always deviates and thus there is no
equilibrium with both agents getting liquidated.
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2.7.3 Trading under predatory threat
As mentioned in the main part of the chapter, the optimization programs of arbitrageurs
with these constraints becomes di¢ cult to solve in closed form (it includes solving 4th order
equations). Thus, I provide some preliminary analysis in the following three Lemmas to
decrease the potential set of equilibria, and then I solve the remaining problem numerically.
First, it is easy to see that:
Claim 31 There exists no equilibrium without trading at date 0.
This Lemma is rather intuitive. If, for example, arbitrageur 1 does not trade in period
0, arbitrageur 2 is better o¤ investing a little into the arbitrage opportunity that staying out
completely, as long as her trade satises (2:13). Given the assumption M2 > 0, there exists
a su¢ ciently small x20 such that it is possible.
Similarly:
Claim 32 There exists no equilibrium with only one arbitrageur trading at date 0.
If, for example, arbitrageur 1 does trade in period 0, arbitrageur 2 can take an arbitrarily
small position such that M2=x20 > M
1=x10. It implies that she becomes the aggressive agent,
and as there is no equilibrium in which both arbitrageurs are liquidated, she will never be
liquidated. As there is no threat of predation on her, investing is strictly better than staying
out, as it is a fundamentally riskless arbitrage opportunity.
Finally:
Claim 33 There is no equilibrium with any agent having xi0 < 0.
First, an agent cannot have xi0 < 0 and become liquidated later, because in this case
not trading at date 0 would make her better o¤ for two reasons: she can trade freely later;
moreover, liquidation means closing positions that one has built up previously. Second, if and
agent has xi0 < 0 and she uses it to force the other trader to liquidation, arbitrageur  i can
decide to withdraw from trading in the rst period, with which she stays solvent, moreover
faces a better investment opportunity, because the e¤ective gap for her is even larger than
before.
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Therefore, it must be that in equilibrium x10; x
2
0 > 0. Suppose now that under their
trades arbitrageurs end up in an unconstrained ss equilibrium. Going back to the date 0
optimization, arbitrageur is optimization problem becomes
max
xi0
W i3 = M
i
0 +
72
232
g20 = M
i +
 
g   xi0   x i0

xi0 +
72
232
 
g   xi0   x i0
2
, (2.23)
so the FOC yields x10 = x
2
0 = (1=)g > 0 with  =
385
1299 . Therefore, g0 = (1  2) g = 5291299g,
and the optimal holdings and the equilibrium gap are as in the model with no constrained,
in Proposition 15. This yields a utility of V
 
M i

= M i + g0x
i
0 +
72
232
g20 = M
i + 1g
2 with
 = (1  2)+ 72
232
(1  2)2.
When is it an equilibrium in presence of the wealth constraint? First, it must satisfy the
conditions derived in Appendix 2.7.2. The equilibrium candidate order and gap
x20 =
385
1299
g and g0 =
529
1299
g
satisfy
x20 >
2
 p
233  15
23
g0,
hence it must be that
M1
x10
;
M2
x20
  10
23
g0 +
1
3
x20 + 
1
nn;nv,
which is equivalent to
M1;M2  1


g2
with

  
24 10
23
+
83
69
+
2
3
vuut 15  2p6
23
(1  2) + 
! 
15 + 2
p
6
23
(1  2) + 
!35
=
385
 
4
p
130051  305
3  12992 > 0.
Second, it must be that none of the agents want to deviate from this prole and change the
state. As having to liquidate puts a constraint on the strategy space of an arbitrageur, none
of the arbitrageurs want to change the state in order to trigger her own distress. Therefore
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the only deviation one has to check is triggering the liquidation of the other arbitrageur.
I conrm it numerically that as long as arbitrageurs trade such that they satisfy (2:13), it
would be too costly for any trader to go long the gap and trigger the liquidation of the
other arbitrageur. Therefore the equilibrium trades are those obtained from (2:23), subject
to (2:13). This concludes the solution.
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Figure 2-1: Equilibrium gap path and the optimal holdings of the monopoly in the arbitrage
opportunity over time.
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The dashed line shows the evolution of the gap and the solid line shows the evolution of the
position of the monopolist arbitrageur as a function of time. The monopoly provides liquidity
to local markets by trading at dates 0, 1 and 2, and the gap disappears at date 3 and remains
closed thereafter. The model parameters are set to g = 10 and  = 1.
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Figure 2-2: Equilibrium gap path and the optimal holdings of the duopoly over time.
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The left panel plots the evolution of the gap (dashed line) and the position of an unconstrained
duopolist arbitrageur (solid line) as a function of time. The right panel compares the gap
when a single arbitrageur (solid line) or two unconstrained arbitrageurs (dashed line) provide
liquidity in local markets. The duopoly provides liquidity to local markets by trading at
dates 0, 1 and 2, and the gap disappears at date 3 and remains closed thereafter. The model
parameters are set to g = 10 and  = 1.
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Figure 2-3: The utility of the aggressive arbitrageur as a function of her trade at date 1.
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The utility of the aggressive arbitrageur as a function of her trade at date 1, xa1, while holding
the cautious arbitrageurs date-1 trade constant at xc1 = 0. The gure illustrates that the
optimal strategy is to go short in the gap, and in this case both arbitrageurs remain solvent.
The parameters are set to g0 = 3,  = 1, Ma = 8, M c = 10, xa0 = 1, x
c
0 = 3.
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Figure 2-4: The utility of the aggressive arbitrageur as a function of her trade at date 1.
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
ut
ilit
y
xa1
locally  optimal
f or state ss
locally  optimal
f or state ll
locally  optimal
f or state sl
globally  optimal
portf olio
The utility of the aggressive arbitrageur as a function of her trade at date 1, xa1, while holding
the cautious arbitrageurs date-1 trade constant at xc1 = 3. The gure illustrates that the
optimal strategy is to go long in the gap and force the cautious arbitrageur into distress. The
parameters are set to g0 = 3,  = 1, Ma = 8, M c = 10, xa0 = 1, x
c
0 = 3.
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Figure 2-5: Capital thresholds for the di¤erent types of equilibria.
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The horizontal axis plots the inverse of the proportion of capital invested in the arbitrage
opportunity by the aggressive arbitrageur,Ma=xa0, and the vertical axis plots the same for the
cautious arbitrageur, M c=xc0. When both agents have low proportion of wealth invested in
the risky assets, top right region, the wealth constraint does not a¤ect arbitrage trading and
the gap path, and an sl equilibrium exists. When arbitrageur a has a much lower proportion
of wealth invested in the arbitrage opportunity that arbitrageur c, bottom left region, there
exists an sl equilibrium. The aggressive arbitrageur predates on the cautious by widening
the gap at date 1, and shorting it after the liquidation, at date 2. For other possible levels
of proportion of capital invested in the arbitrage that satisfy Ma=xa0  M c=xc0 there is no
equilibrium.
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Figure 2-6: Capital thresholds in the four di¤erent cases when arbitrageurs are subject to
wealth constraints.
0 4 8 12
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The horizontal axis plots the starting capital of arbitrageur 1, M1, and the vertical axis plots
the starting capital of arbitrageur 2, M2. When both agents have large initial capital to
invest, Region I, the wealth constraint does not a¤ect arbitrage trading and the gap path.
When at least one arbitrageur has a low capital level to start with, while the other has
relatively more, i.e. Regions II and III, the wealth constraint a¤ects the arbitrage positions
but the gap path is close to the gap of the unconstrained case. Finally, when both arbitrageur
have similarly low capital level to start with, Region IV, both arbitrageurs trade very little
initially and the gap remains large. The model parameters are set to g = 10 and  = 1,
which imply that the threshold for Region I is approximately 1
g
2  8:651.
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Figure 2-7: Equilibrium gap path and the optimal holdings of the duopoly in the arbitrage
opportunity over time.
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The dotted line shows the evolution of the gap, and the dotted/dashed lines show the evolution
of the positions of the constrained duopolist arbitrageurs as a function of time, when their
initial capital levels M1 and M2 are signicantly di¤erent from each other. To contrast, the
dashed line shows the evolution of the gap and the solid line shows the evolution of the
positions when the duopoly is unconstrained, as on Figure 2-2. Trading happens at dates 0, 1
and 2, and the gap disappears at date 3 and remains closed thereafter. The model parameters
are set to g = 10,  = 1, M1 > 7:18 and M2 = 5.
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Figure 2-8: Equilibrium gap path and the optimal holdings of the duopoly in the arbitrage
opportunity over time.
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The dotted line shows the evolution of the gap, and the dotted/dashed lines show the evo-
lution of the positions of the constrained duopolist arbitrageurs as a function of time, when
their initial capital levels M1 and M2 are similar. To contrast, the dashed line shows the
evolution of the gap and the solid line shows the evolution of the positions when the duopoly
is unconstrained, as on Figure 2-2. Trading happens at dates 0, 1 and 2, and the gap dis-
appears at date 3 and remains closed thereafter. The model parameters are set to g = 10,
 = 1, M1 = 1:17 and M2 = 0:9.
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Chapter 3
On the uniqueness of equilibrium in
the Grossman-Stiglitz noisy REE
model
3.1 Introduction
In their seminal paper, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) present a framework for a noisy rational
expectations economy (REE), which since became a workhorse model studying asymmetric
information in competitive nancial markets. The basic purpose of the model is to resolve
the paradox of fully revealing equilibria in models of asymmetric information: in such envi-
ronments, prices would perfectly transmit the information of informed traders to uninformed
ones, and therefore would imply that the value of information is zero. In their paper, they
propose a model of asymmetric information and an equilibrium of the model, in which prices
reect the information of informed individuals, but only partially. Those who spend resources
to obtain information do receive compensation from others without the information.
The standard Grossman and Stiglitz method, which has become widely used in models of
asymmetric information, draws heavily on the fact that random variables are jointly normally
distributed and investors have exponential (i.e. CARA) utilities, as it allows to work with
linear demand functions and an equilibrium price function linear in state variables. However,
the question whether there exist other equilibria of their model, which are potentially both
121
less tractable and less appealing in their predictions, remains. In this chapter, which is joint
work with Dömötör Pálvölgyi, we seek to explore this issue.
The main contribution of the chapter is to show that the model proposed by Grossman
and Stiglitz indeed has a unique equilibrium when allowing for any continuous equilibrium
price function, linear or not. Our solution method is di¤erent from the usual "conjecture and
verify" approach, where the conjecture about a specic functional form of price naturally
imposes limitations on the proof, and only allows to study existence and uniqueness in a
particular class of functions. Here we propose a simple proof to show that no equilibrium
besides the linear class can exist for this model, which hence complements the usual technique
and leads to the conclusion that the unique equilibrium in the linear class of the Grossman
and Stiglitz model is actually the sole equilibrium in the broader class of all continuous price
functions as well.
Moreover, we show that relaxing the assumption of continuous prices leads to multiplicity
in the possible equilibrium price functions. In particular, we provide an algorithm to create a
(non-continuous) equilibrium price that is di¤erent from the Grossman-Stiglitz price function
on a zero-measure set.
The noise in the REE proposed by Grossman and Stiglitz serves the purpose of reveal-
ing information only partially, therefore this chapter naturally belongs to the literature on
partially-revealing rational expectations equilibria. Although the theory of fully-revealing
REE is largely complete, with many studies on the generic existence and uniqueness, and
some non-generic examples of non-existence (see, for example, Radner (1979), and Jordan
(1982, 1983)), we know much less about partially-revealing REEs. Previous studies were
mainly concerned about the existence of a rational expectations equilibrium in di¤erent
settings, see for example Grossman (1976), Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Hellwig (1980),
Diamond and Verrecchia (1981), and Ausubel (1990). In contrast, we study uniqueness of
the noisy REE in the model of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). Our study is also related to
DeMarzo and Skiadas (1998), who show uniqueness of a (non-noisy) perfectly revealing REE
in the model of Grossman (1976), and give examples of partially revealing equilibria when
payo¤s are non-normal. Finally, Breon-Drish (2010) shows that in case of normality, the
unique linear equilibrium is unique in the class of di¤erentiable equilibrium price functions.
Both of these studies use much more elaborate solution techniques than the present chapter,
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while restricting their attention in the possible equilibrium price functions.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the model.
Section 3.3 studies the linear equilibrium of the economy using the standard "conjecture
and verify" method of Grossman and Stiglitz. Section 3.4 presents the argument for no
equilibrium outside the linear class when allowing for any continuous price function. Section
3.5 provides an algorithm for a non-continuous price function. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Model
This section introduces the baseline model. We consider a two-period economy with dates
t = 0 and 1. Agents, specied later, trade at date 0. At date 1, assets pay o¤ and agents
consume.
3.2.1 Assets
There are two securities traded in a competitive market, a risk-free bond and a risky stock.
The bond is in perfectly elastic supply and is used as numeraire, with the risk-free rate nor-
malized to 0. The risky asset is assumed to be in random aggregate supply of u  N  0; 2u,
and has random nal payo¤ d at date 1, with ex ante distribution d  N  d; 2d = 1=d,
which constitutes the common prior for all agents. The price of the stock at date 0 is denoted
by p.
3.2.2 Agents
We assume that the asset market is populated by a continuum of agents (also called traders)
with measure one. Agents do not hold endowments in the risky assets. Agent k 2 [0; 1]
maximizes her negative exponential utility with CARA-coe¢ cient :
E [  exp ( Wk) jIk] ,
where the nal wealth Wk = Wk0 + xk (d  p) is given by the starting wealth Wk0, plus the
number of shares purchased, xk, multiplied by the prot per share, d   p. Ik denotes the
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information set of a trader, and E [:jIk] and V ar [:jIk] denote the expectation and variance
conditional on the information set Ik, respectively.
Traders can be either informed or uninformed. Informed traders, who form a mass of
0 < w  1, observe the signal s = d+ , with   N  0; 2s = 1= s.1 The rest of the agents,
with measure 1   w, are uninformed, and do not observe any signals about f . Instead, all
agents of the model observe the market price p.2 Formally, the information set of all informed
traders is given by Ii = fs; pg, but as the price does not contain more information about
the nal payo¤ than their private observation, fsg is a su¢ cient statistics for fs; pg. The
information set of uninformed traders is Iui = fpg. As agents inside the di¤erent investor
classes are identical, we drop the subscript k from now on.
3.2.3 Equilibrium
We dene an equilibrium of the above economy as follows.
Denition 34 An equilibrium consists of a price function P (s; u), and individual strategies
for informed and uninformed traders, xi (s; p) and xui (p), respectively, such that
1. demand is optimal for informed traders:
xi (s; p) 2 arg max
x2R
E
  exp( W i)js; p ; (3.1)
2. demand is optimal for uninformed traders:
xui (p) 2 arg max
x2R
E
  exp( W ui)jp ; (3.2)
3. market clearing:
wxi (s; p) + (1  w)xui (p) = u, (3.3)
Conditions (3:1)-(3:3) dene a competitive noisy rational expectations equilibrium. In
particular, condition (3:1) states that individual asset demands are optimal for informed
1This assumption ensures that informed agents submit a downward-sloping demand curve.
2As it is standard in models with informational heterogeneity, the presence of random supply u makes sure
that the price does not reveal d perfectly and hence the Grossman-Stiglitz paradox does not apply.
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traders, conditioned on their observation and anything inferable from the price. Also, con-
dition (3:2) states that individual asset demands are optimal for uninformed traders, condi-
tioned on any information they infer from the price. Finally, (3:3) imposes that the market
of the risky asset clears: aggregate demand equals supply.
3.3 The unique linear equilibrium
We rst present the solution technique of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). Solving for an
equilibrium of the nancial market requires three fairly standard steps. First, we postulate a
REE price function. Given the price, we derive the optimal demand of uninformed traders.
Finally, we check under what conditions the market clears at the conjectured price.
Following their seminal paper, we restrict our attention to the class of price functions that
are linear in the state variables s and u. Formally, we conjecture a price function in the form
P (s; u) = Ad+B (s  Cu) ,
with constants A, B and C to be determined in equilibrium.
As it is well known, the assumption of the jointly normal distribution of d and s and the
exponential utility implies that the informed optimization problem (3:1) simplies to
xi (s; P (s; u) = p) 2 arg max
x2R
E

W ijs; P (s; u) = p  
2
V ar

W ijs; P (s; u) = p .
Moreover, the jointly normal distribution of d, s and u, and the conjectured linear form of
the equilibrium price function implies that the price is normally distributed as well, which
together with the exponential utility implies that the uninformed optimization problem (3:2)
simplies to
xui (P (s; u) = p) 2 arg max
x2R
E

W uijP (s; u) = p  
2
V ar

W uijP (s; u) = p .
It is straightforward from here that optimal demands are the following: as informed traders
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cannot learn anything new from the price, they submit demand function
xi (s; p) =
E [djs]  p
V ar [djs] , (3.4)
while uninformed traders demand
xui (p) =
E [djp]  p
V ar [djp] . (3.5)
Informed investors know the prior distribution of d and observe signal s, hence their
posterior distribution is Gaussian with the mean and variance
E [djs] = dd+  ss
d +  s
and V ar [djs] = (d +  s) 1 .
Given that uninformed agents know the prior distribution of d and observe the market price
p, which is a normally distributed noisy signal about s and hence a normally distributed
noisy signal about d itself, their posterior distribution is Gaussian with mean and variance:
E [djp] = dd+ p
p Ad
B
d + p
and V ar [djp] = (d + p) 1 ,
where p  1=2p denotes the precision of the price, with the price being a signal about payo¤
d with variance 2p = 
2
s + C
22u.
The conjectured REE price function must equate demand and supply for each possible
resolution of s and u. Substituting the optimal demands (3:4) and (3:5) into the market
clearing condition (3:3) gives
w
dd+ss
d+s
  p
 (d +  s)
 1 + (1  w)
dd+p
p Ad
B
d+p
  p
 (d + p)
 1 = u.
Reorganizing the above equation, and using that in equilibrium the resulting coe¢ cients must
equal the conjectured A, B and C, we obtain the following result:
Theorem 35 (Grossman-Stiglitz) In the family of linear equilibria there exists a unique
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REE of the model. The equilibrium price function is given in the form of
P (s; u) = Ad+B (s  Cu) , (3.6)
where
A =
d
d + w s + (1  w) p , B = 1 A, and C =

w s
,
with p = 1=
 
2s + C
22u

.
3.4 The unique continuous price
In this section we show that the unique linear equilibrium of the model, solved by Grossman
and Stiglitz (1980) and discussed in Section 3.3, is actually the unique equilibrium when
allowing for any continuous price function.
The rst observation we make is that the demand of informed traders is the same as before.
Indeed, the only uncertainty they face is the unlearnable noise , contained in their signal
s, that is normally distributed. Therefore, the optimization problem of informed traders is
unchanged and independent of the equilibrium price function. It implies that their demand
is linear in signal s and price p:
xi (s; p) =
dd+ss
d+s
  p
 (d +  s)
 1 =
d

d+
 s

s  d +  s

p.
Second, whatever the equilibrium distribution of the market price is, uninformed traders
expectation and variance of d will be a function of the observed market price only, p, up to
a constant. Therefore their demand is also a function of the equilibrium price p only; let us
denote it by xui (p). Market clearing implies that
w

d

d+
 s

s  d +  s

p

+ (1  w)xui (p) = u,
that is
g (p) = s  Cu, (3.7)
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where
g (p)  d +  s
 s
p  (1  w)Cxui (p)  d
 s
d,
and we already use the notation C  = (w s) from Theorem 35. Given the optimal demand
function xui (:) of uninformed investors (for which we want to solve for), one also knows the
function g, and hence from a price realization P (s; u) = p it is possible to compute s  Cu.
Therefore, p always reveals s   Cu. The main question is whether p can tell more about s
than just revealing s Cu. In what follows, we make some simple observations based on (3:7)
to argue that if P (s; u) is continuous, it cannot. Hence p and s   Cu are observationally
equivalent.
Lemma 36 For a given price realization p, the possible (s; u) pairs are all on a straight line.
The proof of Lemma 36 is straightforward from (3:7). It implies that for a xed P (s; u) =
p price the corresponding iso-price set on the (s; u) plane is a subset of a single straight line
with tangency 1=C (see Figure 3-1). As such a line can be dened by its intercept with the
horizontal axis, we can refer to it both as the line consisting of points that satisfy s Cu = lp
for a given constant lp, or simply denote it lp.
Next, we argue that given a p realization of the market price, uninformed agents cannot
learn more about the signal s than its linear combination with the supply shock, s   Cu.
Suppose that the converse is true, which implies that P (s; u) must be a function of s not only
through s Cu. If this is the case, there must be two price realizations p1 and p2, such that
p1 6= p2 but g (p1) = g (p2). It is equivalent to say that there are two pairs, (s1; u1) 6= (s2; u2),
such that they correspond to the two di¤erent prices, P (s1; u1) = p1 and P (s2; u2) = p2
while they are on the same line: s1   Cu1 = lp = s2   Cu2 with lp  lp1 = lp2 .
As P (s; u) is a continuous function of the random variables s and u, the Intermediate
Value Theorem (see, for example, Bartle (1976), p. 153.) implies that if we connect the two
points (s1; u1) and (s2; u2) with any simple curve , then there must be at least one point
(s; u) on  such that
P (s; u) =
p1 + p2
2
.
We will apply this theorem to two curves. The rst curve will be simply the segment
connecting (s1; u1) and (s2; u2), which is a part of line lp. Take a point from this segment,
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denoted by (s; u), such that
P (s; u) =
p1 + p2
2
,
as illustrated on Figure 3-2. (If there are at least two, take any one of them.) The second
will be any curve whose intersection with the line is only (s1; u1) and (s2; u2). This will give
a point outside lp, denoted by (s; u), such that
P (s; u) =
p1 + p2
2
.
Given that (s; u) =2 lp, it must be that s   Cu 6= lp. Hence we found two points of
the (s; u) plane such that they admit the same price, P (s; u) = P (s; u) = p1+p22 , but
g
 p1+p2
2

= s   Cu 6= s   Cu = g
 p1+p2
2

. This is clearly a contradiction.
Therefore, it must be that a price realization P (s; u) = p is equivalent to observing the
random variable ep  s   Cu, i.e. the p 7 ! lp mapping is a one-to-one mapping. If both s
and u are normally distributed, ep is normally distributed as well, and combining it with the
normally distributed prior leads to Gaussian conditional distributions. Hence, uninformed
agentsoptimization program is necessarily a CARA-normal setting, with optimal demand
xui (ep) = E [djep]  p
V ar [djep] ,
and the expectation and variance given by
E [djep] = dd+  epep
d +  ep and V ar [djep] =  d +  ep 1
for some  ep. Market clearing then becomes
w

d

d+
 s

s  d +  s

p

+ (1  w) dd+  epep   d +  ep p

 
d +  ep 1 = u,
therefore p is linear in s, u and ep. Using ep  s   Cu we obtain that p must be linear in
the state variables s and u. As we already showed that in the linear class there is a single
equilibrium price function, we can conclude that the well-known Grossman-Stiglitz unique
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linear equilibrium is actually the unique equilibrium of the economy when allowing for any
continuous price function:
Theorem 37 In the family of continuous equilibrium price functions, there exists a unique
REE of the model. The equilibrium price function is given in the linear form of
P (s; u) = Ad+B [s  Cu] ,
where the coe¢ cients A, B and C are those given in Theorem 35.
3.5 Non-continuous price functions
If the price function P does not have to be continuous but only measurable, then it is possible
to have several equilibrium price functions. In this section we will show the existence of such
price functions.
We construct a P that is non-continuous, and di¤erent from the Grossman-Stiglitz price
function on a zero-measure subset of the whole (s; u) plane. We start with a denition.
Denition 38 We say that a region R in the (s; u) plane is P -homogenous if P (s; u) is
constant. We also call region R p-homogenous, if P (s; u) = p for all (s; u) 2 R.
From the denition of the equilibrium it is clear that the P -homogenous regions uniquely
determine P . Moreover, let us denote the unique linear price function by P0; we have seen
that the P0-homogenous regions are exactly the lines with tangency 1=C.
Denition 39 We further say that P2 is a renement of P1 if every P2-homogenous region
is contained in a P1-homogenous region.
Note that Lemma 36 claims that every price function is a renement of P0.
To make a non-continuous valid price function, we will start from the unique linear equi-
librium, P0 and we will change it on some lines with tangency 1=C. The following observation
will be crucial:
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Claim 40 Suppose we take a renement of P0, P , such that each P -homogenous region is a
line or haline with tangency 1=C. Suppose that on a line l with tangency 1=C the unique
linear price took value p, and the two P -homogenous halines are separated by the point
t 2 l. Denote by p  (t) the price on the left side of t (i.e. the set of points on l that have
lower s-coordinate than t), and by p+ (t) the price on the right side of t. Then we have
p  (t) < p < p+ (t).
Proof. The proof follows from the fact that the random variable describing the set of
potential s values on the right half of the line rst-order stochastically dominates the variable
if s can be on the whole line, therefore any expected utility-maximizing uninformed agent
prefers it. It increases their demand, and hence, by market clearing, it must fetch a higher
price. A similar argument applies to the left side too.
We dene a sequence of functions fPig1i=0 such that we start from the unique linear equi-
librium P0, and after countably many steps we obtain a non-continuous valid price function.
In every step i we rene the previous function by splitting some Pi 1-homogenous lines into
two Pi-homogenous halines.
In the beginning we pick an arbitrary line with tangency 1=C, denote it by l. We split
it arbitrarily using Claim 40, obtaining two new price values, p  and p+, on this line. This
gives us P1. Notice that P1 is not a valid price function, because it takes the value p  on
two di¤erent lines with tangency 1=C: on (some part of) l and on lp  , which was the p -
homogenous line of P0 before. Similarly, P1 takes the value p+ on some part of l and on lp+ ,
which was the p+-homogenous line of P0 before. This would contradict Lemma 36, hence we
have to modify P1.
In the second step, we split lp  and lp+ into two halines, again using Claim 40. We
take care that the four new prices that we obtain correspond to four lines that we have not
modied yet. As we have only modied three lines so far, it is possible to nd appropriate
points for this splitting. This gives us P2. Figures 3-3, 3-4 and 3-5 show the rst two steps
of this construction. As before, P2 is not a valid price function, because there are some price
realizations that correspond to more than one line, contradicting Lemma 36. Thus in the
third step we modify these four lines, and so on.
After the rst n steps we have already modied 2n   1 lines. On 2n 1   1 of them, Pn is
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in line with Lemma 36, but on the other 2n 1 the price function Pn takes 2n values that are
used on 2n yet unchanged lines. Using Claim 40 we split these 2n lines into 2n+1 halines.
Computing the demand of uninformed investors and applying the market clearing condition
for all these halines can yield 2n+1 new prices. This gives us Pn+1, which is still not a valid
price function, and so on.
This algorithm gives a measurable price function that is continuous except for on count-
ably many lines. Notice that this function is also the same as the original unique linear
equilibrium except for a measure-zero set: the countable set of lines we have modied.
3.6 Conclusion
The standard method of conjecturing and then verifying a linear equilibrium price function
has become widely used in models of asymmetric information. While papers following this
technique show that the price function is unique in the linear class, they claim we do not
know anything outside the linear class. Hence it is important to study whether there exist
other equilibria of such a model, which are potentially both less tractable and less appealing
in their predictions.
In this chapter we explore this question. Our solution method is di¤erent from the usual
"conjecture and verify" approach, where the conjecture about a specic functional form of
price naturally imposes limitations on the proof. Our contribution complements the usual
techniques and leads to the conclusion that the unique linear equilibrium of the Grossman and
Stiglitz model is unique when allowing for any continuous price function. We also provide an
algorithm to create a (non-continuous) equilibrium price that is di¤erent from the Grossman-
Stiglitz price function.
In this chapter we restrict our attention to the assumptions of the original Grossman
and Stiglitz (1980) paper. There are some straightforward ways to generalize our results.
First, our result on the non-continuous price function is probably extendable to a price
function which is non-continuous on a positive measure set. Second, it would be interesting
to see whether we could provide similar statements about the equilibrium in the same setting
but with more general parameter distributions and utility functions. Third, an important
question is whether our result would stay in a modication of the model with incorporating
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imperfect competition, as in Kyle (1989). Finally, it would be interesting to study whether
other equilibria exist in certain settings of information aggregation in nancial markets, when
agents have di¤erential information, and all of them have something to learn from the price,
e.g. in Hellwig (1980) or Diamond and Verrecchia (1981). These problems are left for future
research.
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Figure 3-1: The set of (s; u) combinations that satisfy s  Cu = lp.
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Figure 3-2: The relationship of lp, (s; u) and (s; u).
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Figure 3-3: The unique continuous price function P0.
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On line lp it satises P0 = p, on line lp  it takes the value P0 = p , and on line lp+ it takes
the value P0 = p+.
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Figure 3-4: The construction of P1.
s
u
l
p
l
p+
l
p-
P1=p -
P1=p -
P1=p+
P1=p+
We take an arbitrary point on lp and split it into two halines. We compute uninformed
traderss demand if they know s is on the haline left to the splitting point, and plug it into
the market-clearing condition, which leads to the price p . We proceed similarly with the
haline right to the splitting point and obtain p+. Notice that it is not a valid price function
yet, as for example P1 = p+ on some part of lp and of course on the original lp+ (illustrated
by dashed lines), contradicting Lemma 36. Also, P1 = p  on some part of lp and of course on
the original lp  (illustrated by dotted lines). Therefore, in the next step we have to modify
the prices on lp+ and lp  .
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Figure 3-5: The construction of P2.
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We take one arbitrary point on lp+ and one on lp  , and split each to two halines. For all
four halines we compute the uninformed demands conditional on knowing that s is on the
appropriate haline, and then obtain the market clearing prices for them. In this process we
make sure none of the prices are p, p+ or p , otherwise we choose a di¤erent splitting. Notice
that now there is no problem with prices p+ and p , as they are fetched only if s is on a part
of lp. However, P2 is still not a valid price function, because there are four price levels, p++,
p+ , p +, and p  , that are achieved on both a haline and a line, contradicting Lemma 36
(illustrated by +, , 4 and , respectively). Hence, in the next step we must modify P2 on
the lines lp++ , lp+  , lp + , and lp   .
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